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THE CAMPAIGN 



OF 



SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



HERBERT H. SARGENT 

CAPTAIN SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY ; COLONEL FIFTH UNITED 

STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR; 

LIBUTENANT-COLONEL TWENTY-NINTH UNITED STATES 

VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING OPERATIONS 

IN THE PHILIPPINES ; 

MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS 

AUTHOR OF " NAPOLEON BONAPARTe's FIRST CAMPAIGN " 

AND "the campaign OF MARENGO " 



WITH MAPS 



IN THREE VOLUME 

Vol. I 




CHICAGO 

A. C. McCLURG & CO. 

1907 



kionAKY of CONGRESS 

I Two Cooles Recelve<J 
SEPH I90r 
j — . Cooyneht Bntry 

^ CLAfes 'A X)^c„ Ho. 

COPY a. ' 



E7I7 

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Copyright 

By Herbert H. Sargent 

1907 



Published September 7, 1907 
Entered at Stationers' Hall, London, England 



THK UNIVERSITY PRBSS, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. 



TO 

ELIHU ROOT 

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED IN ADMIRATION OF WHAT 

HE DID FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR 

LITTLE ARMY WHEN HE WAS 

SECRETARY OF WAR 



The recent Spanish-American War, while possessing, as every 
war does, characteristics of its own, nevertheless, in its broad 
analogies, falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity 
of teaching which pervades the art from its beginning unto this 
day. It has, moreover, the special value of illustrating the recip- 
rocal needs and offices of the army and navy, than which no lesson 
is more valuable to a nation situated as ours is. — Mahan. 

After a war one ought to write not only the history of what 
has taken place, but also the history of what was intended. — 
Von der Goltz. 

Fools say that you can only gain experience at your own 
expense, but I have always contrived to gain my experience at 
the expense of others. — Bismarck. 

War is a business of positions. — Napoleon. 



PREFACE 

THOUGH the War and State departments 
have kindly aided me in obtaining from the 
Spanish government valuable data (See Appen- 
dix A.) as to the number of the Spanish troops in 
Cuba and at Santiago during the campaign, this 
history is in no sense an official utterance of the 
United States government. It is simply an honest 
expression of my personal views. 

The seventh clause of the " Terms of the Military 
Convention of the Capitulation at Santiago de 
Cuba " allowed the commander of the Spanish 
forces, upon his departure for Spain, to take with 
him all military archives and records pertaining to 
the Spanish forces of eastern Cuba. This has made 
it very difficult for American writers to obtain accu- 
rate information as to the number of men in the 
Spanish army at Santiago, and especially as to the 
number in the companies of each organization. 
Without these records it has been possible to obtain 
only a few of the orders issued by the Spanish 
commanders. From the Spanish government's 
statement (See Appendix A.) I have been able to 
obtain accurate information as to the number and 
distribution of the Spanish soldiers in the theatre 



X PREFACE 

of operations; but not having had access to the 
military archives and records of the Spanish army 
of eastern Cuba, I have found it impossible to 
ascertain, except in few cases, the exact number of 
men in the companies of the various organizations 
at Santiago. But, after all, history at its best can 
never be more than an approximation to the truth. 
No history is accurate in all details; no historian 
can describe events precisely as they occurred. 
"It is," says Blume, "only possible partly to lift 
the veil which covers the records of war." 

My thanks are due to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. 
McClernand, First Cavalry, U. S. Army, and to 
Lieutenant Commander John M. EUicott, U. S. 
Navy, for criticisms of the text of this history 
before publication; and they are especially due to 
Charles P. Fountain, Professor of English at the 
Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, who 
has read critically the entire manuscript of this 
work. His constant encouragement during the 
three years I have been engaged in writing this 
history; his advice, suggestions, and criticisms; 
and his discussion of points in English construction 
have been exceedingly helpful and valuable. 



H. H. S. 



College Station, Texas 
January i, 1907 



CONTENTS 

Volume One 

CHAPTER I Page 

The Cuban Insurrection iS 

Comments 25 

CHAPTER II 

The Declaration of War 32 

Comments 34 

CHAPTER III 

The Theatres of Operations 35 

Comments 4° 

CHAPTER IV 

The Two Navies 44 

Comments 49 

CHAPTER V 

The Situation of the Naval Forces and the 

Outlook from a Strategical Point of View 60 
Comments 65 

CHAPTER VI 
The Resources, the Armies, and the Coast 

Defences 1^ 

Comments 94 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER VII Page 

The Situation of the Military Forces, the 
Plans of Campaign, and the Outlook from 
A Strategical Point of View no 

Comments 123 

CHAPTER VIII 

The Blockade of Havana and the Early Naval 

Operations 150 

Comments 173 

CHAPTER IX 

The Blockade of Santiago Harbour .... 209 
Comments 237 



MAPS 

Map Page 

1. Cuba 24, 156 

2. Atlantic Ocean 62 

3. West Indies 38 

4. Fortifications and Intrenchments of Havana 82 

5. Harbour of Santiago 224 

6. Port of Guantanamo 230 

7. Theatre of Operations 96 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 
SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

VOLUME ONE 



CHAPTER I 

THE CUBAN INSURRECTION ^ 

DURING the latter part of the nineteenth cen- 
tury there were two insurrections in Cuba 
against the Spanish government. The first began 
on October lO, 1868. On that date Carlos Cespedes, 
at the head of one hundred and forty Cubans, 
raised the standard of revolt in the province of 
Santiago and proclaimed a republic. Though 
this insurrection, through good leadership and the 
sympathy of the Cuban people, was prolonged for 
nearly ten years, its military history is insignifi- 
cant. The insurgents never had more than a few 
thousand men in the field at any one time, and 
their operations consisted merely of a series of 
guerilla combats, none of which produced any de- 
cisive effect. This insurrection, known as the Ten 
Years' War, was brought to an end by the con- 
ciliatory efforts of the commander-in-chief of the 

1 See Map 1. 



1 6 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Spanish forces in Cuba, General Martinez Campos, 
who succeeded in effecting, on February lo, 1878, 
a compromise with the insurgents. This compro- 
mise is known as the treaty of Zanjon. 

The second insurrection, which resulted in the 
freedom of Cuba, began on February 24, 1895. On 
that date, in the provinces of Matanzas and Santi- 
ago, several Cuban leaders with small bands of 
followers rose in revolt against Spanish authority. 
In the province of Matanzas the insurgents were 
speedily crushed or forced to surrender, but in 
the province of Santiago they were successful. 
They were soon joined by several thousand re- 
cruits; and, having obtained arms, they were able 
to begin a guerilla warfare against the Spanish 
troops. When it became known that the struggle 
for independence was being resumed in Cuba, sev- 
eral of the Cuban leaders, who had been promi- 
nent in the Ten Years' War and had sought safety 
in exile, at once returned to the island to aid 
the insurgents. Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, and 
Antonio Maceo were among the number. They 
became the new leaders. Jos6 Marti assumed the 
administration of governmental affairs, Maximo 
Gomez was made commander-in-chief, and Anto- 
nio Maceo received a high command in the army. 
A little later Calixto Garcia, another prominent 
Cuban patriot, who was also an exile of the Ten 
Years' War, returned and was appointed to com- 
mand the forces in Santiago Province. In a short 



THE CUBAN IiYSURRECTION 1/ 

time the seriousness of the situation became ap- 
parent even to the home government, and Captain- 
General Martinez Campos, who had been successful 
in pacifying the Cubans in the Ten Years' War, 
was sent to Cuba to put down the insurrection. 

General Campos tried to confine the insurrec- 
tion to the eastern end of the island by a cordon 
of soldiers stationed along the western border of 
the Santiago Province. He was, however, unsuc- 
cessful. Though he received within a few months 
reenforcements to the number of eighty thousand, 
which increased the total strength of his army to 
more than one hundred and forty thousand, and 
though the insurgents sustained a great loss in 
the death of Jos^ Marti, who was killed in one of 
the first fights, nevertheless, Generals Gomez and 
Maceo were able to break through the cordon and 
push westward with their forces. General Campos 
then fell back and attempted to stop the enemy by 
fortifying a line across the island from Jucaro on 
the south side to Moron on the north, a distance 
of about fifty miles. Although he stationed thou- 
sands of troops along the line, it was impossible to 
hold it against the enemy. With Httle difficulty 
Gomez and Maceo were able to cross it, and, as 
the Spanish troops were acting almost entirely on 
the defensive and making scarcely any effort to 
attack and follow the insurgents, the operations 
of the Cuban generals met with considerable suc- 
cess. By dividing their forces, which consisted of 

VOL. I.— 2 



1 8 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

about twenty-five thousand men, into small parties, 
they were able to intercept convoys, to ambush 
detachments, and to carry on a very destructive 
guerilla warfare. In short, the campaign con- 
ducted by General Campos was a failure. Ac- 
cordingly, at the beginning of the following year 
he was superseded by Captain-General Valeriano 
Weyler, who arrived in Havana on February lo, 
1896. 

Before describing the operations of General 
Weyler, it will not be out of place to note briefly 
the methods and policy pursued by the insurgents 
during the insurrection. Theirs was an essentially 
guerilla warfare. They did little real fighting and 
had little respect for the rules of war. Their opera- 
tions consisted mostly in burning sugar-cane, sugar- 
mills, and other property, in annoying and harassing 
the Spanish soldiers, and in making levies upon 
Spanish sympathizers and men of wealth. Their 
policy was to burn and destroy. Gomez himself 
issued the orders ; and in the name of liberty and 
independence the torch was applied, and the de- 
struction of property carried on with relentless 
bitterness.^ 

Upon General Weyler's arrival at Havana, it 
became evident that he intended to prosecute the 
war with vigour. He adopted strict disciplinary 
measures. By proclamations and in other ways 
he soon made it plain to the Cuban people that 
1 See Appendix E. 



THE CUBAN INSURRECTION I9 

the death penalty would be the punishment for 
such treasonable acts as furnishing aid, arms, or 
provisions to the enemy. Having received a large 
number of reenforcements, he immediately began 
operations against the insurgents. His plans, 
with few exceptions, were similar to those of his 
predecessor. He adopted the cordon system. By 
stringing out his troops, he attempted to occupy 
and hold lines entirely across the island. These 
lines were strengthened by field works, — trenches 
were dug, wire entanglements were placed in front 
of them, and blockhouses built at intervals. These 
fortified lines were known as trochas. By means 
of them General Weyler hoped to confine the in- 
surgents to the eastern part of the island. He 
attempted to move from west to east, building 
trochas as he advanced, in order to prevent the 
insurgents from invading the pacified provinces in 
his rear. Though on several occasions he took 
the offensive for a short time with a few thousand 
soldiers, his tactics were essentially defensive, — 
his main efforts being confined almost exclu- 
sively to the defence of the cities, towns, and 
trochas. 

The struggle at this time continued to be simply 
a series of confused guerilla combats. The opera- 
tions were destructive but not decisive. The insur- 
gents continued to roam about in detachments ; but 
they gained no decisive victory. General Weyler's 
forces numbered approximately one hundred and 



20 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

ninety-six thousand men,^ of whom about eight 
thousand were cavalry and about five thousand 
artillery, while the number of insurgents probably 
never at any one time exceeded twenty-five thou- 
sand.2 All these troops were greatly scattered. 
The Spanish cavalry especially was divided into 
many detachments and widely dispersed ^ through- 
out the several provinces of the island. 

This overwhelming superiority in numbers gave 
General Weyler a great advantage and brought 
him some success. During the Summer of 1896 
the forces of General Maceo were hemmed in in 

1 At the beginning of the Spanish-American War there were in 
Cuba 196,820 officers and men. See statement of Spanish govern- 
ment, Appendix A. Between the end of General Weyler's opera- 
tions and the outbreak of the Spanisli-American War there was 
but little if any change in the number of Spanish troops in the 
island. For further statements and discussion as to the number, 
see Appendix B. 

2 The total number of officers and men in the Cuban army at one 
time and another during the insurrection was 53,774. (See Ap- 
pendix D.) Not all of these soldiers, however, possessed fire 
arms, and only a small portion of them had continuous service. 
The Spanish War Department estimated the total number of 
armed insurgents at the beginning of the Spanish-American War 
at fifteen thousand, of whom five thousand were in the prov- 
ince of Santiago. (See Appendix A.) Though it is almost 
certain that at several times during the insurrection the number 
of insurgents exceeded these figures, yet I doubt very much 
whether there were at any one time more than twenty-five thou- 
sand actually on duty under arms. 

" There is no reason to believe," says " Harper's Weekly " in its 
issue of March 14, 1903, "that from February, 1895, up to the 
evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish troops, there were twenty-six 
thousand Cubans under arms, or anything like that number." 

8 See Appendix C. 



THE CUBAN INSURRECTION- 21 

the western part of the island, and in December 
of that year Maceo himself was killed in a chance 
encounter while attempting to cross a trocha with a 
few followers. In the following March his succes- 
sor in command of the insurgents in the western 
part of the island, General Rius Rivera, was cap- 
tured and deported. General Gomez, too, who 
had been successful in the first year of the war, 
was compelled to fall back and confine his opera- 
tions to a smaller area. And even in Santiago 
Province, where the outlook appeared most favour- 
able to the insurgents, General Garcia w^s unable 
to capture any of the fortified towns, or to defeat 
in battle any part of the Spanish forces. In fact, 
the hopelessness of the insurgent cause was daily 
becoming more evident. 

Meanwhile the situation in Cuba was growing 
desperate. The guerilla warfare, the burning 
of crops and buildings, the confiscation of stock, 
money, and provisions, had brought many people on 
the island to the verge of starvation. There was 
no security for property, and little opportunity for 
the Cuban labourer to earn his daily bread. Dis- 
content, suffering, disease, famine, and death were 
everywhere. Yet, notwithstanding the destructive 
policy inaugurated and relentlessly carried forward 
by the insurgents, the Cuban people were in full 
sympathy with them. The desire for independence 
and the hatred of the Spanish government were so 
firmly fixed in the hearts of these people that they 



22 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

were ready to endure almost any hardship rather 
than yield. 

The vigorous, severe, and retaliatory measures 
of Genera] Weyler greatly intensified the desperate- 
ness of the situation. When he found that all the 
rural population were in sympathy with the insur- 
gents and were giving them aid and comfort at 
every opportunity, he closed the country stores, 
and in this way prevented, throughout the rural 
districts, any accumulations of supplies for the 
insurgents. And finally, when he found the coun- 
try people acting as spies upon the Spaniards, 
aiding the insurgents in every way possible, and 
carrying them information of every Spanish move- 
ment, he issued his celebrated reconcentration 
order. By this order the country people through- 
out certain districts were required to leave their 
homes and concentrate in the fortified towns. As 
the majority of these people were poor and as no 
means of feeding them had been provided, this 
severe military measure caused much hardship and 
suffering, and greatly increased the deaths from 
starvation. 

Throughout this insurrection the friction between 
the United States and Spain continually increased. 
The American people, who had not forgotten that 
the independence of their own country had been 
gained through revolution, sympathized strongly 
with the Cuban people and felt that . a helpful 
hand should be extended to them. Though the 



THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 2.3 

government of the United States endeavoured to 
maintain, even at great expense to itself, a strict neu- 
trality in regard to Cuban affairs, yet so great was 
the activity of Cuban agents and sympathizers in 
the United States that the Spanish people found it 
impossible to resist the belief that the American 
government was secretly giving aid and comfort 
to the insurgents. On the other hand, the United 
States was greatly irritated at the treatment re- 
ceived by a number of American citizens in the 
island. Notwithstanding the well-known fact that 
American citizenship had been acquired by many 
Cubans with the deliberate purpose of invoking its 
protection in case of a conflict with Spain, the 
United States felt bound to intercede in behalf of 
her citizens and to defend them in their rights. 
These acts and many others, which were often 
misunderstood through exaggeration and misrep- 
resentation, continued to be a fruitful source of 
trouble between the two powers. 

Meanwhile, the cost of the war to Spain, in men 
and money, already enormous, was rapidly growing 
larger. Though reenforcements numbering 2 1 7,282 
men ^ had been sent into the island during this 
insurrection, the Cuban leaders were so hopeful 
that the United States would help them, and the 
Cuban people themselves so determined not to 
yield even in the face of starvation and death, that 
there seemed to be little prospect of peace. 

1 See Appendix G. 



24 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Thus matters went from bad to worse until, 
finally, in the latter part of General Weyler's ad- 
ministration, the conditions in the island became 
so dreadful that the United States government 
itself determined to intervene. Accordingly, it 
demanded of Spain the revocation of the recon- 
centration edict and the recall of General Weyler. 
The result was that early in October, 1897, the 
Spanish Cabinet decided upon a change of poHcy 
in Cuban affairs. They offered Cuba a new consti- 
tution, which gave the inhabitants a local parlia- 
ment and a fairly liberal measure of autonomy. 
They also recalled Captain-General Weyler, and 
appointed Captain-General Ramdn Blanco his 
successor. 

The new captain-general, upon his arrival at 
Havana, began to carry out the Spanish Cabinet's 
new policy. He at once revoked General Weyler's 
reconcentration order and offered amnesty to all 
political offenders. But these conciliatory meas- 
ures came too late. The Cubans no longer had 
faith in the promises of Spain. The offer of au- 
tonomy was spurned. There was now no possibil- 
ity of a compromise. The time for conciliation 
and compromise had passed. Independence alone 
would now satisfy the Cuban people. 

Such, in brief, was the situation when, on the 
night of February 15, 1898, the blowing up of the 
United States battleship Maine in Havana Harbour 
suddenly brought matters to a crisis. This act 




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THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 25 

meant war between the United States and Spain. 
It meant the destruction of Spanish power in the 
West India Islands. It meant, for the Cuban peo- 
ple, the dawn of a new era and the realization of 
hopes long deferred. 



COMMENTS 

Before describing more fully the general situa- 
tion, it is the purpose here to note briefly the 
distinguishing peculiarities of the struggle between 
Spain and the insurgents prior to the Spanish- 
American War, and to point out the principal 
reasons why the results were not more decisive. 

It seems remarkable that war should have 
continued on the island for three years with such 
unsatisfactory results. It would seem that on an 
island shaped like Cuba, whose average width is 
only eighty miles, and whose total area is consid- 
erably less than that of the State of Illinois, a 
Spanish army, numbering from one hundred and 
forty to one hundred and ninety-six thousand men, 
should have made short work of an army of twenty- 
five thousand insurgents. It would seem that this 
Spanish army, within a year at most, should have 
destroyed the armed insurgents or have driven 
them into the sea. Why was this not done? A 
brief discussion of the methods of warfare em- 
ployed by the Spaniards will, it is believed, give 
us a clear and satisfactory answer to this question. 



26 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

First : The cordon system of making war which 
was adopted by the Spaniards was faulty. The 
Spanish army was greatly weakened in strength 
and fighting power by being scattered, and by 
attempting to occupy and hold a line entirely 
across the island. With a little skill it was easy 
for the enemy to mass his forces at some point of 
the line and break through it before reenforce- 
ments could arrive. The fact that the line was 
nearly always fortified did not in any way remedy 
the faults of the system. Indeed, the stronger 
the line the less likely were the troops to leave it 
in order to unite for offensive warfare against the 
enemy. This system not only resulted in scatter- 
ing the Spanish troops, but it kept them scattered. 
After a trocJia was built at great expense, it was 
deemed necessary, of course, to occupy it and be 
ready to defend its entire length, even though it 
might never be attacked. 

This system is directly opposed to the true sys- 
tem — that of concentration. To concentrate your 
forces and be stronger than your enemy at the 
vital point; to act offensively and in force against 
him; to outnumber him upon the battlefield; to 
manoeuvre so as to make him fight at a disadvan- 
tage, these principles constitute the true system — 
the system that brings results whatever may be the 
character of your adversary. 

Secondly: The Spaniards followed the defensive 
method of warfare. Having built their trochas^ 



THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 2/ 

they occupied them and awaited developments. 
Instead of hunting up the enemy and pursuing 
him vigorously as they should have done, they 
waited for him to attack them. They were too 
indolent to take the offensive, and too well satis- 
fied with their own methods to appreciate the fact 
that only by aggressive and energetic warfare can 
insurrections be crushed. 

They should have taken the field against the 
insurgents ; sought for them everywhere ; followed 
them when found ; attacked, routed, annihilated, or 
driven them into the sea. This plan could easily 
have been followed during the dry season from Oc- 
tober to June; and it is safe to say that with their 
superiority in numbers and their well-known cour- 
age, the Spaniards should have crushed out the 
insurrection in less than a year. 

The cordon system of the Spaniards, combined 
with their defensive tactics, gave to the insurgents 
many advantages. Though the latter were never 
able, because of military inefficiency and lack of 
organization, to take full advantage of their adver- 
sary's faulty method, yet it continually offered 
them opportunities for accomplishing great results. 
Had they been able to profit by it, they might 
have massed overwhelming numbers at a weak 
point of the Spanish line, and by attacking and 
crushing the enemy there, they might have divided 
his forces and defeated, subsequently, the frac- 
tional parts in detail. In short, this method of 



28 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

warfare permitted the insurgents to choose their 
own battlefield, and to bring thereon superior num- 
bers whenever they so desired. " Bonaparte's art 
of war — namely, of concentrating forces on the 
point of attack," says Emerson, " must always be 
theirs who have the choice of the battlefield." 

Thirdly : The cavalry force of the Spaniards was 
too small. The oppressive heat and unhealthful 
climate of the island made active campaigning there 
very debilitating for dismounted troops. Mounted 
troops would have been much more suitable for 
aggressive warfare. Cavalry was needed to scout 
the country thoroughly, to hunt out the insurgents 
from their hiding-places, and to attack and crush 
them when found. There never was a time during 
the insurrection when the insurgents, with their 
lack of organization, poor discipline, and disincli- 
nation to concentrate and fight, could have pre- 
vented a single brigade ^ of United States cavalry 
from marching victoriously anywhere on the island. 
Such being the case, it is plain that if Spain had 
possessed twenty or twenty-five good cavalry regi- 
ments in Cuba, and had energetically taken the 
offensive and overrun the rebellious parts of the 
island, she could hardly have failed to conquer. 
Undoubtedly such tactics would not only have 
resulted in the speedy destruction of the armed 
insurgents, but would have produced upon the 
Cuban people the greatest moral effect. 

^ A brigade consists of tliree regiments numbering approxi- 
mately three thousand men. 



THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 29 

It will perhaps not be amiss to point out the 
fact that in thus dividing forces in order to wage 
war against the divided and scattered parts of the 
enemy's army there is no violation of the princi- 
ple of concentration so long as each fraction of 
the attacking army is sufficiently strong to meet 
and overcome any opposition of the enemy. Or, 
to state the matter more in detail : if the enemy 
abandons the regular methods of making war and 
divides his army into detachments for the purpose 
of waging guerilla warfare, it is allowable, indeed, 
it may often become necessary for a commander 
who has superior forces and is waging offensive 
warfare to divide and scatter his own forces in 
order to attack and crush separately the enemy's 
scattered detachments; but in so doing he should 
ever bear in mind that good strategy requires that 
each fraction of the attacking force should be 
stronger than that of the enemy at the point of 
attack; and, furthermore, that the enemy should 
not be permitted to concentrate his forces in suc- 
cession against the fractional parts of the attacking 
army. 

From the foregoing comments there may be 
obtained a fairly clear idea of what the military 
policy of Spain should have been in Cuba. It is 
not the purpose in this discussion to point out the 
general policy which Spain should have followed 
in her treatment of the Cuban people. That, 
indeed, is largely a moral question, involving the 



30 THE CAMPAIGN- OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

government of colonies and the rights of man, 
with which, however interesting, we are not now 
concerned. But the purely military question, how 
in the shortest time and with the least expense 
Spain could have crushed out the armed resistance 
in the island, does concern us. 

The Spanish army of one hundred and ninety- 
six thousand men in Cuba was too large. An army 
of sixty thousand, organized with the proper pro- 
portion of mounted troops, would have been much 
more efifective. The Spanish government seemed 
to think that in order to gain victories in Cuba 
it was necessary to overrun the island with foot 
soldiers. So many troops were sent there that 
they were actually in one another's way ; and the 
difficulty of supplying them with arms, food, cloth- 
ing, and medicine increased, of course, in propor- 
tion to their numbers. Suppose Spain had taken 
the money spent upon the subsistence, equipment, 
and transportation of the 217,282 men sent to 
Cuba during the insurrection, and had spent it 
economically and judiciously, or as much of it 
as was needed, upon an army of sixty thousand 
soldiers, composed of thirty thousand infantry, 
twenty-five thousand cavalry, and five thousand 
artillery ; suppose that Spain had given this army 
better food, better hospital service, more transpor- 
tation, better forage for the animals, all the ammu- 
nition needed for target practice, thorough drill in 
target shooting; suppose, in short, that she had 



THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 3 I 

spared no pains and no expense to make this army 
as nearly perfect as possible, and had then inaugu- 
rated a vigorous and aggressive campaign against 
the insurgents, — who can doubt what the result 
would have been? Such an army would have 
been much better able to stand the hardships of a 
tropical climate. Such an army would have out- 
numbered the insurgents nearly three to one, and 
would have possessed sufficient cavalry to overrun 
the island and crush out the enemy while the in- 
fantry and artillery held the towns and cities and 
gave protection to the loyal people. Spain wasted 
her means in transporting more men to and from 
Cuba than were necessary. She wasted her means 
in arming and equipping more dismounted troops 
than she had any need of. She wasted her means 
in building trochas and in defending them when 
their defence did little or nothing towards de- 
feating the insurgents. She failed, because she 
did not grasp the situation; because she adopted 
a faulty system of making war; because she did 
not appreciate the fact that insurrections can be 
crushed only by aggressive and energetic warfare ; 
and because she did not have, among the captain- 
generals who commanded her troops in Cuba, a 
single one who showed any generalship worthy of 
the name. 



CHAPTER II 

THE DECLARATION OF WAR 

THE blowing up of the battleship Maine was 
not immediately followed by a declaration 
of war. Time was taken for an investigation of the 
disaster, and for preparation for the impending 
struggle ; but the delay only added to the feeling 
of bitterness between the two peoples. It was the 
lull before the storm — the pause of silent wrath 
preceding the clash of arms. The American peo- 
ple and their representatives in Congress beheved 
that Spanish officials were responsible for the de- 
struction of the Maine, and they were determined 
that Spain should atone for the act, and that her 
rule in Cuba should end. Accordingly, on April 
19, 1898, the Senate and House of Representa- 
tives of the United States passed the following 
resolutions : 

" Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed 
for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near 
our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the 
people of the United States, have been a disgrace to 
Christian civilization, culminating as they have in the 
destruction of a United States battleship, with two hun- 
dred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a. 



THE DECLARATION OF WAR 



33 



friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot 
longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President 
of the United States in his message to Congress of April 
eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which 
action of Congress was invited : Therefore, 

" Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

" First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, 
and of right ought to be, free and independent. 

" Second. That it is the duty of the United States to 
demand, and the Government of the United States does 
hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once 
relinquish its authority and government in the island of 
Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
and Cuban waters. 

" Third. That the President of the United States be, 
and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the en- 
tire land and naval forces of the United States, and to 
call into the actual service of the United States the militia 
of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary 
to carry these resolutions into effect. 

" Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims 
any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, juris- 
diction, or control over said island except for the pacifi- 
cation thereof, and asserts its determination, when that 
is accomplished, to leave the Government and control of 
the island to its people. " 

These resolutions, approved by the President on 
April 20, were equivalent to a declaration of war. 
Almost immediately Spain severed diplomatic re- 
lations with the United States, and on April 24 

VOL. I. — 3 



34 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

made a formal declaration of war. On April 25 
the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States passed an act declaring that war 
existed, and had existed between the United States 
and the kingdom of Spain since April 21, 1898. 



COMMENTS 

To begin hostilities prior to a formal declaration 
of war has not been an unusual occurrence since 
the middle of the eighteenth century. The reason 
for this departure from the custom of making dec- 
larations of war has grown out of the greater facili- 
ties with which in modern times information can be 
disseminated. Nations now have ambassadors at 
the capitals of civilized countries who are gener- 
ally accurately informed as to the probabilities of 
war and can forewarn their countrymen. For the 
most part, too, war now comes at the end of a long 
series of negotiations. Hence formal declarations 
prior to the beginning of hostilities are at the pres- 
ent time seldom necessary. Moreover, under a 
government like that of the United States, in which 
an Act of Congress is necessary to create a state 
of war, a formal declaration is needless ; for dis- 
cussions leading to the passage of legislative acts 
creating war enable all powers concerned to keep 
themselves accurately informed as to the probable 
outcome. 



CHAPTER III 



THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 



THE islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and their 
adjacent waters were the principal theatres 
of operations during the Spanish-American War; 
but the operations of the Santiago campaign, which 
will be described in this history, were in large meas- 
ure confined exclusively to Cuba and its waters. 
Cuba is the largest of the West India Islands. 
It lies southeast of the United States, at the outlet 
of the Gulf of Mexico. It is long and narrow, 
having the shape of an immense lizard, with the 
convex side of its curved tail towards the north. Its 
greatest length is seven hundred and sixty miles, 
its greatest breadth one hundred and thirty-five 
miles, and its average breadth eighty miles. It has 
a number of good harbours, the chief of which are 
Bahia-Honda, Mariel, Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, 
Nucvitas, Nipe, and Baracoa on the north coast; 
and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, 
and Cienfuegos on the south coast. The principal 
cities lie on or near these harbours. They are Ha- 
vana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Puerto Principe, Holguin, 

1 See Maps i and 3. 



36 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Baracoa, Guantanamo, Santiago, Manzanillo, and 
Cienfuegos. The railroad mileage of the island is 
not extensive. At the outbreak of the war the prin- 
cipal railroads were two short lines extending out ot 
Santiago, and the lines connecting Havana, Matan- 
zas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north 
coast with Cienfuegos on the south coast. Through 
nearly the entire length of the island there extends 
an irregular ridge of mountains and hills. This 
ridge in some parts of the island is hardly notice- 
able ; in others its highest points rise several thou- 
sand feet above sea level. In the southeastern 
part, near Santiago, is the Cobre range of moun- 
tains, the highest in the island, one peak of which 
reaches an elevation of seventy-six hundred and 
seventy feet. The climate of Cuba, except in the 
higher altitudes, is tropical. The average annual 
rainfall is 51.7 inches, of which nearly two-thirds is 
precipitated during the rainy season, which begins 
with June and ends with October. 

Porto Rico, the fourth in size of the West India 
Islands, lies five hundred miles east and a hundred 
miles south of Cuba, and on the east side of Hayti, 
which occupies the greater part of the intervening 
space between Cuba and Porto Rico. Its shape is 
that of an irregular parallelogram one hundred and 
eight miles long and thirty-seven miles wide. Its 
principal harbour, San Juan, one of the best in the 
West Indies, is a large bay on the north coast shut 
in from the Atlantic by a long narrow island, which 



THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 37 

at its eastern end is separated from the mainland 
by only a little surf-covered inlet. The city of San 
Juan, containing about thirty thousand inhabitants, 
is situated at the western end of this island. This 
city faces inward towards the bay, and is sheltered 
from the ocean by a ridge about sixty feet high, 
which rises abruptly along the shore behind the 
city. The defences of the ridge were two batteries 
and an old fortification extending along the crest. 
On the westernmost point of the ridge overlooking 
and commanding the entrance of the harbour is 
an antiquated stone fortress known as Morro Castle. 
Across the mouth of the harbour, on a sand bar 
near the point of land opposite the castle, is Fort 
Canuelo, and directly in front of the mouth is 
Cabras Island. 

San Juan, Porto Rico, was the nearest Spanish 
port to Spain in western waters. It is 2354 ^ miles 
from the Cape Verde Islands, 984 miles from 
Havana, 960 from Key West, 1187 from Tampa, 
Florida, and 1245 from Hampton Roads, Virginia. 

The prevalence of yellow fever and pernicious 
malarial fever has made campaigning very dan- 
gerous in the West Indies. In 1741 an English 
expedition was formed in Jamaica to attempt the 
capture of Santiago de Cuba. It consisted of a 
fleet of eight ships-of-the-line, twelve frigates, and 
about forty transports. The fleet was commanded 

1 In this work all distances across water are expressed in nauti- 
cal miles, and all distances across land in statute miles. 



38 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

by Vice- Admiral Vernon, ^ and the army aboard 
the transports, numbering thirty-four hundred 
men, was under the command of General Thomas 
Wentworth. 

As the entrance to Santiago Bay was closed by 
a boom, a direct attack upon the city of Santiago 
was deemed impracticable. Accordingly, Guan- 
tanamo Bay ,2 forty miles east of Santiago, was se- 
lected as a base of operations for prosecuting the 
campaign. The plan was for a part of the fleet, 
stationed at the entrance of Guantanamo Bay, to 
cover and protect the transports anchored within ; 
a second part to take position off Santiago Harbour 
and blockade that port ; and a third, consisting of 
the fastest vessels, to go to Havana to watch the 
Spanish fleet there, while the land forces marched 
overland and attacked the city of Santiago. As 
Santiago was but four days' march from Guanta- 
namo Bay and known to be almost defenceless 
on the land side, this plan seemed to offer good 
chances of success. 

About the middle of July General Wentworth 
disembarked his forces and began active opera- 
tions. But as he advanced towards Santiago, he 
committed the mistake of exhausting the energies 

1 With this land force were some American troops. One of the 
Washingtons accompanied the expedition, and Mount Vernon 
owes its name to the naval commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral 
Vernon. 

2 At that time Guantanamo Bay was known as " Walthenani 
Harbour" and was renamed by Vernon " Cumberland Harbour." 




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THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 39 

of his soldiers in making and repairing roads. The 
delay was fatal to the success of the undertaking. 
In about three weeks such a large number of the 
English troops became suddenly ill that the for- 
ward movement had to be stopped within sixteen 
miles of Santiago, though practically no opposition 
was offered by the Spaniards. For several months 
this illness prevented any further effort to capture 
the city; and in the latter part of November the 
English army, after losing about fifty per cent of 
its original strength, returned to the landing and 
was reembarked on the transports. 

In 1762 an English expedition, consisting of a 
fleet of forty war vessels and one hundred and fifty- 
six storeships and transports, commanded by Sir 
George Pollock, and an army of 14,041 soldiers, 
commanded by Lord Albemarle, was sent to take 
Havana. The expedition arrived off Havana June 
6, and on the following day the army was landed. 
Operations were at once begun against the city. 
The Spanish fleet, which was in the harbour, con- 
sisted of about forty war vessels, and the Spanish 
military forces numbered 27,610 men. The defence 
was exceedingly obstinate ; butowing to perfect har- 
mony of action between the British fleet and army, 
good progress was made. On July 30 Morro Castle 
was taken; and on August 13 the capitulation of 
the city and the surrender of the Spanish fleet were 
agreed upon and duly signed. Though the con- 
quest was a valuable one, it was attended by great 



40 



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



loss of life. On July 3 no less than five thousand 
soldiers, or more than one-third the entire army, 
were sick with fever; and at the end of the cam- 
paign 2754 soldiers had died, of which number 
less than four hundred had been killed or had 
died of wounds. 

Out of an army of thirty-two thousand soldiers 
sent to San Domingo by Napoleon at different 
times during the year 1802, " fifteen thousand 
men at least," says Thiers, " perished in two 
months." Yellow fever was the main, but not 
the sole, cause of this frightful mortality. Though 
great care was given to the sanitary condition of 
the camps, death swepjt away the soldiers with 
awful rapidity; even those who survived the dis- 
eases were for months afterwards so reduced in 
strength that they were utterly unfit for military 
duty. 

COMMENTS 

In a war between the United States and Spain it 
was evident that the islands of Cuba and Porto 
Rico and their adjacent waters, on account of their 
proximity to the United States and their occupa- 
tion by the military and naval forces of Spain, 
would become the principal theatres of operations. 
Inasmuch, however, as the overthrow of Spanish 
rule in Cuba was the main issue, and as it was the 
larger and wealthier of the two islands, and nearer 



THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 4 1 

the United States, it followed that this island and 
its contiguous waters would most probably be the 
scene of the chief military and naval operations of 
the war. 

The fact, too, that the Cuban people were 
engaged in insurrection against the Spanish gov- 
ernment, made it easier for the United States 
to make a landing and gain a foothold in Cuba. 
But no considerable part of the United States 
army could be transported to the island with 
safety until the United States navy should ob- 
tain, at least for a time, command of the sea in 
Cuban waters. As both belligerents had respect- 
able navies, not very unequal in fighting power, 
as will appear later, it seemed most probable that 
each navy would strive early in the struggle to 
cripple, defeat, or destroy the other. 

It was evident, then, that the part which the 
land forces of the United States would take in the 
fight for the island would depend in great measure 
upon the outcome of the naval struggle. If Spain 
should be victorious, she would undoubtedly as- 
sert herself in Cuban waters and prevent American 
troops from landing on the island. If, on the other 
hand, the United States should be victorious, she 
could despatch her troops to the island for the 
purpose of entering upon a campaign against the 
Spanish troops there. 

The most important strategical point of the 
island was Havana, the capital city. This city, 



42 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

situated on a fortified harbour, connected by rail 
with Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on 
the north coast, and with Cienfuegos on the south 
coast, was the chief seat of Spanish power in the 
West Indies. The presence of large numbers of 
Spanish troops at or near the capital indicated its 
importance, and its railroad connections added 
greatly to its strength. In order to cut off the 
commerce of the city it would be necessary to 
blockade not only Havana Harbour, but likewise 
the other points connected with it by rail. This 
would necessitate the division of the blockading 
forces into two fleets, — one to close the ports of 
Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande 
on the north coast, and the other to close the 
port of Cienfuegos on the south coast. 

The knowledge derived from the histories of 
wars in the West Indies could not fail to be of 
inestimable value to any one responsible for the 
conduct of a campaign in Cuba. No matter what 
precautions were taken, it was plain that invad- 
ing armies could not long keep their health in the 
island. As a rule, when an army landed, not much 
sickness developed before the end of the third or 
fourth week; then suddenly probably a quarter 
of the command would become ill and continue 
ill for several weeks, with new cases arising daily, 
until practically every soldier of the command had 
passed through a serious spell of sickness. Mala- 
rial fever, dysentery, and yellow fever were the 



THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 43 

prevailing diseases; and at times, especially when 
the sanitary condition of the troops was bad, the 
mortaHty was appalling. When not fatal, so en- 
ervating were these tropical diseases that their 
victims would lose all ambition and energy ; and 
upon convalescence many would be left in such a 
weak and emaciated condition that they were no 
longer fit to bear the hardships of an active cam- 
paign. In truth, it may be said without any dis- 
paragement of the well-known fighting qualities of 
the Spanish soldiers, that these diseases were more 
to be feared than the enemy's bullets. 

Past experiences all indicated that the most 
favourable time for making war in Cuba was from 
October to June. A campaign begun in October, 
if prosecuted with vigour, might be decided before 
the arrival of the summer months, or might con- 
tinue for nineteen months without passing through 
more than one rainy season. It was plain, too, 
that if it became necessary to begin military opera- 
tions in Cuba during the rainy season, the decisive 
effort should be made before the fevers had weak- 
ened the fighting forces and destroyed the chances 
of victory. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE TWO NAVIES 

AT the outset of the war it was evident that a 
large part of the fighting would take place 
on the sea, and that the result would depend in 
a great measure upon the relative naval strength 
of the two contending powers. A comparison of 
the two navies will therefore be instructive. A 
fairly correct estimate of their relative strength 
may be obtained by considering separately the 
different kinds of war vessels: first, the battle- 
ships and armoured cruisers; secondly, the moni- 
tors ; thirdly, the protected cruisers ; fourthly, the 
torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. 

Modern armoured men-of-war comprise battle- 
ships and armoured cruisers. They are the fighters 
— the ships that bear the brunt of battle. Of these 
each power had seven. Those of the United States 
were the battleships loiva, Indiana, Massachusetts, 
and Oregon ; the armoured cruisers, Nciv York and 
Brooklyn; and the second-class battleship Texas. 
Those of Spain were the battleship Pelayo, and 
the armoured cruisers, Eviperador Carlos V, Almi- 
rante Oquendo, Infanta Maria Teresa, Princesa de 
Asturias, Vizcaya, and Cristobal Colon. 



THE TWO NAVIES 



45 



The following tables give the displacement, the 
speed per hour, and the principal armament^ of 
each vessel. 

UNITED STATES 



Battleships. 


Name of vessel. 


Displace- 
ment (tons). 


Speed 2 
(knots). 


Armament 
(guns). 


Iowa 

Indiana 

Massachusetts . . . 
Oregon 


11,340 
10,2SS 
10,2SS 
10,288 


16.5 
15.5 
16.0 
16.5 


18 
16 
16 
16 


Armoured Cruisers. 


Brooklyn .... 
New York .... 


9,215 
8,200 


21 

21 


20 
18 


Battleship, Second Class. 


Texas 


6,315 


17 


8 



1 In the tables the guns of the main batteries only are given ; 
the smaller guns, under three inches in calibre, are omitted. 

- The speeds of the vessels are taken from Clowe's Naval 
Pocket Book of 1898. It says: "The speeds given are in most 
cases trial speeds, or, in the case of vessels not yet tried, estimated 
speeds. They are not, with very few exceptions, speeds which 
can be obtained under service conditions ; and, as a rule, they may 
be thus discounted : Extreme service speed about seven-eighths of 
the speed indicated (and even this cannot generally be maintained 
for many hours) ; extreme speed for a continuance, without risk 



46 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 
SPAIN 



Battleship. 


Name of vessel. 


Displace- 
ment (tons). 


Speed 
(knots). 


Armament 
(guns). 


Pelayo 


9,900 


16 


13 


Armoured Cruisers. 


Emperador Carlos V 
Almirante Oquendo 
Infanta Maria Teresa 
Princesa de Asturias 
Vizcava 




9,090 
7,000 
7,000 
7,000 
7,000 
6,840 


20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 


14 
12 
12 
12 
12 
14 


Cristobal Colon . 



It should be noted that the armoured cruiser 
Princesa de Asturias took no part in the war ; in 
April she had not received even her boilers and 
engines, nor had the battleship Pelayo and the 
armoured cruisers, Emperador Carlos V and Cris- 

to boilers or engines, about four-fifths of the speed indicated. 
Thus, the average so-called 2i-knot ship may be regarded as 
good, provided that she be moderately clean, for a spurt, without 
serious risk of breaking down, at about 18.4 knots ; and for a con- 
tinuous chase, lasting several days, at about 16.S knots. There 
are, of course, exceptions, particularly among new vessels, and 
vessels not fitted for forced draught; but the actually attainable 
speeds are more often than not rather under than over the 
proportions designated." 



THE TWO NAVIES 



47 



tobal Colon, received their entire armament at the 
outbreak of hostilities. 

The monitors are light-draft turret vessels of 
low speed and scarcely any freeboard, with thick 
armour and large guns, and are designed for har- 
bour and coast defence. Of this class the United 
States had six; Spain had none. 



UNITED STATES 



Monitors. 


Name of vessel. 


Displace- 
ment (tons). 


Speed 
(knots). 


Armament 
(guns). 


Puritan 


6,060 


10 


10 


Monterey .... 


4,0S4 


12.5 


4 


Miantonomoh . . . 


3,990 


10 


4 


Amphitrite .... 


3,990 


10 


6 


Monadnock .... 


3,990 


12.5 


6 


Terror 


3,990 


10 


4 



The Monterey and Monadnock took no part in 
the Santiago campaign. At the beginning of 
hostilities they were stationed on the Pacific 
coast, and shortly afterwards were sent to the 
Philippines. 

The protected cruisers are the scouts, the eyes 
and ears of the navy. Of this class the United 
States had fourteen; Spain had only five that 
could be classed with them. 



48 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUhA 



UNITED STATES 



Protected Cruisers. 


Name of vessel. 


Displace- 
ment (tons) 


Speed 
(knots). 


Armament 
(guns). 


Columbia .... 


7,375 


23 


11 


Minneapolis 
Olympia . . 
Chicago . . 
Baltimore 








7,375 
5,S70 
4,500 
4,413 


23 

21 

■IS 

20 


11 

14 
18 
10 


Philadelphia 
San Francisco 








4,324 
4,09S 


19 
19 


12 

12 


Newark . . 








4,098 


19 


12 


Charleston . 








3,730 


IS 


S 


New Orleans 








3,600 


20 


10 


Cincinnati . 








3,213 


19 


11 


Raleigh . . 
Atlanta . . 








3,213 
3,000 


19 
15 


11 
8 


Boston . . 








3,000 


15 


S 



SPAIN 



Proi 


ECTED Cruisers. 




Name of vessel. 


Displace- 
ment (tons). 


Speed 
(knots). 


Armament 
(guns). 


Alfonso XIII . . . 


5,000 


20 


11 


Lepanto 


5,000 


20 


11 


Reina Cristina . . 


3,090 


17 


6 


Reina Mercedes . . 


3,090 


17 


6 


Alfonso XII . . . 


3,090 


17 


6 



THE TWO NAVIES 49 

In the United States navy there were fifteen 
torpedo boats ; in the Spanish navy there were 
nineteen torpedo boats, ten torpedo gunboats, and 
six torpedo-boat destroyers. 

Besides the warships and torpedo craft already 
enumerated, there were in the United States navy 
fifteen small cruisers, one large wooden cruiser, one 
despatch boat, thirteen single turreted monitors, 
sixteen gunboats, one harbour defence ram, and 
one dynamite gun vessel ; and in the Spanish navy, 
two old armoured iron cruisers, two large wooden 
cruisers, eleven small cruisers, two despatch boats, 
six gun vessels, and twenty-three gunboats. Each 
belligerent also owned, chartered, or controlled a 
number of auxiliary cruisers, and numerous yachts, 
tugs, colliers, transports, and supply ships. 

At the beginning of the war the personnel of 
the United States navy, including nearly four thou- 
sand naval militia that had been organized in the 
seaboard and lake States, numbered about nine- 
teen thousand five hundred officers and men ; 
and that of the Spanish navy about twenty-five 
thousand. But the American sailors, though out- 
numbered by those of Spain, were more thor- 
oughly drilled in target practice and squadron 
mancEuvres. 

COMMENTS 

Before commenting upon the relative strength 
of the American and Spanish navies, it will not be 

VOL. I. — 4 



50 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

out of place to point out a few principles applicable 
to naval warfare. 

All results in war are produced by the application 
of force ; and the indispensable requisite for suc- 
cess is to be superior to the enemy at the point of 
contact in numbers, weapons, or position. The 
purpose of the science of war is to effect this 
superiority, which can be obtained only by con- 
centration of forces. To concentrate one's forces 
and thus be superior to the enemy on the battle- 
field is the correct system on land or sea for win- 
ning victories. This principle, confined to no 
element, limited to no time, applicable everywhere 
and forev^er, is the foundation of all successful mili- 
tary operations. 

If the war vessels of a navy were each to act 
independently, the enemy's fleet would be able 
to defeat and destroy separately each vessel en- 
countered. Inasmuch, therefore, as good strategy 
always requires that the attacking force shall be 
stronger than the enemy on the battlefield, it has 
come to be the rule for the more powerful warships 
to manoeuvre and fight in fleets. The less power- 
ful generally act as scouts, singly or in pairs, or 
as commerce destroyers, or as auxiliaries to the 
main fleets. But though they are sometimes com- 
bined into a fleet to meet an opposing fleet com- 
posed practically of the same kind of vessels, yet 
they seldom play a determining part in a maritime 
war; the real power is centred in the fleets of 



THE TWO NAVIES 



51 



armoured warships that are built for defensive 
as well as offensive action. The object is so to 
combine and manoeuvre these as to be stronger 
than the enemy when the battle hour arrives. 
This superior strength may consist in better arma- 
ments, as, for instance, in larger or better guns, or 
in heavier vessels and thicker armour, or in greater 
numbers. 

The strength of a modern warship is in her guns, 
armour protection, and motive power. By means 
of her motive power she carries her guns to any 
part of the world. The motive power of a warship 
in the present age is self-contained ; it resides in 
the fuel on board, which acts through the boilers 
and engines. This self-sustaining capacity of a 
warship to produce motion may be termed her 
endurance. It means the capacity of the ship for 
maintaining her motion by means of the fuel sup- 
plies carried or furnished. The coal endurance of 
a ship, as ordinarily understood, means her steam- 
ing radius, — the number of miles she would steam 
without recoaling. For different warships the coal 
endurance varies with the type, size, and indi- 
vidual peculiarities of each vessel; for monitors it 
is much smaller than for battleships; for battle- 
ships, generally smaller than for cruisers. 

Inasmuch as the coal supply on board a ship 
is necessarily limited, her self-sustaining power to 
produce motion is also limited. In order, there- 
fore, that ships or fleets may for an unlimited time 



52 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

maintain their fighting power, fresh fuel supplies 
must be obtained from colliers or coaling stations. 
Hence is seen the importance of having coaling 
stations in different seas where fleets are intended 
to operate; or, in case no coaling stations exist, 
the importance of supplying the fleets by means 
of colliers sent out for that purpose. 

In estimating the strength of a fleet the speed 
of the vessels composing it is a factor of prime 
importance; for the speed of a fleet as a whole 
is necessarily regulated by the speed of its slowest 
vessel. Thus, a fleet pursuing an enemy or fleeing 
from him faster than its slowest vessel destroys its 
unity for concentrated action and weakens consid- 
erably its fighting power. Hence it follows that 
if fleets are formed of vessels of varying speed, the 
speed of each in excess of the slowest is useless 
for unity of action ; and consequently such a fleet 
has no greater military value than if each vessel 
composing it had no higher speed than the slowest. 
When practicable, therefore, fleets should as a rule 
be composed of vessels of nearly uniform speed. 
Slow-going monitors should not be combined with 
battleships or armoured cruisers, unless other con- 
ditions than those of utilizing the speed make such 
combinations temporarily necessary. 

In the organization of battle fleets the principle 
of concentration might be carried too far, were it 
not for certain influences which constantly tend 
to limit the size of such fleets. As battle fleets 



THE TWO NAVIES 53 

increase in size beyond a certain point, they be- 
come unwieldy and difficult to handle. Indeed, 
they may even become so large as to extend 
beyond the limits of command of one man. And, 
moreover, their increase in size nearly always 
results in a decrease in speed ; for the more 
numerous the additions to a fleet, the greater the 
probability of slower vessels being among them. 
As on the land a fighting force of half a million or 
more men is divided into several armies that each 
may be better supplied and more easily manoeuvred, 
and the whole be more effective, so on the sea, for 
like reasons, large navies are divided into several 
battle fleets. Another consideration, too, which 
necessitates a division of naval forces into fleets 
is the nature and extent of the country to be pro- 
tected, and the number, situation, and importance 
of its colonial possessions. In a war, for instance, 
between the United States and a European power, 
it would be necessary for the United States to 
divide her naval forces ; part would be needed to 
protect and defend the Philippines, while a much 
larger part would be needed for offensive and 
defensive purposes on the Atlantic coast. Again, 
the conditions of the coast defences of the United 
States and the distribution of the enemy's naval 
forces might be such that it would be necessary to 
divide the naval forces of the United States on the 
Atlantic coast into two or more fleets. 

A comparison of navies is not generally an easy 



54 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

matter, for the reason that each country classifies 
its warships according to its own methods, which 
are far from uniform and often very perplexing. 
And besides, another difficulty arises from there 
being so many different kinds of war vessels : 
vessels of steel and iron and wood ; vessels with 
heavy armour and vessels without armour; ves- 
sels with large guns and vessels with small guns ; 
vessels, too, of many sizes, from the gunboat of 
only one hundred tons' displacement, armed with 
a single machine gun, to the heavily armoured 
battleship of sixteen or eighteen thousand tons' 
displacement, armed with a dozen or more large 
guns of eight to thirteen-inch calibres. 

But notwithstanding the difficulties of accurate 
classification and comparison, an examination of 
the data already set forth should give us a fairly 
correct idea of the powers and distinguishing pecu- 
liarities of the American and Spanish navies. By 
referring to the preceding tables it will be seen that 
the five American battleships and two armoured 
cruisers were apparently not unevenly matched 
by Spain's one battleship and six armoured cruis- 
ers. In tonnage and armaments the United States 
ships were somewhat superior; but six out of 
seven vessels in the Spanish battle fleet were 
much swifter than all but two of those of the 
United States. The latter, therefore, had the 
greater fighting power; the former the greater 
mobility. As to the monitors, and the dynamite 



THE TWO NAVIES 55 

gunboat Vesuvius, Spain had no ships to compare 
with them. But her torpedo flotilla was greatly su- 
perior ; she had nineteen torpedo boats, ten torpedo 
gunboats, and six torpedo-boat destroyers ; and the 
United States had only fifteen torpedo boats. 

By again referring to the tables it will be seen 
that the average trial speed of the American and 
Spanish armoured cruisers was 20.2 knots per 
hour, of the battleships 16. i knots, and of the four 
monitors on the Atlantic coast 10 knots. But the 
speeds that must be taken into account in making 
or planning naval campaigns are not the trial 
speeds, but the uniform, sustained speeds that can 
be obtained under service conditions. Applying 
to the foregoing figures the rule given in the foot- 
note on page 45 for determining the service speed, 
we obtain for the armoured cruisers an average ser- 
vice speed of 16-2 knots per hour, for the battle- 
ships 12.9 knots, and for the monitors 8 knots. In 
general these are the speeds that must be reckoned 
with ; but at times even they are subject to a slight 
discount, for when the vessels of a fleet are not of 
uniform speed, the average service speed of the 
fleet would more properly be obtained by dis- 
counting the trial speed of the slowest vessel than 
by discounting the average trial speed of the 
fleet. Again, it may happen — in fact, often does 
happen — that some vessel of the fleet that cannot 
be left behind has so foul a bottom, or is injured 
in such a way, as to render its speed considerably 



56 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

below the service speed of the slowest vessels. 
But for all practical purposes, bearing in mind 
that an exceptional circumstance may warrant a 
separate discussion and conclusion, these speeds 
may be taken as a correct basis for a comparison 
of the strategical and tactical manoeuvres of these 
battle fleets. 

In comparing the armoured fleets of the two 
belligerents, it will be observed that Spain had 
six fast armoured cruisers quite similar in arma- 
ment and in nautical qualities and of uniform 
speed, and that the United States had but two of 
this class. This homogeneous group of six fast 
cruisers gave Spain a great advantage ; or rather, 
would have given her a great advantage if they 
had all been in perfect condition, as they should 
have been, at the outbreak of hostilities. In order 
to bring a superior force against this fleet, the 
United States would have been obliged to unite 
all her armoured cruisers and battleships into 
a single fleet. As the Orego7i, however, was not 
available for this purpose at the beginning of 
the war, the necessary superiority in fighting 
power could only have been supplied by adding 
monitors to the American fleet. But such a fleet 
of heterogeneous vessels would have been greatly 
handicapped. The swifter fleet would have had 
the choice of battle, and in a measure also the 
choice of the battlefield. Under these circum- 
stances the Spanish commander would have been 



THE TWO NAVIES 57 

able to fight or flee as the conditions seemed 
more or less propitious. Should he have chosen 
or been compelled to flee, only the armoured 
cruisers of the American fleet could have over- 
taken him, and he could then have turned upon 
them in the proportion of six to two. If, on the 
other hand, he should have been able to chase 
the American fleet, it could not have fled faster 
than the speed of its monitors without breaking 
up its unity as a fleet and subjecting its slower 
vessels to the danger of defeat in detail. 

As to monitors, they are of little use in offen- 
sive war. Being of slow speed and having little 
coal endurance, and with their turrets awash even 
in a moderate ocean sea, their usefulness is con- 
fined almost exclusively to the defensive. They 
are intended for coast and harbour defence ; di- 
verting them from that object and making them 
a part of a battle fleet is merely a makeshift to 
supply the need of battleships or armoured cruisers. 
It is an attempt to bring a stronger force upon the 
battlefield at a great cost — an attempt to increase 
the fighting power of a fleet at the expense of its 
speed and mobility. "If you wish offensive war 
carried on vigorously upon the seas," says Captain 
Mahan, " rely exclusively upon ships that have 
the qualities of ships and not of floating batteries. 
We had in the recent hostilities twenty-six thou- 
sand tons of shipping sealed up in monitors, of 
comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic 



58 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and Pacific. There was not an hour from first 
to last, I will venture to say, that we would not 
gladly have exchanged the whole six for two 
battleships of less aggregate displacement; and 
that although, from the weakness of the Spanish 
defences, we were able to hug pretty closely most 
parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish guns 
at Santiago kept our fleet at a greater distance, 
we should have lamented still more bitterly the 
policy which gave us sluggish monitors for mobile 
battleships." 

On the whole, then, taking into account displace- 
ment, speed, and armament, and the conditions of 
the two navies at the outbreak of the war, it would 
seem that the American navy was considerably 
better than the Spanish. But it is manifest that 
if Spain, before the outbreak of hostilities, had 
exercised a little more foresight and energy in the 
matter of armaments and drill and target practice, 
she could easily have had her armoured vessels 
and crews sufficiently well prepared to have had 
at least a good fighting chance against the navy 
of the United States. " The force of the Spanish 
Navy — on paper, as the expression goes — was 
so nearly equal to our own," says Captain Mahan, 
" that it was well within the limits of possibility 
that an unlucky incident — the loss, for example, 
of a battleship — might make the Spaniard deci- 
sively superior in nominal, or even in actual, avail- 
able force. An excellent authority told the writer 



THE TWO NAVIES 



59 



that he considered that the loss of the Maine had 
changed the balance — that is, that whereas with 
the Maine our fleet had been slightly superior, so 
after her destruction the advantage, still nominal, 
was rather the other way. We had of course a 
well-founded confidence in the superior efficiency 
of our officers and men, and in the probable better 
condition of our ships and guns ; but where so 
much is at stake as the result of a war, or even 
as the necessary prolongation of war, with its 
sufferings and anxieties, the only safe rule is to 
regard the apparent as the actual, until its reality 
has been tested." 



CHAPTER V 

THE SITUATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES AND 
THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT 
OF VIEW^ 

AS soon as war seemed probable the United 
States government selected the island of 
Key West, off the southern point of Florida, as 
a base of naval operations. Lying in the Gulf 
of Mexico opposite Havana and only ninety 
miles distant therefrom, it was admirably situated 
as a base of operations for a blockade of Cuba or 
an attack on the Cuban capital. Moreover, a fleet 
rendezvousing there was sufficiently near the gulf 
ports of the United States to shield them from 
attack. 

At the outbreak of the war Acting Rear-Admiral 
William T. Sampson had under his command at 
Key West one of the most powerful fleets of war- 
ships that had ever floated in American waters. 
This flleet consisted of the armoured cruiser New 
York, the two battleships, Iowa and Indiana ; the 
three monitors, Amphitrite, Puritan, and Terror ; 
the four cruisers, Cincinnati, Marblehead, Detroit, 
and Montgomery ; the six gunboats, Wilmington, 

1 See Map 2. 



SITU A TION OF NA VA L FOR CES AND UTL 00 K 6 1 

Nashville, Castine, Machias, Newport, and Helena ; 
the despatch boat Dolphin ; the converted yachts, 
Eagle and Mayfloivcr ; and the four torpedo boats, 
Dupont, Foote, Porter, and Winslow. 

A second fleet, under the command of Com- 
modore Winfield Scott Schley, was held in reserve 
at Hampton Roads, Virginia, for the purpose of 
giving a feeling of security to the people of the 
coast cities, of strengthening the incomplete coast 
defences of the Atlantic, and especially of meeting 
any move that might be made by the Spanish 
squadron lying at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde 
Islands. This fleet, known as the Flying Squadron, 
consisted of the armoured cruiser Brooklyn; the 
two battleships, Massaehusetts and Texas ; the two 
cruisers, Columbia and Minneapolis ; and the collier 
Merriuiac. 

In addition to these two fleets a patrol squadron, 
commanded by Commodore John A. Howell, was 
hastily organized for the protection of the Atlantic 
coast cities northward from Hampton Roads, It 
consisted of the protected cruiser San Franeiseo 
and the four auxiliary cruisers, Yankee, Dixie, 
Prairie, and Yosemite. 

The battleship Oregon, which was destined to 
play an important part in the war, must not be 
overlooked. She left San Francisco on March 19, 
1898, en route for the West Indies by way of Cape 
Horn. After a remarkable voyage of fourteen 
thousand seven hundred miles, the greater part of 



62 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

which was at high speed, she arrived off Jupiter 
Inlet, Florida, on May 24, in perfect condition. 

The war vessels of Spain, not including those in 
the Philippines, were divided into two squadrons. 
The first, which remained in Spanish waters dur- 
ing the early part of the war, was commanded by 
Admiral Camara, and consisted of the battleship 
Pelayo; the armoured cruisers, Emperador Carlos V 
and Princesa de Astiirias ; the armed auxiliary 
cruisers, Rapido and Patriota ; and a number of 
torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. The 
second, at the outbreak of the war, was at St. 
Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands, under the 
command of Admiral Pascual Cervera. The as- 
sembling of the second squadron had begun early 
in March, when the torpedo-boat destroyers, Phiton, 
Furor, and Terror, and a small flotilla of torpedo 
boats sailed from Cadiz to the Canary Islands, and 
thence on March 24 to St. Vincent in the Cape 
Verde Islands. At St. Vincent they were joined 
on April 14 by Admiral Cervera with the Maria 
Teresa and Cristobal Colon from Cadiz ; and on 
April 19 by the Vizcaya and Almirantc Oqiiendo 
from Havana. 

The war vessels of Cervera's squadron were not 
in first-class condition. Three of the cruisers had 
defective breech mechanism and poor ammunition 
for their five and a half inch guns ; the Colon had 
never received her heavy guns ; and the Vizcaya, 
not having been recently docked and cleaned, was 




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SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 6^ 

far below her rated speed. Admiral Cervera had 
repeatedly reported the condition of his ships to 
the Spanish authorities; but nothing had been 
done to remedy the deficiencies. So convinced 
was he of what the result would be in an encounter 
with one or both of the powerful American fleets 
that he opposed the sending of his squadron to 
Cuba. He frankly declared that such an under- 
taking would be hazardous, — that it would proba- 
bly result in his defeat, and perhaps in the 
bombardment of the home cities. As early as 
April 8 he wrote to his government as follows : 

" From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see 
that the government persists in the idea of sending the 
flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me to be a very risky 
adventure which may cost us very dear ; for the loss of 
our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Carib- 
bean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries, and 
result, perhaps, in the bombardment of our coast cities. 
I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because 
I have anticipated it long ago. I believ^e a naval defeat 
would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to 
defend itself with its present means, perhaps it would 
give the Americans some annoyance." 

And on April 20 he suggested the plan of going 
to the Canaries, where he could protect these 
islands, and at the same time be in a position to 
hasten to the defence of the mother country, if the 
necessity should arise. The despatch setting forth 
this plan of operations was signed by Admiral 



64 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Cervera and all his captains. Nevertheless, the 
orders to sail for the West Indies were issued ; 
and on April 22 Cervera, in acknowledging their 
receipt, wrote again as follows: 

" It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the 
surprise and consternation experienced by all on the 
receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well 
justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition 
except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and 
demoralized return ; while if it should remain in Spain it 
might be the safeguard of the nation. . . . The C0I071 
does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor 
ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, 
with the exception of about three hundred rounds, is bad. 
The defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not 
been changed. The cartridge cases of the Colon cannot 
be re-charged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo. 
. . . But I will trouble you no more. " 

And on April 24 the Admiral wrote : 

"I will try to sail to-morrow. As the act has been 
consummated I will not insist upon my opinion concern- 
ing it. May God grant that I be mistaken ! . . . With 
a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice." 

And Captain Villaamil, the second in command, 
who met shortly afterwards such an heroic death in 
the sea fight off Santiago, sent a private telegram 
to the Spanish premier, Sagasta, saying : 

" In view of the importance to the country of the 
destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you 



SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 65 

should know, through a friend that does not fear censure, 
that while as seamen we are all ready to meet an hon- 
ourable death in the fulfilment of our duty, I think it un- 
doubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as 
certain as it will be fruitless and useless in terminating the 
war if the representations ^ repeatedly made by the Ad- 
miral to the Minister of Marine are not taken into 
consideration. " 



COMMENTS 

Since the navies of the United States and Spain 
were not so very unequal in fighting power, and 
each was divided into two fleets, it is evident that 
neither nation could have sent one of its fleets 
across the ocean without subjecting it to the danger 
of being attacked by the combined fleets of the 
adversary. As to the United States, she had no 
good reason at the beginning of hostilities for send- 
ing either of her fleets across the ocean, for an 
attack on Cuba ofi"ered a much better opportunity 
of injuring Spain. The proximity of the island 
to the naval base of operations at Key West, its 
wealth and importance, and its occupancy by a 
large Spanish army, made it, in fact, the natural 
objective of the naval as well as the military forces 
of the United States. 

It was good strategy for the United States to 
attack Spain in Cuba, not only because the island 

1 For a further expression of the views of Admiral Cervera prior 
to the war, see Appendix O. 
VOL, I.— 5 



66 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

was the most vulnerable of the Spanish possessions, 
but because there was a strong probability that 
nearly all the armoured vessels of the American 
navy could be brought against any force sent 
thither by Spain. Thus, in following this plan, 
the strategical advantage of combination was with 
the United States. This was a great advantage, 
as it gave her the opportunity of crushing with 
superior forces any part of the Spanish navy sent 
into Cuban waters. Even had all the armoured 
vessels of Spain been sent to those waters, the 
opportunity of meeting them before they could 
have replenished their coal would still have been 
open to the United States. 

On the other hand, had Spain elected to keep 
her fleet at home, and had the United States sent 
thither one of her fleets, the strategical advantage 
of combination would have been with Spain. 

But under these or like conditions, the strate- 
gical advantage of combination is of little or no 
value to its possessor unless he has the ability to 
act with vigour and promptness in making use 
of the opportunities offered. By skilful combina- 
tions, by unforeseen circumstances, through the 
errors and perhaps the necessities of the enemy, 
through even the fortune of war, which sometimes 
favours the strong and sometimes the weak, the 
desired results may be reached. But so vast is 
the ocean, so numerous are the gulfs and bays 
and inlets of the sea, so strong are the fortified 



SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 6/ 

harbours where fleets can obtain the protection of 
shore batteries, and so indeterminable are many of 
the factors of naval warfare, that the commander 
of the weaker naval force often has favourable 
chances for exercising his own skill and genius in 
thwarting the combinations of his more powerful 
adversary. 

At the beginning of the war, pending the issue 
of the struggle for maritime supremacy, a blockade 
of the ports of Cuba offered the United States the 
best chance of injuring Spain. An effective block- 
ade of the island would have destroyed its com- 
merce, cut off the supplies and reenforcements of 
the Spanish army, and perhaps forced the Spanish 
navy to come to the relief of the blockaded ports. 
But as the United States navy was not sufficiently 
large to blockade effectively all the principal ports 
of the island, the best results could have been ob- 
tained by blockading Havana Harbour and the ports 
connected with it by rail. Even if the navy had 
been divided into two fleets for this purpose — one 
to blockade the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Car- 
denas, and Sagua la Grande, and the other the port 
of Cienfuegos — they would still have been suffi- 
ciently near each other to concentrate quickly for 
battle, should Cervera's squadron have appeared 
in Cuban waters. 

With the armoured ships of the United States 
navy divided into two fleets as here suggested, and 
with a number of protected cruisers watching the 



68 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

more distant ports of the island, and other swift 
cruisers acting as scouts on the lookout for the 
Spanish squadron, the situation would have been 
most favourable for decisive results. Thus situated, 
the United States navy could have cut off a large 
part of the commerce of the island and at the same 
time completely covered its base of operations at 
Key West. Thus situated, it could have inflicted 
great injury upon Spain without weakening its own 
power for future action, and yet have been ever 
ready to mass its warships for battle in an emer- 
gency. If the Spanish squadron had attempted to 
raise the blockade by advancing upon Cienfuegos, 
the fleet at Havana within thirty-six hours after 
receiving the news of such an attempt could have 
joined the fleet at Cienfuegos. If, on the other 
hand, the Spanish squadron had advanced upon 
Havana, the fleet at Cienfuegos could just as 
quickly have joined the one at Havana. Or, if 
either American fleet had been surprised and 
brought face to face with the enemy before the 
other could have united with it, it could either 
have fallen back upon the second fleet, or have 
fought with the assurance that the second fleet 
would join it in a few hours. In either case the 
chances were that if one of the American fleets 
had been defeated before the arrival of the other, 
the Spanish squadron would not have been in a 
condition, a few hours after the fight, even though 
victorious, to meet the second fleet successfully. 



SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 69 

For the purpose of discussion the assumption 
has just been made that the Spanish squadron 
might have succeeded in surprising and attacking 
one of the American fleets before the other could 
unite with it. But this assumption is highly im- 
probable, for the reason that the Spanish squadron, 
after crossing the Atlantic, would not have been in 
a condition to fight a battle successfully without 
first seeking some harbour near at hand where 
it could replenish its coal. And evidently the 
seeking for such a harbour would have soon be- 
come known to the American naval scouts, and 
been promptly communicated to the American 
fleets. 

When maritime war between two belligerents 
cannot be brought to immediate issue, blockade is 
nearly alwa}^s the first step taken for the mastery 
of the sea ; and though it is often but a temporary 
expedient for bringing matters to an issue, it nearly 
always has a far-reaching effect upon the result of 
the campaign. And, moreover, there is much to be 
said in favour of this method of bringing pressure 
upon an adversary. "The stoppage of commerce, 
in whole or in part," says Captain Mahan, " exhausts 
without fighting. It compels peace without sacri- 
ficing life. It is the most scientific warfare, because 
the least sanguinary, and because, like the highest 
strategy, it is directed against the communica- 
tions — the resources — not the persons of the 
enemy." 



70 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Thus far the discussion has been made from the 
point of view of doing the greatest injury to Spain. 
But there were other things that had to be con- 
sidered, the chief of which were the safety of the 
coast cities of the Atlantic and the demand of the 
people of those cities for protection against a 
Spanish naval attack. Had the coast defences of 
the United States been completed and been occu- 
pied by sufficient coast artillery, all the armoured 
vessels of the United States could have been con- 
centrated upon the western end of Cuba without 
endangering the safety of the chief seaboard cities 
of the Atlantic. The deficiencies in the coast 
armaments of the United States and the unreason- 
able clamour of the Atlantic seaport population 
for protection caused the armoured vessels of 
the United States to be divided into two fleets 
widely separated from each other. Thus the 
deficiencies in coast armaments neutralized for a 
time a large part of the United States naval forces. 
They were the means of keeping the Flying Squad- 
ron on the Atlantic coast, when, otherwise, its true 
position would have been to aid Admiral Sampson's 
fleet in the blockade of western Cuba. But it 
should be borne in mind that the protection of the 
Atlantic coast cities by the Flying Squadron was 
merely a temporary expedient. The important 
point to be determined was the destination of the 
Spanish naval forces ; and this point was ever 
present in the minds of those who directed the 



SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK "Jl 

movements of the American fleets.^ As long then 
as there seemed to be a probability that Cervera's 
fleet might strike at the Atlantic coast cities, there 
were some reasons — though in the opinion of the 
writer insufhcient ones — for keeping the Flying 
Squadron in this position; but as soon as it was 
definitely determined that the destination of Cer- 
vera's squadron was the West Indies and not the 
coast cities, the strategical situation immediately 
demanded that the Flying Squadron should join 
Admiral Sampson's fleet, or, which practically 
amounted to the same thing, take position before 
Cienfuegos, where it could aid Admiral Sampson in 
blockading the western end of the island, and at 
the same time be ready to unite with him for the 
destruction of Admiral Cervera upon his arrival at 
any Spanish port in West Indian waters. 

In view of these facts, what plan of operations 
was best for Spain to pursue ? Had the Spanish 
navy been fully prepared for war; had it sailed 
boldly and rapidly for Porto Rico, made San Juan 
Harbour its base of operations, and used to advan- 
tage its superiority in torpedo boats and torpedo- 
boat destroyers, Spain certainly would have had 

1 In planning the naval strategy of the war, the President and 
Secretary of Navy were assisted by a naval war board. This 
board at first consisted of Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secre- 
tary of Navy; Montgomery Sicard, Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy; 
Albert S. Barker, Captain U. S. Navy ; and A. S- Crowninshield, 
Captain U. S. Navy. In May Assistant Secretary Roosevelt 
and Captain Barker left the board, and Captain Alfred T. Mahan, 
U. S. Navy (retired), joined it. 



72 



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



a fair chance of victory. Had San Juan Harbour 
been properly supplied in advance with coal and 
provisions, it would have made a fairly good base 
of operations ; and with the armoured vessels and 
torpedo craft of Spain concentrated there, the two 
fleets of the American navy would have been 
obliged to unite in order to meet them on anything 
like equal or superior terms. But inasmuch as the 
plan was to keep the Flying Squadron in the 
vicinity of Hampton Roads until the destination of 
the Spanish naval forces crossing the ocean was 
definitely ascertained not to be the Atlantic coast 
cities of the United States, there might have been of- 
fered the Spanish navy the opportunity of meeting 
the American fleets singly before they could have 
united. Again, inasmuch as the battleships, cruis- 
ers, and monitors of the United States navy were 
of such variable speed, the swift Spanish cruisers 
might possibly have sailed out of the harbour and 
met under most favourable conditions one or the 
other of the American fleets, while they were at- 
tempting to unite. In this connection it will be 
remembered that even the four armoured vessels 
of Cervera's squadron were, in the aggregate, su- 
perior in both speed and armament to the three 
armoured vessels of the Flying Squadron. Fur- 
thermore, Spain had a powerful weapon of destruc- 
tion in her torpedo boats, and had she been able 
to use them to advantage, the results would most 
probably have been startling and tremendous. 



SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 73 

It might seem that if this plan had been adopted, 
the coast of Spain would have been left unprotected ; 
but such would not have been the case, for neither 
of the American fleets would have dared to cross 
the ocean so long as the Spanish navy remained 
undefeated in the vicinity of Porto Rico. 

When two armies are manoeuvring against each 
other's communications, it is a principle of strat- 
egy that the army whose communications are most 
easily threatened will abandon the initiative and 
conform to the movements of its adversary. This 
principle with slight modifications applies to naval 
warfare. On the sea the coast cities — the re- 
sources — take the place of the " communications " 
on the land. If, therefore, two navies are manoeu- 
vring against each other's coast cities, that navy 
whose coast cities are most immediately threatened 
will abandon the initiative and conform to the move- 
ment of its adversary. As a matter of fact, then, 
the mere presence of the Spanish naval forces in 
San Juan Harbour, menacing the coast cities of 
the United States, would have protected the coast 
cities of Spain from attack. 

But however meritorious this plan seems to be, 
there would have been little or no use in attempt- 
ing to follow it so long as several important vessels 
of the Spanish navy were lacking in munitions of 
war and deficient in armaments. War can never be 
carried on without taking great risks, even where 
the prospects for victory seem most encouraging; 



74 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

but it would be the height of folly to adopt a plan 
of campaign and expect a favourable issue, when at 
the very outset the chances of success are clearly 
seen to be on the side of the adversary. The con- 
ditions being as they were, it is believed that the 
best plan of operations for Spain was the one 
pointed out by Admiral Cervera. It will be re- 
membered that he advised sending his squadron 
to the Canary Islands. As these islands belonged 
to Spain and could have been easily supplied with 
coal and provisions, they would have afforded a 
secure and permanent base of operations. Such 
a base could not have been maintained in the 
Cape Verde Islands, where Cervera then was, be- 
cause they belonged to Portugal. Stationed in the 
Canary Islands, his squadron would not only have 
been a constant menace to the Atlantic coast 
cities of the United States, and thus probably have 
prevented the Flying Squadron from leaving the 
vicinity of Hampton Roads to take part in the 
blockade of Cuba, but would also have been a 
protection to the coast cities of Spain, for no 
American naval commander would have been so 
unwise as to attempt an attack upon them without 
first defeating Admiral Cervera. 

In deciding upon a plan of operations, the facts 
known to the Spanish authorities at the time should 
have received careful consideration. They knew 
that the Spanish navy was not properly prepared 
for war; that the armoured cruiser Princcsa de 



SITUA riON OF NA VAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 75 

Asturias had not receiv^ed her boilers and engines ; 
that the battleship Pelayo and the armoured 
cruiser Emperador Carlos V had not received their 
entire armament; that even Cervera's squadron 
was not fully supplied with the necessary heavy 
guns, ammunition, and torpedoes; and that, owing 
to the foul bottom of the armoured cruiser Viz- 
caya, the speed of the squadron was far short of 
what it should have been. 

On the other hand, they knew that Spain's 
regular army greatly outnumbered that of the 
United States; that there were under arms in 
Cuba and Porto Rico more than two hundred 
thousand Spanish soldiers, and that the total 
strength of the American army was only twenty- 
eight thousand.^ It was apparent, too, that the 
United States would be compelled to organize 
and drill thousands of volunteers and transport 
them across an open sea at great risk — unless 
she could obtain and hold complete command of 
the sea in West Indian waters — before she could 
hope to make a successful invasion of Cuba or 
Porto Rico. 

Clearly, then, in the face of these facts, Spain's 
best course in the beginning, until she could put 
her armoured vessels into proper condition, would 
have been to act strategically on the defensive — 
to leave her land forces in Cuba and Porto Rico 
to bear the brunt of the fighting in the earher part 

^ See Appendix L. 



'J 6 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

of the war, and to take up a strong position with 
her navy, or the greater part of it, where she could 
protect her coast cities and at the same time 
threaten those of the enemy, and where she could 
have the strategical advantage of combination in 
case either American fleet crossed the ocean to 
attack her. 

Furthermore, this plan would have offered Spain 
other advantages than those already mentioned. 
It would probably have enabled the first encoun- 
ters of the war to take place on the land, where, at 
the beginning, Spain was strong and the United 
States weak. It would have given Spain time to 
equip properly and put in good fighting trim all, 
or nearly all, the armoured vessels of her navy. 
It would have allowed Cervera to sally forth with 
his swift cruisers at opportune times to threaten the 
coast cities of the United States, or to menace 
and perhaps destroy American transports bearing 
troops to Cuba. And, finally, it would have pre- 
vented the United States from obtaining unchal- 
lenged control of the sea without having first met 
and fought under disadvantageous conditions the 
Spanish naval forces in the Canaries ; for an Ameri- 
can fleet sent across the ocean would have had to 
run the risk of meeting superior forces, and of fight- 
ing far from its base of operations, with no coaling 
station near at hand. 

It might seem that this plan would have pre- 
cluded Spain from making any determined effort to 



SITUATION OF NAVAL FORCES AND OUTLOOK 'JJ 

reenforce or supply the troops in Cuba, and offered 
practically no opposition to the blockade of the 
island. The reply is, that Cuba, already provided 
with as many troops as were necessary to hold the 
island, needed no reenforcements ; that no plan 
which Spain could have adopted, under the existing 
conditions, would have been successful in raising, 
except temporarily, the blockade of western Cuba; 
and that all the vessels of the United States navy, 
had they been available for the purpose, could 
not have maintained against Cuba's long coast- 
line, with its numerous inlets, bays, and harbours, 
a close blockade. Consequently there would have 
been numerous opportunities offered for landing 
supplies, to say nothing of the favourable chances 
proffered for running the blockade. And besides, 
owing to the size of Cuba and the great fertility 
of its soil, there was, in truth, little or no danger 
of the Spanish soldiers suffering for the necessa- 
ries of life. 

It is nearly always good strategy not to do that 
which your enemy wishes you to do. But in this 
case Spain did the very thing which the naval 
authorities of the United States desired her to 
do. She despatched her most puissant fleet to 
the West Indies, and by so doing gave Admiral 
Sampson the opportunity of uniting both Ameri- 
can fleets for its destruction. 

That Spain should have insisted upon this 
course seems remarkable in the face of the fact 



78 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

that Admiral Cervera and all his captains bitterly 
opposed it, and suggested instead the much better 
plan of taking up a position in the Canaries — in 
the face of the fact, too, that all these officers 
clearly pointed out that the sending of Cervera's 
squadron to the West Indies would surely result 
in its defeat and destruction, and that such de- 
struction might endanger the Canaries, or even 
result in the bombardment of the home cities. 
Again and again did Admiral Cervera beg his 
government not to adopt this plan. Again and 
again did he call attention to the deficiencies and 
weaknesses of his squadron, and point out without 
fear or favour many unwelcome facts that must 
have pierced like daggers those responsible for 
the deplorable condition of the Spanish navy. 

With prophetic vision this great man beheld 
the future. It was given him to see and foretell 
the end. And yet, with as brave a heart as ever 
beat in a human body this courageous sailor, this 
great soul, at the command of his superiors, 
pointed the prows of his vessels westward and 
sailed them unfalteringly to their doom. Fortu- 
nate is the country that is wise enough, when mak- 
ing war upon the sea, to adopt and follow the advice 
of its educated and trained naval officers. Spain 
was perishing for the want of a leader, yet she 
would not give heed to the wise counsels of one of 
her ablest, bravest, and most distinguished sons. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE RESOURCES, THE ARMIES, AND THE COAST 

DEFENCES ^ 

SPAIN'S population at the beginning of 1898 
was estimated at eighteen milHon, Her man- 
ufactures were comparatively insignificant. Her 
government, burdened with debt, had scarcely any 
ready money and little credit. Indeed, her finan- 
cial condition, compared with that of the United 
States, whose credit was unlimited and whose 
treasury was overflowing with gold and silver, was 
in itself a handicap that from the beginning almost 
predetermined the final result. 

The strength of Spain's army as given in the 
"Anuario Militar de Espana " of 1898, including 
all regular and irregular troops, was 492,067^ offi- 
cers and men. There is good reason, however, 
for doubting the accuracy of these figures ; they 
are probably about one hundred and fifty thou- 
sand in excess of the actual number. But, be that 
as it may, there were at the outbreak of the war one 
hundred and ninety-six thousand eight hundred 

1 See Maps 4 and 7. 

2 See Appendix K. 



8o THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and twenty^ trained Spanish soldiers on duty in 
Cuba, and about nine thousand in Porto Rico. 

But at the time the American authorities did 
not know, even approximately, how many troops 
were in Cuba and Porto Rico. The number in 
Cuba was variously estimated by the command- 
ing general, Major-General Nelson A. Miles, and 
others; but none of these estimates, it is believed, 
was equal to the actual number. On April 12 
the Consul-General of Cuba, Fitzhugh Lee, tes- 
tified before the Senate Committee of Foreign 
Affairs that there were probably ninety-seven or 
ninety-eight thousand Spanish soldiers then in 
the island, of whom only about fifty-five thou- 
sand were capable of bearing arms. General Miles 
estimated the number at one hundred and fifty 
thousand, which, though much nearer the truth, 
was still about forty-six thousand less than the 
actual number. 

The Spanish soldiers in Cuba, having been en- 
gaged in war with the insurgents for three years, 
were acclimated, more or less experienced in cam- 
paigning, and well supplied with small arms and 
smokeless-powder cartridges. They were armed 
with the Mauser rifle, a modern, small calibre, 
magazine arm that had great range and penetra- 
tive power ; but they were not, on the whole, good 
marksmen, for the reason that they had had 
scarcely any practice in target shooting. 
^ See Appendix A. 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 8 1 

The city of Havana was strongly fortified ^ and 
well-defended ; but little had been done towards 

1 Havana was fortified as follows : 

1. Earthwork No. i, about a mile and a half east of harbour 
entrance, sixty feet above sea level, armed with four Ordonez 
6-inch rifles, and two rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns. 

2. Earthwork No. 2, about a mile east of harbour entrance, 
sLxty feet above sea level, armed with two Krupp 12-inch rifles, 
four Ordonez 8-inch rifles, and two rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns. 

3. Velasco Battery, an earthwork just east of and a part of El 
Morro, one hundred and fifty feet above sea level, armed with 
three Krupp ii-inch guns, four Hontoria 4.7-inch guns, and one 
rapid-fire 2.3-inch gun. 

4. El Morro, "Castillo del Morro," with water battery at its 
foot and flanking barbette batteries, situated on a projecting 
point at the east side of the harbour entrance, eighty-eight feet 
above sea level, armed with six ii-inch rifles, twelve S-inch 
howitzers, and three 6-inch rifles. 

5. La Cabaiia, a large stone-bastioned work with both land 
and water front, in rear of El Morro and directly opposite the 
city, seventy-five feet above sea level, armed with fifteen 6.2-inch 
guns. 

6. La Pastora, an old stone work lying south of El Morro near 
north end of La Cabaiia, armed with twelve S-inch howitzers. 

7. San Diego, a small stone-bastioned work with only land 
fronts, on hill east of La Cabafia, one hundred and ninety feet 
above sea level, armed with four 6.2-inch rifles. 

8. Atares, a small stone-bastioned work on hill at southwestern 
extremity of Havana Bay, one hundred and eleven feet above sea 
level, armed with six 6.2-inch rifles. 

9. La Fuerza, an old stone fort on west side of channel oppo- 
site south end of La Cabana, fifteen feet above sea level, armed 
with four ii-inch rifles. 

ID. La Punta, a stone-bastioned work with a small detached 
work and batteries on west side of harl50ur entrance, twelve feet 
above sea level, armed with five ii-inch rifles, three 6.2-inch rifles, 
and five 6-inch rifles. Across the channel just in rear of this 
work were several lines of torpedoes. 

II. La Reina, a stone work and battery on seashore about a 
mile west of harbour entrance, thirty feet above sea level, armed 
with seven 8-inch howitzers and three Hontoria 6.2-inch rifles. 
VOL. I. — 6 



82 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

erecting modern fortifications for the defence of 
the other ports of Cuba, and practically nothing 



12. Santa Claia, a small but powerful work of stone and earth, 
on seashore, about a mile and a half west of harbour entrance 
forty-four feet above sea level, armed with two Ordoiiez 12-inch 
rifles, three Krupp ii-inch rifles, four 8-inch howitzers, two rapid- 
fire 2.3-inch guns, and four Gatling guns. 

13. Earthwork No. 3, a seashore battery, about two miles west 
of harbour entrance, twenty feet above sea level, armed with four 
Ordoiiez 8-inch howitzers. 

14. Earthwork No. 4, a seashore battery just westward of 
Earthwork No. 3, twenty feet above sea level, armed with two 
Ordonez 9.5-inch rifles, and two Ordonez 6-inch rifles. 

15. Earthwork No. 5, a battery lying between Earthwork No. 4 
and Chorrera Bay, twenty-three feet above sea level, armed with 
three Hontoria 6.2-inch rifles, four Ordonez 6-inch rifles, and two 
rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns. 

16. El Principe, a stone-bastioned redoubt just west of city, 
one hundred and eighty-seven feet above sea level, armed v,fith 
nine 6.2-inch rifles and four 6-inch mortars. 

17. Las Animas, an incompleted redoubt on a hillock in 
valley between El Principe and Atares, armed with three 6.2-inch 
rifles. 

18. Auxiliary batteries along seashore ; one between Earthwork 
No. 2 and Velasco, armed with three 6-inch howitzers ; one to the 
left of Santa Clara, armed with six 4.7-inch rifles and four 6-inch 
howitzers ; one to the left of Earthwork No. 3, armed with six 
12.6-inch mortars; and one to the left of Earthwork No. 5, armed 
with six 3.5rinch rifles. 

In these fortifications more than one hundred serviceable guns 
could be directed against a hostile fleet attacking the city. 

This account does not include the two hundred or more pieces 
of obsolete and useless cannon at El Morro, La Cabana, El 
Principe, and other places. 

On the land side of ILavana, in commanding positions, there were 
a large number of carefully prepared entrenchments. They ex- 
tended in a sort of irregular way from La Cabaiia to Cojimar Bay 
east of the city, and thence around the harbour past the towns of 
Guanabacoa and Puentes Grandes to Chorrera Bay on the west 
side of the city. There were in these entrenchments three 12.6-inch 




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RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 83 

had been done towards strengthening and arming 
with modern guns the massive stone forts that for 
generations had stood hke sentinels at the mouths 
of a number of important harbours. Plans had 
from time to time been submitted for the defence 
of the principal seaports and harbours of the 
island ; but as the appropriations for this purpose 
were limited, practically all of the work done was 
confined to the port of Havana. On Novem- 
ber 2, 1895, Captain-General Martinez Campos, 
Commander-in-chief of the Spanish army in Cuba, 
appointed a commission of artillery and engineer 
officers to devise a system of fortifications for 
the ports of Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago de 
Cuba, and Guantanamo. But neither the plans 
submitted by this commission, nor any of those 
previously submitted for the defence of these sea- 
ports, were ever carried into effect. 

Although the population of the United States 
had increased from 38,558,371 in 1870 to about 
73,000,000 in 1898, the regular army had actually 
decreased. An Act of Congress passed in 1870 
limited the enlisted strength of the army to thirty 
thousand, and by a similar Act in 1874 it was 
further limited to twenty-five thousand, and thus 
mortars, five 10.6-inch mortars, three 6-inch rifles, and six rapid-fire 
2.3-inch guns in addition to the field-pieces with the troops. 

In the fortifications of the city there were 4406 soldiers ; and 
in the entrenched positions east, south, and west of the city, there 
were 24,116 soldiers with one hundred and four pieces of field 
artillery in addition to a division of infantry numbering 31,479 
soldiers with thirty pieces of field artillery. 



84 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

remained until March 8, just preceding the out- 
break of the Spanish-American War, when it was 
increased by two regiments of artillery composed 
of one hundred officers and sixteen hundred en- 
listed men. On April i, 1898, the regular army 
consisted of 2143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, 
or in round numbers twenty-eight thousand ^ offi- 
cers and men. 

For a third of a century after the great Civil 
War this little army had been struggling on in the 
face of many difficulties. After the surrender at 
Appomattox the people, both North and South, 
being tired otwar, turned their attention and ener- 
gies to industrial pursuits, and to the development 
of the great resources of the country, taking little in- 
terest in military matters and devoting no thought 
to preparation for future war. Even though the 
necessity for the reorganization of the army in 
accordance with modern military ideas had been 
repeatedly and persistently pointed out by all the 
commanding generals since the Civil War, and 
many other far-seeing and able officers, no legis- 
lation was obtainable for this purpose until the 
beginning of the war with Spain. 

But in spite of this indifference on the part of 
the people and Congress, the officers of the army 
did not become discouraged. Their zeal still re- 
mained ; and they were determined that the army 
should at any rate be well disciplined and highly 
1 See Appendix L. 



RESOLTRCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 85 

trained. Accordingly, it was carefully and persist- 
ently drilled; and, as far as circumstances would 
permit, practised in field manoeuvres and tactical 
problems, under conditions resembling as nearly as 
possible those of actual war. In the single matter 
of appropriations for target practice Congress had 
been liberal; and consequently for a number of 
years such close attention had been given to target 
shooting that this small body of regulars had be- 
come practically an army of marksmen. The ma- 
jority of the officers, too, impelled by a sense of 
duty, and a love for their profession, had through 
hard work become highly proficient in their duties. 
In short, the army had reached such a state of dis- 
cipline and general excellence that from the lowest 
private to the highest in command it was per- 
vaded by the feeling that it would not falter or be 
defeated on a fair field. 

But not only in the smallness of her army was 
the United States ill prepared for war; her coast 
defences also were inadequate, and only partly 
supplied with guns, ammunition, and men. And, 
besides, she had practically no munitions of war 
on hand with which to arm and equip any increase 
in her forces. 

To meet the land forces of Spain upon anything 
like equal terms, it was necessary to create quickly 
a large army — to organize, muster in, equip, and 
mobilize thousands of volunteers, to complete 
and man the coast defences, and to provide by 



86 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

manufacture and purchase the needful munitions 
of war. 

On April 21 the American Minister at Madrid 
was given his passports by the Spanish govern- 
ment. Congress, regarding this action as equiva- 
lent to a declaration of war, on the following day- 
authorized the President to increase temporarily 
the military establishment by a call for volunteers ; 
and at the same time empowered the Secretary of 
War to recruit from the nation at large three volun- 
teer cavalry regiments. Four days later, April 26, 
Congress added two companies to each regular 
regiment of infantry, and by authorizing additional 
enlistments increased the regular army to 62,597 
men. And on May 11 Congress authorized the 
Secretary of War to organize a volunteer brigade 
of engineers, to consist of not more than three 
regiments aggregating not more than thirty-five 
hundred men ; the same act also authorized the 
organization of an additional volunteer force of ten 
thousand enlisted men, who were to possess " im- 
munity from diseases incident to tropical climates." 
Under the provisions of these acts of April 22 and 
26, and May 11, the regular army was increased 
and the volunteer army organized. 

In accordance with the Act of April 22, President 
McKinley, on the following day, two days after the 
beginning of the war, issued a call for one hundred 
and twenty-five thousand volunteers. These volun- 
teers were apportioned among the States according 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 8/ 

to population. The country's response to the 
President's call was spontaneous and enthusiastic. 
Immediately the War Department was overwhelmed 
by tenders of service from all parts of the country. 
Many more than the number called for offered 
themselves. Even many of the veterans of the 
Civil War who had fought with Lee and Grant, 
"smelling the battle afar off," insisted upon claim- 
ing the privilege of fighting side by side for the 
honour of their country. 

On May 25 the President issued a call for 
seventy-five thousand more volunteers, which was 
responded to with no less alacrity than the first call 
had been. The question with the authorities was 
not what States would be able to supply their 
quotas, but how many of the thousands of men 
offering themselves could be accepted. 

With the first call for volunteers the organization 
and equipment of the large army of 1898 began. 
The State volunteers were organized into regiments 
or parts of regiments under officers appointed by 
the governors of the several States. The United 
States volunteers were organized into sixteen regi- 
ments — ten of infantry, three of cavalry, and three 
of engineers — by officers appointed by the Presi- 
dent. About the regular army as a nucleus this 
large volunteer force was formed, and by the 
officers of the regular army it was mustered in, 
equipped, and mobilized. 

A complete system of fortifications for the coast 



88 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

cities of the United States had been provided for 
by the Endicott Board of 1885. Congress had 
favoured the system, but had supported it so feebly 
with appropriations that very little progress had 
been made in the work. The undertaking required 
the expenditure of $100,000,000 for the construc- 
tion and emplacement of 2362 heavy guns and 
mortars. In thirteen years less than one quarter of 
the amount called for had been appropriated. On 
April I, 1898, only one hundred and fifty-one guns 
were in position. The War Department, having 
frequently pointed out the necessity for pushing the 
work to a conclusion, and having spent judiciously 
the small amounts appropriated from time to time, 
could do no more. With the failure of Congress 
to supply the needful funds the work necessarily 
came to a standstill. 

On March 9, when war seemed almost certain, 
Congress, realizing the deficiencies and inade- 
quateness of the coast defences, passed an act 
placing at the President's immediate disposal 
$50,000,000 " for national defence." Accordingly, 
allotments were at once made to the difTerent de- 
partments of the army for the purpose of pushing 
forward this work as rapidly as possible. 

The burden of this task naturally fell upon the 
Ordnance Department and the Engineer Corps; 
and they, with the cooperation of the Quarter- 
master Department, went to work with extraordi- 
nary energy to meet the emergency. In a short 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 89 

time the harbours of the Atlantic coast were 
comparatively safe against attack, although many 
of the guns that had to be used as a temporary 
expedient were old, of multifarious patterns, and 
mounted on carriages of every variety and age. 
By April 21 a number of emplacements and car- 
riages for the heavy modern guns already built 
but not yet mounted had been constructed, and 
the guns themselves put permanently or tempo- 
rarily into position. And within a few days after 
the declaration of war, 1535 torpedoes and mines 
with the electrical appliances for their operation 
had been placed in various harbours. 

But up to this time the preparation for war had 
been confined almost exclusively to coast defences, 
for the reason that the only appropriation made 
before the outbreak of hostilities was for national 
defence, and not available for offensive prepara- 
tions. Accordingly, between March 9 and April 
23, the War Department was practically unable to 
do anything in the way of ordering or purchasing 
clothing, tentage, and commissary stores, or of ac- 
cumulating material and equipments, for offensive 
war. 

Furthermore, the officers of the Quartermaster, 
Commissary, and Medical departments, as well as 
those of the other departments, were too limited 
in number to do the work necessary for such an 
enormous increase in the military establishment. 
On April 23 only twenty-two trained officers were 



90 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

in the Commissary Department; only one hun- 
dred and seventy-nine were ready for duty in the 
Medical Department; and only fifty-seven were 
allowed by law in the Quartermaster Department. 
These officers had been sufficient for the needs of 
the small regular army, but now that war had come 
and an army ten times the size of the regular force 
was about to be organized, it was necessary to in- 
crease immediately the personnel of all the depart- 
ments, in order that the work of mustering in, 
equipping, supplying, and mobilizing the volun- 
teers might be carried on in a systematic and suc- 
cessful manner. 

It is not the purpose in this history to go into 
the details of the organization, mustering in, equip- 
ment, and mobilization of this large army, but only 
in a general way to outline and point out what was 
done, by whom, and when. It will suffice to say 
that no sooner had the call for volunteers been 
made and the necessary means been provided by 
Congress for creating and equipping this large 
army than each head of department of the regular 
army went to work to do his part with determina- 
tion, energy, and enthusiasm. 

The heads of the departments were : Brigadier- 
General H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General ; Brigadier- 
General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers; 
Brigadier-General M. I. Ludington, Quartermaster- 
General ; Brigadier-General George M. Sternberg, 
Surgeon-General ; Brigadier-General G. Norman 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 9 1 

Lieber, Judge Advocate-General; Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Thaddeus H, Stanton, Paymaster-General; 
Brigadier-General D. W. Flagler, Chief of Ord- 
nance; Brigadier-General A. W. Greely, Chief 
Signal-Officer ; Brigadier-General Charles P. Egan, 
Commissary- General; and Colonel George H. 
Barton, Acting ^ Inspector-General. 

William McKinley was President of the United 
States, General R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, and 
Major-General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of 
the Army. Under the immediate direction of the 
President and Secretary of War, the Adjutant- 
General, Brigadier-General H. C. Corbin, per- 
formed his duties. Besides keeping in touch with 
the different departments and issuing in the name 
of the President, Secretary of War, or Commanding 
General, the necessary orders, he had immediate 
charge of the mustering in and preliminary mobili- 
zation of the State volunteer troops, of the organi- 
zation and mustering in of the sixteen regiments of 
United States volunteers, and of the expansion of 
the regular army. 

There was much to be done. Approximately 
a quarter of a million men had to be organized, 
mustered in, equipped, and mobilized. Nearly 
everything had to be created. Clothing, tentage, 

1 The Inspector-General, Brigadier-General J. C. Breckenridge, 
having been commissioned a major-general of volunteers by the 
President, and the officer next in rank in the Inspector-General's 
Department, having been commissioned a brigadier-general of 
volunteers, neither served in that department during the war. 



92 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

wagons, ambulances, harness — in fact, almost 
everything in the way of uniform and equipment 
— had to be contracted for and manufactured ; 
cannon, small arms, cartridges, and other muni- 
tions of war had to be made, supplies of all kinds 
to be bought, and the transportation of troops on 
land and sea to be provided for. 

In the matter of arms the War Department had 
on hand a sufficient number of Krag Jorgensen 
30-calibre magazine rifles and carbines, including 
those already in use, to arm the increased regular 
army and about two thousand volunteers; but the 
greater part of the army, more than two hundred 
thousand volunteers, had to be furnished with the 
45-calibre Springfield rifles. Of these weapons 
there were 265,895 on hand. But there was no 
smokeless powder for them, nor was any obtain- 
able. Though the Springfield was a little out of 
date, it had been in its day an excellent military 
rifle. In range and penetration it was slightly 
inferior to the Krag Jorgenson ; and, being of 
larger calibre, fewer cartridges could be carried 
by the soldier. But the most serious objection to 
the arm arose not so much from any inherent 
inferiority as from the lack of smokeless-powder 
cartridges. The Krag Jorgensen, like the Mauser, 
was a modern small calibre magazine rifle, whose 
bullet had great range and penetrative power. In 
construction the two arms were very similar, and 
in power nearly equal ; but the Mauser, as it gave 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 93 

a greater muzzle velocity to the bullet, was slightly ' 
superior. 

Even with the abundant means at the disposal 
of the War Department, after the call for volun- 
teers had been made, there were a few articles in 
addition to Krag Jorgensen rifles and smokeless- 
powder cartridges that could not be obtained or 
manufactured fast enough to supply the demand. 
Wagons and ambulances and harness could not be 
purchased immediately in sufficient number ; great 
difficulty was experienced in obtaining sufficient 
canvas to supply the army with tents ; and no 
khaki cloth for uniforms was to be had in the 
United States. All this resulted, of course, in 
great inconvenience to the troops. The volunteers 
had to accept an inferior rifle and use black pow- 
der ; a number of regiments could obtain no tents ; 
the entire army was short of transportation ; and 
many soldiers had to go to the tropics and fight 
in winter clothing. But by the most energetic 
efforts these articles were soon manufactured, 
and in a short time practically all the volun- 
teers were fully supplied and equipped with every- 
thing needed, except modern magazine rifles and 
smokeless-powder cartridges. There were com- 
plaints, of course; some of them just, but most of 
them were about things that could not be helped ; 
not a few were made by colonels, quartermasters, 
or commissary officers of volunteer regiments, who, 
having had little or no previous experiences in their 



94 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

duties, did not know how to obtain the equipments 
and suppHes needed for their commands. Some 
mistakes were made, some confusion resulted; a 
few of the subordinate, newly appointed officers of 
the departments were not equal to the emergency; 
but in the end the work of preparation was quickly 
and systematically done. 

In five weeks practically all the volunteers of the 
first call had been mustered into the service. By 
the end of May 163,626 new men had been added 
to the army. On May 25, less than five weeks 
after the first call for troops, an expedition sailed 
to the Philippines. This was followed by a second 
expedition on June 15, and by a third on June 27 
and 29. And on June 14, less than seven weeks 
from the first call, the Fifth Corps, numbering ap- 
proximately seventeen thousand men, sailed from 
Tampa, Florida, to Santiago de Cuba. In August 
the organization, mustering in, mobilization, and 
equipment of 274,717 officers and men, had been 
completed.^ 

COMMENTS 

Though plans for fortifying Santiago de Cuba 
had been submitted by a commission of able 

1 " The successful accomplishment of this undertaking in such 
a comparatively brief period is in itself the greatest tribute that 
could be paid to the officers of the regular army by whom the 
work was done."— General R. A. Alger, in " The Spanish-American 
War." 

" The rapid mobilization of the army proved the wonder of 
mankind'"— Henry Watterson, in "History of the Spanish- 
American War." 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 95 

Spanish officers appointed two years and a half 
before the outbreak of the war, and though the 
necessity for fortifying the port was apparent, 
nothing was done. This neglect on the part of 
the Spanish government is most interestingly com- 
mented upon by Major Severo Gomez Nunez of 
the Spanish army in his book, "La Guerra Hispano- 
Americana, Santiago de Cuba." He says : 

" All the studies made by artillerists and engineers be- 
fore the war with regard to Santiago de Cuba prove to 
have been prophetic. The hard fought and most decisive 
battles took place on the very spots pointed out by them 
as positions to be defended. 

" An examination of the ground with a view to planning 
the defence of Santiago would unhesitatingly fix upon 
Daiquiri as the point where an enemy would land ; and 
the piers, magazines, shops, and equipage of every kind 
located there and belonging to powerful American com- 
panies who were working the mines of Vinent and Juragua, 
these connected, too, by railway with Santiago, would 
have to be destroyed at once should an enemy plan the 
taking of that city. 

" The inference was so certain that the conclusion was 
reached to use that part of the defence as a base for the 
establishment of a fortified camp for the protection of 
Santiago on the land side. 

" This conclusion once formed, the locating of posi- 
tions was for the purpose of closing the approaches by 
Sevilla, Aguadores, Lagunas, and El Caney roads, and the 
Juragua railway, as these routes would certainly be util- 
ized by an enemy advancing on the city. The military 



96 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

cordon which surrounds it with the old forts attached, 
together with the central redoubt of the military camp, 
were regarded as within the city proper; whilst Dos 
Caminos, Quintero, El Sueno, San Juan, Caridad, and 
Las Cruces would be advanced positions for the building 
of redoubts, and El Caney, La Redondn, Sevilla, El Pozo 
would be detached forts furnished with field guns. The 
mineral regions would be occupied by mobile detach- 
ments provided with artillery, so that the enemy could 
not approach the inlets to Aguadores, Sardinero, Jutici, 
Siboney, Juragua, and Daiquiri, especially the harbour 
and piers of this last place. 

"This plan would require cannon, many of them and 
good ones, and our country was at this critical moment 
lacking in them, and they were scarce at Santiago. Had 
those redoubts been armed with howitzers and siege guns, 
and had those field works been provided with light can- 
non, any attack by land on the part of the Americans 
would have been checked, just as the feeble coast bat- 
teries of Morro Castle and Socapa prevented tlie Yankee 
squadron from entering the harbour in spite of the many 
and powerful guns it carried. 

" It is sad, it is grievous to have to record these things, 
and our pain is augmented when we see that the actual 
facts have given us no wisdom. When a plan of defence 
is once decided upon, because that plan, that work is es- 
sential, is useful for the prestige and security of the state 
and its aims, it ought to be completed rapidly, tirelessly, 
without regard to cost, in the firm belief that it is right and 
indispensable to the life of the nation. . . . Still looking, 
as we are, for military aggrandizement, the hard lesson of 
the past would naturally serve as a chastisement for 
negligence, and as a warning for the future." 




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RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 97 

Several months after the suspension of hostilities, 
the commanding general, Nelson A. Miles, in his 
annual report to the Secretary of War, said : " The 
experience of the last few months, I trust, will be 
valuable to the people and government of the 
United States. The value of proper defences for 
our ports, harbors, and seaport cities of inestima- 
ble wealth, has been demonstrated ; and I trust that 
the system already adopted for coast defences, the 
completion of which has been so long delayed, may 
be carried out without unnecessary delay. I have 
urged the importance of this in my annual reports 
for the last thirteen years." 

Had the fortifications defending the coast cities 
and principal harbours of the United States been 
completed at the outbreak of the war, the military 
strength of the nation would have been much 
greater. The lack of adequate coast defences not 
only left many important seaports of the Atlantic 
unprotected, but made it necessary for the Flying 
Squadron to be held on the Atlantic coast for the 
purpose of defending these seaports in case of 
attack, when correct strategy required that both 
American squadrons should be united in Cuban 
waters, or at least be within supporting distance of 
each other. Thus the delay in completing the 
coast defences not only weakened the United States 
on land, but was a constant hindrance to the carry- 
ing out of correct strategical movements on the 
sea, — preventing that concentration of effort, that 
VOL. I.— 7 



98 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

exclusivenessofpurpose.which lies at the foundation 
of all military and naval success. This division of 
the American navy might have led to far-reaching 
and disastrous results, for, if other conditions had 
been favourable, it would have afforded the Span- 
ish navy an opportunity of bringing a superior force 
against one or the other of the American squadrons. 
The appropriation of ^50,000,000 for national 
defence, made only a few weeks before the opening 
of hostilities, enabled the Ordnance Department 
and the Engineer Corps by great exertions to add 
enormously to the strength of the coast fortifica- 
tions, though much of the work was necessarily 
hurried and temporary. 

It was a fortunate circumstance that in the early 
stages of the war the Spanish navy was not suffi- 
ciently strong to attack some of the poorly pro- 
tected coast cities of the United States. Had the 
war been with a naval power strong enough to make 
a successful attack against one or more of the prin- 
cipal American seaports, the importance of careful 
and timely preparation would have been brought 
home to the American people in a manner never 
to be forgotten. Though experience is a wise 
teacher, yet it does seem that a great nation of 
virile, strenuous, and intellectual people ought to 
be able thoroughly to appreciate the meaning of 
the old proverb, " In time of peace prepare for 
war, " without waiting to have the lesson impressed 
upon them by the humiliating experience of having 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 99 

one or more of their large seacoast cities captured, 
sacked, or destroyed. " Fools, " said Bismarck, 
"say that you can only gain experience at your 
own expense, but I have always contrived to gain 
my experience at the expense of others." 

Had the Act of Congress appropriating $50,- 
000,000 for national defence been so worded as 
to allow a part of the sum to be used for offensive 
purposes, much could have been done prior to the 
declaration of war towards preparing for the im- 
pending conflict. But, with the exception of push- 
ing to completion such small contracts for the 
regular army as the law had already authorized, no 
provision whatever could be made for furnishing 
great quantities of small arms, ammunition, harness, 
wagons, ambulances, tentage, clothing, and sub- 
sistence that became necessary as soon as war was 
declared. Though the entire nation and every rep- 
resentative in Congress felt that war was inevitable 
and would shortly come, though more than two 
hundred thousand trained Spanish soldiers were 
within a few hours' sail of the American shores, 
the great supply departments of the War Depart- 
ment had to waste many precious days — had to 
mark time, as it were, from the blowing up of 
the Maine on February 15 until the first call for 
volunteers on April 23. 

When it is remembered that Cuba lies within 
one hundred and fifty miles of the coast of southern 
Florida, that one hundred and ninety-six thousand 



100 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Spanish troops were in the island at the beginning 
of the war, and only twenty-eight thousand Ameri- 
can troops in the United States, and that Spain's 
navy was not greatly inferior to that of the United 
States in fighting power, and even superior to it in 
some respects, one can readily appreciate how 
serious the situation might have been, if the fortune 
of war in the earlier stages of hostilities had been 
favourable to Spain on the sea. 

Let us suppose that by more skilful combina- 
tions on the sea, or the utilization of her superiority 
in torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, or 
through some fortuitous disaster to the American 
navy, Spain had at the start, or early in the strug- 
gle, gained control of the sea in Cuban waters, is it 
not possible that she might have then attempted, 
with some hope of success, an invasion of the 
United States with the troops occupying Cuba? 
Though, as a matter of course, owing to the great 
resources of the United States and the large num- 
ber of volunteers that would in a few months have 
been ready for active duty, the Spanish forces 
would undoubtedly have been finally conquered 
or destroyed, nevertheless, with the United States 
officials ignorant as to where the Spanish troops 
would land, and having only the small regular army 
to meet them, and it scattered, or at least not con- 
centrated at the landing place, is it not probable that 
Spain could have landed troops and possibly have 
captured some large seaport or important harbour? 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES lOI 

It is never wise to underrate the fighting power 
of an adversary. Though the Spaniards are not 
given to making invasions and pushing with vigour 
offensive operations against an enemy, yet it is 
well to remember that they are, and have ever 
been, an extraordinarily brave people. Had they 
once made a landing and gained a foothold in 
the United States, they doubtless could not have 
been expelled without desperate fighting and much 
bloodshed. At El Caney, where they occupied a 
stone fort and a strong defensive position, they were 
defeated by the Americans ; but not until forty-nine 
per cent of them had been killed or wounded in one 
of the most desperate struggles mentioned in his- 
tory. In this battle the Spaniards numbered five 
hundred and twenty; the Americans, more than 
six thousand. 

It has already been pointed out that prior to the 
declaration of war nothing was done by Congress 
in the way of reorganizing and increasing the regu- 
lar forces, except the passing of an act adding to 
the regular establishment two artillery regiments. 
Had an act been passed prior to the destruction 
of the Maine, or immediately afterwards, similar 
to the one that has since passed and is now the 
law, reorganizing and augmenting the regular 
army, and allowing the President in an emergency 
to increase it from a peace footing of 59,657 
enlisted men to a war footing of 100,000, the 
United States would have been in much better 



102 THE CAMPAIGN OF SAXTIAGO DE CUBA 

condition to meet the situation at the outbreak 
of hostilities. 

There was no good reason why the United 
States should not have been better prepared for 
war. The emergency did not suddenly arise. The 
coming conflict could be foreseen by all. For 
months prior to the destruction of the Maine, war 
with Spain was very probable ; after that act, it 
was almost inevitable. 

Looking at the situation from the point of view 
of ordinary precaution, we are not putting the mat- 
ter too strongly to say that at least one hundred 
thousand trained troops were needed at the begin- 
ning of the war to meet with fair chances of success 
emergencies that might arise, while the volunteers 
were being enlisted and properly trained. 

It is true that 14,350^ regulars sailed to Cuba in 
General Shafter's expedition, and that they, with 
the small number of volunteers accompanying 
them, were sufficient to defeat the Spaniards in 
the critical and important battles of El Caney and 
San Juan. But it should be remembered that there 
were 196,820 Spanish soldiers in Cuba, of whom 
36,582 2 were in the province of Santiago, 9430 

1 The strength of General Shafter's expedition, as given in his 
official report, was 16,887 officers and men. Only three volun- 
teer regiments sailed with him,— ist U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, 2d 
Mass. Volunteer Infantry, 71st N. Y. Volunteer Infantry. Their 
strength as given in return of June 20, made on board the trans- 
port, was 2537 officers and men. 

2 See Appendix F. 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 103 

in and about Santiago and its harbour, not to men- 
tion 2666 occupying several inland towns within 
a few miles of Santiago, and 1000 marines in the 
city. Under these circumstances it was natural 
to suppose that General Shafter would have to 
meet superior forces on the battlefield. There 
was every reason to believe that the Spanish com- 
mander at Santiago, General Arsenio Linares, 
upon learning of the destination of General 
Shafter's expedition, would attempt immediately 
to concentrate ^ at Santiago a large proportion of 
the Spanish troops of the province for the purpose 
of crushing the American army. But only a small 
effort of this kind was made. Indeed, the most 
marvellous incompetency in strategy and general- 
ship was everywhere manifested by the Spanish 
commander. If, then, it is argued that results 
prove that a larger number of trained American 

1 Referring to this matter, the " Revue Militaire " for January, 
1900, said : " It is true that almost all the eastern part of Cuba 
was in possession of the insurgents, and that movements of troops 
were ditlicult because of lack of communications, but notwithstand- 
ing all this, it was possible to make a concentration of large num- 
bers of troops that were scattered throughout the province ; the 
success of Escario's column, which left Manzanillo and entered 
the evening before the city was invested by the Americans, demon- 
strates this. There were six thousand men in Guantanamo, twelve 
thousand in Holguin, and six thousand in Manzanillo ; but all 
these forces remained inactive, and Lieutenant-General Linares, 
Governor of Santiago, had only the troops that formed the garri- 
son of the city for its defence. Even these were scattered until 
the last moment among the widely separated positions that they 
occupied, and the only object of which was to hold the insurgent 
bands at a distance." 



[04 



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



troops were not needed, the reply is that under 
ordinary circumstances, under usual strategical 
conditions, success would have been impossible 
without them. 

Anticipating somewhat the history of these 
events, we may here point out that only about 
seventeen hundred Spanish soldiers and sailors 
were actually engaged on the fighting line in the 
battles of El Caney and San Juan on July i, while 
General Shafter, out of a total force of 18,218 ^ 
officers and men equipped and present for duty, 
brought upon these two battlefields 15,065. And 
even with these odds in favour of the Americans 
the strongly entrenched forts and defensive posi- 
tions of the Spaniards made the American victory 
a dearly bought one. What would have been the 
result had the Spanish commander brought upon 
the battlefields of El Caney and San Juan as large 
a percentage of his total forces at Santiago as the 
American commander did of his forces? What 
would have been the result had he gone a step 
farther and concentrated at Santiago a large pro- 
portion of the Spanish troops of the province 
and overwhelmingly outnumbered the Ameri- 
cans? Thousands of Spanish soldiers as brave 
as the bravest were in the province, but they had 
no leader worthy of the name. " Of what avail 
are men," says Carlyle, " when we must needs 
have a man? " 

1 See Appendix R. 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AA'D COAST DEFENCES 1 05 

That the Spanish commander should not have 
brought on these two battlefields an aggregate 
force of soldiers numbering more than one to 
every hundred in the island seems marvellous. 
That General Shafter's small army should not, 
under so many unfavourable conditions, have been 
defeated, crushed, captured, or annihilated, seems 
hardly short of the miraculous. When it is remem- 
bered that in this campaign the United States won 
a glorious victory far-reaching in its results, in 
spite of a lack of proper and timely preparation, 
in spite of the small size of the invading army and 
the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, in spite 
of the tropical rains, the withering heat, the deadly 
fevers, and the desperate resistance ofifered by the 
Spaniards on the battlefield, one is almost tempted 
to exclaim with Bismarck that " God always looks 
after the fools and — and the United States." 

Had General Shafter's army been destroyed, the 
United States would have had remaining only a 
handful of trained soldiers with which to prosecute 
the war in Cuba. Out of twenty-five regiments of 
infantry in the regular army, eighteen had sailed 
in General Shafter's expedition. Out of ten regi- 
ments of cavalry the greater part of six had sailed ; 
and out of seven regiments of artillery, two of which 
had not yet been organized, the batteries of three 
had sailed. And, besides, the greater part of three 
regiments of regular infantry and four batteries of 
regular artillery had sailed to the Philippines. 



I06 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

It can be readily seen that with the regular 
forces practically eliminated, the prosecution of 
the campaign in Cuba to a successful termination 
would have cost the American people a frightful 
amount of blood and treasure. Undoubtedly the 
volunteers would in time have conquered the 
Spaniards in the island; but having been only 
recently organized, and having had no experience 
in campaigning, no instruction in how to care for 
themselves in the tropics, no practice in target 
shooting, and few opportunities for acquiring 
proficiency in drill and military manoeuvres, they 
would not have been in proper condition to begin 
a campaign until Autumn, and even then they 
would have had to undergo many hardships, 
suffer great mortality, perhaps a number of de- 
feats, in acquiring that discipline and proficiency 
necessary to win victories against trained troops. 

In this connection it may be noted that soldiers 
cannot be made in a day, and that their training is 
more important now than ever before. In these 
days, when the weapons used in war are constantly 
changing and steadily increasing in effectiveness, 
the efficiency of a soldier is measured, not by his 
bravery, for nearly all men are brave, but by his 
military education and training. Especially must 
the soldier of to-day be instructed in target shoot- 
ing. He must not only be taught to shoot, but to 
shoot accurately, and this proficiency cannot be 
acquired without painstaking care and persistent 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 10/ 

practice. If with his rifle the soldier can hit his 
man at six or eight hundred, or a thousand yards, 
he becomes a power on the battlefield and is worth 
more than a dozen untrained men. 

The Act of Congress of April 26 increasing the 
regular army temporarily to 62,597 men had the 
effect of practically doubling the enlisted strength 
of the regular forces ; but as the Act was not passed 
until five days after the beginning of the war, the 
additional men authorized therein could not be 
got into shape in time to take part^ in the earlier 
operations. Had the Act been passed two months 
earlier, much could have been done towards train- 
ing and instructing these recruits previous to the 
sailing of General Shafter's expedition. 

But though the increase of the regular army at 
the last moment added practically nothing to its 
strength in the active operations about to be en- 
tered upon, there was not in the entire army a 
single regiment, battalion, squadron, or company, 
nor a single officer, that was not eager to go to the 
front and take part in the earliest fighting. Many 
of the officers knew that the outlook was unfa- 
vourable, that the chances of success were doubtful. 

1 " The regular regiments went to Santiago with very few 
recruits received under the Act of April 26. The Second Infantry 
was an exception. That regiment had about two hundred of such 
recruits. I think no other regiment had any considerable number. 
The regimental commanders generally expressed themselves as 
not desiring to take recruits recently received, because of non- 
instruction and lack of equipment." — Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. 
McClernand, U. S. Army, in personal letter to the author. 



I08 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Many of them knew that suffenng and fever and 
death were in their pathway; but whatever diffi- 
culties and hardships had to be met, however fierce 
the fighting might be, there was ever present in 
that little band of brave men the feeling that they 
would give an account of themselves worthy the 
praise of the American people. 

But after the passage of the Act of Congress 
declaring war, authorizing the calHng forth of the 
volunteers, and increasing the regular army, there 
was no further delay. From that time on the 
work of putting the military forces of the United 
States into condition for active operations was 
pushed with the utmost energy. 

At the outbreak of the war the first call for 
troops was made by the President on April 23, 
the second call on May 25 ; and by the end of 
May the records show that 163,626 enlisted men 
had been mustered into the service. At the begin- 
ning of the Civil War in 1861, the first call for 
volunteers was made by the President on April 15, 
the second call on May 3 ; and by the end of May 
only 16,161 enlisted men had been mustered into 
the service. In August, 1898, the military forces 
of the United States numbered 274,717 officers 
and men ; in the Civil War that number was not 
reached until November, 1861. 

The accomplishment of this great undertaking 
in so short a time, under such adverse circum- 
stances, was due to the efficient heads of bureaus 



RESOURCES, ARMIES, AND COAST DEFENCES 1 09 

of the War Department and their assistants, and to 
the Hne officers of the United States army, and 
especially was it due to the efficient Secretary of 
War, General R, A. Alger, and the able Adjutant- 
General of the Army, Brigadier-General H. C, 
Corbin, the greatest executive staff officer this 
country has ever known. Through their intelli- 
gence, patriotism, zeal, and ceaseless toil, this 
great army was speedily mustered in, equipped, 
and mobilized. Fortunate is the nation that can 
always in time of peril command the services of as 
able and highly trained officers as were those of 
the United States army at the beginning of the 
Spanish-American War. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES, THE 
PLANS OF CAMPAIGN, AND THE OUTLOOK FROM 
A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW 

ON April I, 1898, the 28,183 officers and men 
composing the regular army of the United 
States were on garrison duty at the ninety-two 
military posts, East, West, North, and South 
throughout the country. Not more than a few 
hundred men were stationed at any one of these 
posts; indeed, since the Civil War only a few 
regiments had had, even for a short time, all 
their companies united. 

On April 15 such of the regiments as could 
be spared from their stations were sent to New 
Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa, preparatory to an 
invasion of Cuba; but before this plan was fully 
carried into effect the military authorities deter- 
mined to establish at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, 
a camp, to be known as Camp George H. Thomas, 
for the mobilization and instruction of the United 
States forces. Here, during the latter part of 
April and the early part of May, a large propor- 
tion of the regular army and a number of volun- 
teer regiments were assembled. Later, for a like 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES III 

purpose, Camp Alger, named in honour of the 
Secretary of War, was estabhshed at Falls Church, 
Virginia, near Washington. From Camp Thomas 
and other points troops were soon hurriedly 
pushed forward to Tampa, Jacksonville, and Fer- 
nandina, in Florida, with a view of having them 
near at hand and ready for an immediate move- 
ment on Cuba. 

The purpose was to organize the regulars and 
volunteers into eight corps ; and though, owing to 
the short duration of the war, this purpose was not 
entirely carried out, it was well along towards 
completion by the middle of the Summer. Each 
of these eight corps was to consist, as far as prac- 
ticable, of three divisions; each division, of three 
brigades ; each brigade, of three regiments. The 
corps were commanded by the following officers 
and were mobilized at the following places : 

The First Army Corps, Major-General John R. 
Brooke, Camp George H. Thomas, Chickamauga 
Park, Georgia; the Second Army Corps, Major- 
General William M. Graham, Camp Alger, Falls 
Church, Virginia ; the Third Army Corps, Major- 
General James S. Wade, Camp George H. Thomas, 
Georgia; the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General 
John J. Coppinger, Mobile, Alabama (this corps 
was subsequently sent to Tampa and Fernandina, 
Florida, and then to Huntsville, Alabama) ; the 
Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. 
§hafter, Tampa, Florida (this corps was sent to 



112 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Santiago de Cuba) ; the Sixth Army Corps, Major- 
General James H. Wilson, Camp George H. 
Thomas, Georgia (the organization of this corps 
was not completed) ; the Seventh Army Corps, 
Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, Tampa, Florida 
(this corps was subsequently sent to Jacksonville, 
Florida) ; the Eighth Army Corps, Major-General 
Wesley Merritt, San Francisco, California (this 
corps was sent to Manila, Philippine Islands). 

Most of the regiments of the regular army that 
could be spared from their stations were finally 
concentrated at Tampa, and, with a few volunteer 
regiments, were organized into the Fifth Corps, 

In addition to these eight corps, about twelve 
thousand volunteers were distributed along the 
seacoast from New Jersey to Maine ; five regi- 
ments of United States volunteers were stationed 
at different points in the South; and one regiment 
of regular infantry, three of cavalry, and the 
greater part of the artillery, were left at the vari- 
ous army posts and seacoast forts of the United 
States. 

Of the 274,717 officers and men in the American 
army in August, 1898, there had sailed to Manila 
10,934, leaving 263,783, the greater part of whom, 
had they been needed, would have been avail- 
able in the Autumn for active operations against 
Spain, 

At the outbreak of the war there were in the 
West Indies about two hundred and five thousand 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES II3 

eight hundred and twenty Spanish soldiers, of 
whom one hundred and ninety-six thousand eight 
hundred and twenty were in Cuba, and about nine 
thousand in Porto Rico. Of those in Cuba 160,238 
were widely distributed throughout the western 
and central provinces of the island, principally in 
and about Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cien- 
fuegos, and on or near the railroads connecting 
these seaports; the remainder, numbering 36,582,^ 
were widely scattered throughout the province of 
Santiago in the eastern part of the island. 

As the rainy season in Cuba was near at hand 
and would probably last until October or Novem- 
ber, the officials of the War Department believed 
that the wisest course would be to devote the 
Summer to organizing, equipping, and drilling the 
volunteers, and to defer the principal campaign 
against the Spaniards until Autumn, but in the 
meantime to keep the regulars at Tampa in a state 
of readiness for making into Cuba or Porto Rico 
any harassing incursions which might seem prac- 
ticable, or which the march of events might seem 
to justify. 

On the other hand, the Spaniards in Cuba had 
formulated no plans for a land campaign ; nor had 
they made any special effort to concentrate their 
forces at or near the principal seaports of the 
island. They were awaiting events. They be- 
lieved, however, that if an invasion were attempted, 
1 See Appendix F. 



114 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

it would most probably be made in the vicinity of 
Havana ; and as the city was strongly fortified, 
and a large number of troops were there, or within 
easy reach, they felt great confidence in their abil- 
ity to defeat such a movement. 

No sooner had war been declared than the 
officials of the War Department of the United 
States decided to send to Cuba an expedition 
composed of about five thousand of the regu- 
lar troops encamped at Tampa. Major-General 
William R. Shafter, United States Volunteers, a 
brigadier-general in the regular army, who had 
gained in the Civil War a solid reputation as a 
hard fighter, was placed in command. This expe- 
dition was not intended as an extensive movement 
against the Spaniards in Cuba, but merely as a 
reconnoissance in force, for the purpose of gaining 
information, and furnishing supplies, arms, and 
ammunition to the insurgents. The expedition 
was to sail under convoy of the navy, and to make 
the first landing on the south coast of Cuba, where 
it was expected that General Shafter would be 
able to communicate with General Maximo Gomez, 
the Commander-in-chief of the Cuban insurgents, 
and supply him with arms, ammunition, and food. 
Having accomplished this object. General Shafter 
was to reembark his troops and proceed to the 
northwest coast of Cuba for the purpose of fur- 
nishing supplies and arms to the insurgents in that 
vicinity, unless the arrival of the Spanish squadron 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES I15 

should, in the meantime, render this movement 
hazardous ; in which case the expedition was to 
return to the United States. 

On April 29 orders were issued for this move- 
ment, but as information was received on the 30th 
that Cervera's squadron had sailed westward from 
Cape Verde Islands on the previous day, the Navy- 
Department officials felt that ships could not 
then wisely be spared to convoy the expedition. 
Orders were therefore sent General Shafter to 
delay the movement. He was directed, however, 
to make inquiries with a view of learning whether 
it would be practicable, notwithstanding the prob- 
able approach of Cervera's squadron, for an expe- 
dition of six or seven thousand men to be convoyed 
to the vicinity of Mariel, on the northwest coast of 
Cuba. 

This latter movement was pronounced feasible 
by Commodore Watson in command at Key West. 
Accordingly General Shafter, after some corre- 
spondence with the War Department, received 
orders on May 9 to transport the troops originally 
intended for the reconnoissance on the south coast 
of Cuba to the vicinity of Mariel, or some other 
important point on the north coast. He was ex- 
pected to land, take up a strong defensive position, 
and occupy sufficient territory to give room for 
large reenforcements. The purpose was to form a 
nucleus with the troops first landed, and then to 
reenforce them as rapidly as possible by sending 



Il6 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

forward the remaining available regular regiments, 
and the volunteers as fast as they could be made 
ready for active service, until there should be a 
sufficient force to undertake a campaign against 
Havana. But when it became known on the loth 
that no convoy could be obtained for several days, 
the orders of the 9th were temporarily suspended; 
and at the same time instructions were given to 
send about twelve thousand of the infantry at 
Tampa to Key West, with a view of having them 
convoyed to Cuba at a later date. But on account 
of an insufficient water supply at Key West, this 
plan had also to be abandoned. Meanwhile, posi- 
tive information having been received that Cer- 
vera's squadron had arrived off Martinique, West 
India Islands, on May 11, it became impracticable 
to carry out any of these plans for transporting 
troops to Cuba until the Spanish squadron should 
be met and vanquished. 

But though the plans for an attack on Havana 
were on this account postponed, the organization 
of an invading army at Tampa was pushed as 
rapidly as possible. While the War Department 
was collecting a fleet of transports at that port 
during the latter part of May, word was received 
that Cervera's squadron had entered Santiago 
Harbour on May 19. Although at the time there 
was some little doubt as to the correctness of this 
information. General Shafter was ordered on May 
2^ to be prepared to place his troops on the 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES WJ 

transports with the view of sailing to Santiago de 
Cuba. 

Meanwhile, numerous conferences were held in 
Washington by the President with the Secretary of 
War, other members of the Cabinet, and General 
Miles, for the purpose of considering plans of 
campaign. As a result of these conferences, Gen- 
eral Miles, having been directed to formulate a 
plan of operations, submitted the following: 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, D.C, May 26, 189S. 

The Honorable the Secretary of War. 

Sir, ... As you are aware, the available force of the 
regular army, numbering some seventeen thousand men, 
has been ready for the field from the day that the govern- 
ment decided to take war measures against the Spanish 
government, and, as it will be remembered, my first pur- 
pose was to form a junction with Gomez's troops on the 
south coast of Cuba, in Santa Clara Province. This move- 
ment was delayed, as the navy reported that it could not 
well furnish the convoys and desired all of their available 
ships to meet the Spanish fleet. When it was reported 
that the Spanish fleet had returned to Cadiz, transports 
were gathered in the Gulf to move a portion of the army 
to Cuba, and are now in readiness for that purpose. 

In view of the fact that the volunteer army is neither 
equipped nor instructed, nor even supplied with ammuni- 
tion sufficient to fight a battle, I deem it advisable to sug- 
gest the use of the available force now on the Gulf in the 
following manner : 

According to all accounts, the Spanish fleet is divided, 



Il8 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

a small portion being in Cuban waters and the remainder 
at Cadiz on the coast of Spain. If the ships and torpedo 
boats under the command of Admiral Cervera have been 
enclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I suggest 
that the military forces go at once to the assistance of the 
navy, and by landing fifteen miles east of Santiago de 
Cuba, at Daiquiri, move over the low mountains towards 
Santiago de Cuba, where, by placing the artillery in posi- 
tion, they can command the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, 
and with field and siege guns would be able to destroy 
the fleet by a plunging fire, or at least assist our navy 
in entering the harbor, thereby destroying or capturing 
the Spanish fleet as well as the garrison occupying that 
vicinity. We can also communicate with General Garcia, 
who has eight thousand men in Santiago de Cuba Prov- 
ince, which would assist in the capture of the garrison. 
This might be considered the first movement. 

Second, if it should be found, before the above move- 
ments could be accomphshed, that the Spanish fleet had 
escaped from Santiago de Cuba or shall have been cap- 
tured by our fleet, it would be well, in my judgment, to 
capture the island of Porto Rico by a combined attack of 
the army and navy with the least possible delay. Twenty- 
five thousand men of the army, principally artillery and 
infantry, with the assistance of the fleet, will, in my judg- 
ment, be sufficient to capture that island. . . . 

Of course our ships, which are necessary to accomplish 
the object specified, should at all times have the safe con- 
voy of the ships of the navy. 

Very respectfully, 

Nelson A. Miles, 

Major- General, Com?nanding. 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 19 

And on the next day he again wrote the Secre- 
tary of War : 

" Referring to my letter ^ of yesterday and to our con- 
sultation since, I desire to submit the following : 

" As we are now about to inaugurate active military 
operations in conjunction with the navy, I think it would 
be advisable to load the transports at Tampa with a strong 
force of infantry and artillery, move them to Key West, 
and thence along the northern coast of Cuba, where they 
would have the full protection of Admiral Sampson's fleet 
until they reach Admiral Schley's fleet at Santiago de 
Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the army and 
navy, capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Span- 
ish fleet at that point. 

"If, before reaching Admiral Schley's fleet, it shall be 
found that he has already accomplished the above object 
or that the Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I then urge 
the importance of a combined attack of the army and 
navy upon Porto Rico. We will be able to land a superior 
force, and I beheve that a combined effort will result in 
capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done 
before it can be reenforced from Spain. The distance 
from Key West to Porto Rico is ten hundred and forty 
miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico, it is four 
thousand miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of 
great advantage to the military, as it would cripple the 
forces of Spain, giving us several thousand prisoners. It 
could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a 

1 In these letters General Miles also submitted further plans; 
but as they had no immediate bearing upon the campaign, and 
were not to be carried out until the movement upon either Santiago 
de Cuba or Porto Rico was accomplished, they are omitted here. 



120 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

most excellent port for our navy, which could be relieved 
from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we 
could have a sufficient garrison to hold it against any 
force that might be sent against it." 

On May 29 General Shafter was ordered to place 
his troops on board the transports, and on May 30 
and 31 he received the following telegraphic orders: 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, D.C, May 30, 1898. 

Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Florida. 

Referring to my telegram of last night, Admiral Schley 
reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been 
seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to 
capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing 
harbor and fleet. Load your transports with effective 
force of infantry and artillery, both regular, and mortars 
and two or three field batteries. You can take any dis- 
mounted cavalry you desire. Limit the animals to the 
least number required for artillery and transportation, as it 
is not expected that you will go but a short distance inland. 
Your troops should have five hundred rounds of ammuni- 
tion per man if possible, two months' supplies, and in 
addition you can load supplies to last six months. If 
practicable, take five thousand rifles with ammunition for 
insurgents. You can organize your command under 
Generals Arnold, Burt, Hawkins, Kent. Henry, Lawton, 
and Chaffee. Have your command embark as rapidly as 
possible, and telegraph when your expedition will be 
ready to sail. I leave for Tampa to-night. 

Miles, 
Major- General, Commanding. 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 121 

War Department, Washington, 

May 31, 1898 — 2.30 a.m. 
Major-General Wiixiam R. Shafter, Tampa, Florida. 

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are 
directed to take your command on transports, proceed 
under convoy of the navy to the vicinity of Santiago de 
Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that 
point as your judgment may dictate, under the protec- 
tion of the navy, and move it on to the high ground 
and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as 
shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison 
there, and cover the navy as it sends its men in small 
boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the navy, 
capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to 
be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost 
energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the govern- 
ment relies upon your good judgment as to the most 
judicious use of your command, but desires to impress 
upon you the importance of accomplishing this ob- 
ject with the least possible delay. You can call to your 
assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and 
make use of such of them as you think advisable to 
assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are 
cautioned against putting too much confidence in any 
persons outside of your own troops. You will take every 
precaution against ambuscades or surprises or positions 
that may have been mined or are commanded by the 
Spanish forces. You will cooperate most earnestly with 
the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon 
a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to 
Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On comple- 
tion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or 



122 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de 
Cuba, reembark your troops and proceed to tlie harbor of 
Puerto de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means 
for further orders and future important service — this with 
the unaerstanding that your command has not sustained 
serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your 
transports and convoy. When will you sail? 
By command of Major- General Miles. 

H. C. CORBIN, 

Adjutant- General. 

But affairs at Tampa were in such great con- 
fusion that many difficulties were encountered in 
getting the expedition ready to sail. When the 
regiments of the Fifth Corps, which were to com- 
pose the expedition, arrived at Tampa, the lack of 
an adequate supply of water and other sanitary 
requirements necessitated their being assigned to 
camps at considerable distance from each other, 
and from Port Tampa, where the embarkation 
was to take place. Not only was " the capacity 
of the place greatly exceeded," but the facilities 
for embarking the troops were inadequate. Only 
a single line of railroad connected Tampa with 
Port Tampa, nine miles away. The switching 
facilities were entirely too limited, and for miles 
the line was choked with freight-cars which could 
not be unloaded near the places where the regi- 
ments were encamped and the supplies needed. 
As the cars had no labels indicating their contents, 
consignments could not be found when wanted. 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 123 

and as the little local post-ofifice could not properly 
handle the mail, bills of lading were not promptly- 
distributed. Thus it became impossible for receiv- 
ing officers to supply and equip the troops expe- 
ditiously. The equipments and supplies needed 
were nearly all there, but to find them was the 
difficulty. An officer seeking clothing would open 
a car onh' to find cannon, or seeking bacon and 
beans would find shirts and shoes. The docking 
space, too, was inadequate. There was wharfage 
for only eight or nine of the thirty-five or more 
vessels that had to be loaded, and no storage 
facilities had been provided. 

Naturally, in the midst of such a chaotic condi- 
tion of affairs, delays were unavoidable and mis- 
takes frequently made. But, nevertheless, General 
Shafter and his officers, working day and night with 
enthusiasm unabated and energy unsurpassed, suc- 
ceeded in loading the transports and embarking 
the troops in eight days, although, through unfore- 
seen and uncontrollable circumstances, which will 
be described later, the final departure of the ex- 
pedition did not take place until June 14. 



COMMENTS 

If the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico had not be- 
longed to Spain, there would have been no serious 
thought in this war of either power's attempting 
to invade the territory of the other. The fighting 



124 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

would have been almost exclusively on the sea, and 
almost the only use for land forces would have been 
to man the coast fortifications. But the proximity 
of Cuba to the United States and the fact that 
Spain had a large army there, made it advisable 
for the United States government to begin imme- 
diate preparations for striking Spain a fatal blow 
on Cuban soil and preventing a possible invasion 
of its own territory. How large an army would be 
necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes 
depended in a great measure upon the number of 
Spanish troops then in Cuba. But this number 
was not known to the United States authorities. 
General Miles had placed it at one hundred and 
fifty thousand, which was about forty-six thousand 
less than the actual number. But even if the actual 
number had been no larger than General Miles' 
estimate, there was ample reason for the belief 
on the part of military experts that the successful 
invasion of Cuba and the adequate manning of 
the coast fortifications of the United States would 
require the services of every man of the two 
hundred thousand volunteers called for by the 
President. 

If it should be contended that, owing to tropical 
diseases and enervating climate, a large proportion 
of the Spanish troops in Cuba were unfit for active 
operations and therefore such a large American 
army was not necessary, the reply is, that in every 
invasion of the island a large percentage of the 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 25 

invading forces have become unfit for active ser- 
vice within a few weeks after their arrival. 

From a military point of view there were reasons 
that seemed conclusive for deferring until Autumn 
the main campaign against Cuba. The rainy sea- 
son was near at hand and would probably last until 
October. Aside from the hindrances to active 
operations that would be caused by daily torren- 
tial rains, it would be impossible for the soldiers 
to escape the fatal diseases that were prevalent in 
that climate at that season of the year. Again, 
the volunteers were not ready for active service. 
Time was needed, not only for their equipment, 
instruction in drill, and target practice, but also for 
organizing them into brigades and corps. It was 
highly important for them to pass through some 
of the daily experiences of a soldier's life before 
being sent into a tropical climate on an active 
campaign against an army composed of men who 
had become accustomed to the hardships of actual 
warfare. Nor would the Spanish troops in Cuba 
be benefited in the least by this delay. On the 
contrary, with their supplies and reenforcements 
cut off as a result of the American blockade, they 
would be constantly diminishing in strength and 
numbers. Moreover, until the Spanish naval 
forces had been defeated, or securely blockaded 
in some West Indian port, an army could not be 
transported to Cuba without taking risks entirely 
unwarranted by the circumstances. The control 



126 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

of the sea in West Indian waters was the first essen- 
tial of a successful invasion of Cuba, and the fact 
that this would most probably be accomplished 
during the rainy and sickly season, while the volun- 
teers were being put in a state of readiness for active 
service, was in itself, from a military point of view, 
a sufficient reason for deferring until Autumn the 
principal land campaign against Cuba. 

But, on the other hand, there were strong reasons 
why the United States government desired to make 
an early movement on Cuba. A large proportion 
of the regular army, in a high state of discipline 
and ready for any active service, was assembled 
at Tampa. The Cuban insurgents needed arms, 
ammunition, and supplies, and especially encour- 
agement in their waning warfare against the Span- 
iards. The Cuban people too, many of whom were 
in a state of destitution and starvation, needed im- 
mediate relief. Furthermore, the people of the 
United States, wrought up to a liigh pitch of ex- 
citement over these facts, were extremely anxious 
to have the campaign begin at the earliest possible 
moment. Had there been much delay, there would 
in all probability have arisen from the people, 
regardless of all military considerations, the cry 
of " On to Havana," just as at the beginning of the 
great Civil War McDowell's army, while yet in a 
state of unreadiness, was pushed forward to humili- 
ation, disaster, and defeat by the cry of " On to 
Richmond." 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 12/ 

This condition of affairs evidently had some 
weight in shaping the poHcy of the War Depart- 
ment. Orders for landing troops at Mariel were 
issued and on the point of being carried out before 
the control of the sea had been gained or even 
actively attempted. Indeed, Cervera's squadron 
had not yet reached West Indian waters. The 
intention was for these troops to form the nucleus 
of an army, which was to begin a campaign against 
Havana in the Autumn. It is| almost needless to 
point out how hazardous the attempt to execute 
such a plan would have been. To say nothing of 
the danger of transporting the first troops of the 
expedition, there was no certainty, before the plans 
of the Spanish navy were known, that they could 
be strengthened by the reenforcements that would 
have been indispensable not only to their success, 
but to their very existence. 

Moreover, the haste with which orders for an 
attack on Havana were changed or revoked seems 
to indicate very clearly that the War Department 
felt very sensibly the influence of popular senti- 
ment, or that it had not duly considered the ob- 
stacles that would have to be met in any plan for 
the invasion of Cuba prior to the blockading or 
defeat of Cervera's squadron. 

It was very fortunate for the United States that 
the plan of making a landing at Mariel was not 
carried out, for the only troops that were available 
for that purpose were the regulars, which were so 



128 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

much needed shortly afterwards at Santiago de 
Cuba. If they had been landed at Mariel, they 
could not have been withdrawn without serious 
embarrassment; and if they had not been strongly 
reenforced, they could have been captured or an- 
nihilated by the powerful Spanish force which was 
in the vicinity of Havana. 

It should be noted also that an invading army 
operating from Mariel with Havana as its objective 
would not in the slightest degree have affected the 
demand ^ for troops to assist in the capture of 
Cervera's squadron, whatever West Indian port 
it might have entered. Had the squadron been 
blockaded in the harbour of Cienfuegos, Cuba, 
or San Juan, Porto Rico, there would still have 
been an imperative need for an invading army to 
attack the Spanish land forces of the harbour, 
while the American admiral stood ready at its 
mouth to destroy the Spanish ships should they 
attempt to escape. 

A landing at Mariel would have compelled the 
United States not only to divide the regular troops 
which were at Tampa, but also to maintain two 
armies in Cuba instead of one. This would have 
virtually amounted to an invasion of the island 
along two Hues of operations, and would have 

1 On June 6 Admiral Sampson, in command of the blockading 
fleet off Santiago de Cuba, telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy : 
" Every consideration demands immediate army movement ; if 
delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from 
the fleet." 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 29 

created the necessity of keeping open two lines 
of water communications: one from Tampa to 
Santiago de Cuba, around the eastern end of the 
island, the other from Tampa to Key West and 
thence to Mariel. Such a division of the invading 
forces would have placed them at a great disad- 
vantage, because it would have given the enemy 
the opportunity of massing overwhelming forces 
against one invading army while neglecting the 
other or holding it in check with a containing 
force.^ " To invade a country," says Napoleon, 
" along a double line of operations is a faulty 
combination." 

The adoption of a double line of operations, 
objectionable at any time, would have been par- 
ticularly so at the beginning of the campaign, 
when the fourteen or fifteen thousand regulars at 
Tampa were practically the only troops in the 
United States available for active service. It was 
of the greatest importance to keep these troops 
united, either for the purpose of aiding the navy 
in the capture or destruction of any part of the 
Spanish naval forces that might appear in West 
Indian waters, or of invading Cuba or Porto Rico 
along a single line of operations after the Spanish 
naval forces had been disposed of It was only by 
keeping them united that they were able shortly 

1 "Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty 
of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the 
enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against 
another portion of the hostile forces." — Wagner. 
VOL. I. — 9 



130 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

afterwards at Santiago to strike the blow which 
produced such decisive results. 

As the unchallenged control of the sea was 
essential to a successful land campaign on the 
island, it was necessary that the army should be in 
a state of readiness to respond promptly to any 
demand made by the navy for cooperation and 
assistance in destroying Cervera's squadron. In 
fact, it could be clearly foreseen that the destruc- 
tion or serious disabling of this squadron meant 
not only the control of the sea but the speedy ter- 
mination^ of the war. To save her honour Spain 
might have prolonged the conflict for a time; by 
desperate fighting her armies might have won a 
few temporary victories ; but at best such triumphs 
could have brightened but for a moment the dark 
clouds of humiliation and irretrievable disaster 
that were destined soon to cover in total eclipse 
the glory of a once proud and mighty empire. 

From what has been said it might seem that 
only a small American army was needed, but such 
was not the case. It was important that the army 
should be large enough to meet any contingency. 
In the first place, it could not be known in advance 
how many troops would be needed to attack the 

1 "The war was the squadron, and nothing but the squadron. 
To suppose, as it was supposed at the time, that the hostilities 
could be continued after the loss of the ships shows a sad lack of 
knowledge of our military situation and of the meaning of modern 
squadrons." — Victor M. Concas, Captain Spanish Navy, Chief 
of Staff of Cervera's Squadron. 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 131 

garrison of the port in which Cervera's squadron 
should take shelter. Had Cervera entered the 
harbour of Cienfuegos instead of the harbour of 
Santiago de Cuba, it can readily be seen that the 
railroad connections of Cienfuegos with Havana, 
Matanzas, and Cardenas would have permitted a 
quick concentration of a large number of Spanish 
troops at that port ; or had Cervera succeeded in 
entering Havana Harbour, it is evident that a suc- 
cessful attack by the Americans against the forti- 
fications of the city and the large Spanish force in 
the vicinity, would have necessitated the employ- 
ment of the entire available strength of the United 
States army. 

Secondly, if by greater skill on the sea, or by 
the fortunes of war, or by any other means, the 
Spaniards had gained control of West Indian 
waters, the American army ought to have been 
strong enough not only to defend the coast forti- 
fications, but also to meet any attack that might 
have been made by Spanish troops sailing from 
Cuba to the United States. 

Thirdly, if none of the Spanish naval forces had 
crossed the Atlantic, the American army ought to 
have been strong enough to make a successful 
invasion of Cuba by landing near Havana. 

And lastly, it was not alone the destruction of 
Cervera's squadron and the unchallenged control of 
the sea in West Indian waters that brought the cam- 
paign to a speedy termination, but the additional 



132 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

fact that more than a quarter of a million of Amer- 
ican soldiers would have been available in the 
Autumn for active operations. Though the main 
purpose of armies and battle fleets is to fight, yet, 
even before the clash of arms, victories are not infre- 
quently won by reason of readiness, strength, and 
favourable strategical positions; for, after all, the 
science of war is in great part the science of num- 
bers and positions. And such victories are most 
to be desired, for they are obtained without blood- 
shed. Preparedness for war is an insurance against 
war; this fact, thoroughly recognized and acted 
upon, would do more towards bringing about an 
era of peace than all the arguments and resolutions 
of the peace societies of the world. 

In this discussion there should constantly be 
kept in mind the fact that the best results were 
impossible without cordial cooperation between 
the army and navy. Harmony of action and 
unity of purpose were the ends to be sought. 
" Exclusiveness of purpose," says Napoleon, " is the 
secret of great successes and great operations." 

Thus far this discussion has indicated that the 
best plan of campaign for the army was to hold 
itself in readiness to cooperate with the navy in 
the destruction of Cervera's squadron upon its 
arrival in West Indian waters. But other contin- 
gencies should be considered. What would have 
been the best plan for the army if Cervera's 
squadron, reenforced by the available armoured 



SITUATION- OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 33 

vessels of Caniara's squadron, had taken up a 
position in the Canary Islands? In that case the 
army should have cooperated with the navy in an 
attack upon either Havana or Porto Rico. 

Inasmuch as Sampson's fleet was blockading 
Havana and the principal ports of western Cuba 
connected with Havana by railroad, and as there 
was nothing to cause any American warships to 
be withdrawn from this important work so long as 
the Spanish naval forces remained at the Canary 
Islands, it is evident that the whole of Sampson's 
fleet would have been available for cooperation 
with the army in an attack on Havana. But, on 
the other hand, if Porto Rico had been attacked, 
a number of the American warships would have 
had to be withdrawn from Cuba to assist the army 
in making a landing and in capturing San Juan. 
This would have weakened the blockading forces 
of Havana, and in a measure destroyed that unity 
of action which is so necessary to the accomplish- 
ment of great undertakings, and for the lack of 
which history records so many failures. 

Secondly, the army could probably have landed 
at Mariel for an attack on Havana, or even at 
Matanzas, which was very weakly fortified, as 
easily as it could have landed at any port of 
Porto Rico. 

Thirdly, as Havana was only ninety miles from 
the naval base of operations at Key West, and 
only three hundred and six miles from Tampa, an 



134 5"^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

army with its supplies, and the reenforcements 
that would have been necessary to maintain it in 
Cuba, could have been transported from Tampa 
to Havana with greater despatch and much less 
hazard than from Tampa to Porto Rico, which 
lies nine hundred and sixty miles from Key West 
and eleven hundred and eighty-seven miles from 
Tampa. Moreover, transports sailing from Tampa 
to Porto Rico would, during the latter part of the 
voyage, have incurred the danger of an attack by 
the Spanish squadron in the Canary Islands, while 
those sailing from Tampa to Havana would have 
been constantly under the protection of Sampson's 
warships at Key West and Havana. 

And finally, inasmuch as Havana was the capi- 
tal, and the largest and wealthiest city of Cuba, 
and the only strongly fortified city in the island, 
and inasmuch as the war was being fought for the 
overthrow of Spanish rule in Cuba, the defeat of 
the Spanish troops at Havana and the capture 
of that city would have resulted in the certain 
loss of the island. Indeed, the fall of Havana 
would almost certainly have ended the campaign ; 
for Havana was the chief seat of Spanish power in 
the Spanish West Indian possessions. 

But Porto Rico was so far distant from Cuba, and 
especially from the lines of communication leading 
from Tampa to Havana, that its occupation by the 
United States would not have aided to any appre- 
ciable extent the prosecution of the campaign 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 35 

against Cuba. In fact, its situation was such that 
it neither protected these lines of communication 
when held by the United States, nor greatly en- 
dangered them when held by Spain ; and though 
its occupation by the United States would have 
made much more difficult Spain's chance of bring- 
ing relief to the Spanish soldiers in Cuba, it would 
have produced no decisive effect upon the result 
of the campaign. 

To sum up the strategy of the campaign in 
a sentence : an attack on Havana, if Cervera's 
squadron remained in the Canary Islands,^ or an 
attack on Cervera's squadron, if it sailed to the 
West Indies, were the only plans that offered 
decisive results. 

But though the plan of attacking Havana 
offered the only decisive results as long as the 
Spanish naval forces remained away from West 
Indian waters, its capture would have been very 
difficult of accomplishment, because the harbour 
and city were strongly fortified and defended by 
a large number of Spanish troops; because the 
railroad connections with the interior, and with 

1 In this discussion Cervera's squadron, reenforced by the 
available armoured vessels of Camara's squadron, has been 
assumed to be at the Canary Islands, because it is believed 
that this would have been its best position at the beginning 
of hostilities. It is hardly necessary to remark that the same 
conclusions would be reached were the assumption to be made 
that the armoured vessels of the Spanish navy, either united or 
divided, remained in any waters across the ocean from the West 
Indian Islands. 



136 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, afforded ex- 
cellent facilities for a concentration of forces ; be- 
cause the Spaniards are an extraordinarily brave 
people with a predilection for defensive warfare; 
and because the transportation of the necessary 
reenforcements from Tampa to the scene of op- 
erations would have taxed almost to its utmost 
the transport service of the United States. That 
the city could not have been captured by the 
combined forces of the army and navy of the 
United States without furious fighting, severe 
hardships, and great loss of life, admits of little 
doubt. 

But, on the other hand, as Porto Rico was not 
strongly fortified and was occupied by only about 
nine thousand soldiers, the seizure of that island 
could have been made with fewer troops and much 
smaller losses. Although the loss of Porto Rico 
would have deprived Spain of the harbour of San 
Juan as a naval base of operations, and thereby 
have made it much more difficult for her naval 
forces to come to the assistance of the Spanish 
army in Cuba, or to undertake a campaign against 
Sampson's forces in Cuban waters, yet it would 
have had little or no effect in hastening the ter- 
mination of the war. Moreover, the invasion of 
Porto Rico would have caused the postponement 
of the final and decisive campaign against Cuba, 
and crippled the United States by wearing out 
the regular forces which would be needed in all 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 137 

their original strength and vigour for an attack 
on Havana. In short, the United States could not 
afford to fritter away the strength of its best troops 
upon the occupation of Porto Rico and the capture 
of San Juan Harbour, when the strategical situ- 
ation clearly indicated that, unless the Spanish 
naval forces should first be defeated, the capture of 
Havana alone would decide the fate of Cuba and 
bring the campaign to an end. 

But, after the destruction of Cervera's squadron 
at Santiago, the best plan of campaign for the 
army was to invade and occupy Porto Rico; 
partly because it was important that the United 
States should be in possession of the island when 
hostilities terminated, in order that it might be 
retained when the treaty of peace was signed, 
and partly because the destruction of Cervera's 
squadron having already made certain the ulti- 
mate loss of Cuba, an attack on Havana, or any 
other Cuban city, would have been a mere waste 
of blood and treasure. 

In a discussion of this subject Captain Mahan 
says: 

"The character and the direction of the first move- 
ments of the United States in this conflict with Spain were 
determined by the occasion, and by the professed object, 
of the hostilities. As frequently happens, the latter began 
before any formal declaration of war had been made ; and, 
as the avowed purpose and cause of our action were not 
primarily redress for grievances of the United States against 



138 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Spain, but to enforce the departure of the latter from Cuba, 
it followed logically that the island became the objective of 
our miUtary movements, as its deliverance from oppression 
was the object of the war. Had a more general appre- 
ciation of the situation been adopted, a view embracing 
the undeniable injury to the United States, from the then 
existing conditions, and the general iniquitous character 
of the Spanish rule in the colonies, and had war for these 
reasons been declared, the objective of our operations 
might have been differently chosen for strategic reasons ; 
for our leading object in such case would not have been 
to help Cuba, but to constrain Spain, and to compel her 
to such terms as we might demand. It would have been 
open, for instance, to urge that Puerto Rico, being be- 
tween five and six hundred miles from the eastern end of 
Cuba and nearly double that distance from the two ports 
of the island most important to Spain, — Havana on the 
north and Cienfuegos on the south, — would be invalu- 
able to the mother country as an intermediate naval 
station and as a base of supplies and reenforcements for 
both her fleet and army; that, if left in her undisturbed 
possession, it would enable her, practically, to enjoy the 
same advantage of nearness to the great scene of opera- 
tions that the United States had in virtue of our geo- 
graphical situation ; and that, therefore, the first objective 
of the war should be the eastern island, and its reduction 
the first object. The effect of this would have been to 
throw Spain back upon her home territory for the support 
of any operations in Cuba, thus entailing upon her an 
extremely long line of communications, exposed every- 
where through its course, but especially to the molesta- 
tion of small cruisers issuing from the harbors of Puerto 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 39 

Rico, which flank the routes, and which, upon the suppo- 
sition, would have passed into our hands. This view of 
the matter was urged upon the writer, a few days before 
hostiUties began, by a very old and intelligent naval officer 
who had served in our navy, and in that of the Confed- 
erate States. To a European nation the argument must 
have been quite decisive ; for to it, as distant or more 
distant than Spain from Cuba, such an intermediate 
station would have been an almost insurmountable obsta- 
cle while in an enemy's hands, and an equally valuable 
base if wrested from him. To the United States these 
considerations were applicable only in part ; for while the 
inconvenience to Spain would be the same, the gain to 
us would be but little, as our lines of communication to 
Cuba neither required the support of Puerto Rico, nor 
were by it particularly endangered." 

The same author adds the following wise and 
timely words in regard to the strategical value of 
the island of Porto Rico to the United States : 

" This estimate of the military importance of Puerto 
Rico should never be lost sight of by us as long as we 
have any responsibility, direct or indirect, for the safety 
or independence of Cuba. Puerto Rico considered 
militarily is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian Canal, and 
to our Pacific Coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt 
and the beyond ; and there is for us the like necessity to 
hold and strengthen the one, in its entirety and in its 
immediate surroundings, that there is for Great Britain to 
hold the other for the security of her position in Egypt, 
for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the control of the 



140 THE CAMPAIGN OP SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

route to India. It would be extremely difficult for a 
European state to sustain operations in the eastern Medi- 
terranean with a British fleet at Malta. Similarly, it would 
be extremely difficult for a transatlantic state to maintain 
operations in the western Caribbean with a United States 
fleet based upon Puerto Rico and the adjacent islands. 
The same reasons prompted Bonaparte to seize Malta in 
his expedition against Egypt and India in 1798. In 
his masterly eyes, as in those of Nelson, it was essen- 
tial to the communications between France, Egypt, and 
India. His scheme failed, not because Malta was less 
than invaluable, but for want of adequate naval strength, 
without which no maritime position possesses value." 

If the reasoning in the foregoing comments 
is sound, the following general plan expressed in 
the form of orders would have been strategically 
correct. 

First: If Cervera's squadron does not cross the 
Atlantic, the American army and navy will attack 
Havana in the Autumn. Meanwhile, during the 
Summer, the regular troops at Tampa will be held 
in readiness to make brief incursions into Cuba for 
the purpose of supplying the insurgents with food, 
arms, and ammunition. 

Secondly: If Cervera's squadron sails to West 
Indian waters, and is there blockaded in port, the 
American army will then immediately cooperate 
with the navy in bringing about the destruction of 
the Spanish squadron. 

Thirdly : If Cervera's squadron is destroyed in 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 141 

the West Indies, and hostilities do not immediately 
cease, the American army will then undertake the 
occupation of Porto Rico. 

Probably it would not have been wise to plan 
further than this at the outset. At the beginning 
of a campaign no plan can be set forth in detail 
which will meet the varying emergencies and 
changing conditions that are bound to occur as the 
action progresses. Under ordinary circumstances 
it is sufficient to outline merely the general stra- 
tegical plan, leaving the details to the admirals and 
generals. " It is a delusion to believe," says Count 
Von Moltke, " that a plan of war may be laid for a 
prolonged period and carried out in every point. 
The first collision with the enemy changes the 
situation entirely, according to the result. Some 
things decided upon will be impracticable; others, 
which originally seemed impossible, become feas- 
ible. All that the leader of an army can do is to 
get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide for 
the best for an unknown period and carry out his 
purpose unflinchingly." 

But at the beginning of this war the President 
was the only official of the United States who had 
the authority to plan a campaign for the army and 
navy and issue the necessary orders for its execu- 
tion. No one can study the .strategy of this cam- 
paign without feeling that the President of the 
United States had need at the time of an advisory 
council composed of a few able officers of the army 



142 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and navy, who should have worked out in advance 
the best plans to follow in the contingencies that 
would most probably arise, not for the army alone, 
nor for the navy alone, but for both. The need for 
such a council has since been recognized by the 
United States government; in July, 1903, a Joint 
Board on National Defence, composed of four offi- 
cers of the army and four officers of the navy, was 
created.^ Previous to the creation of this board 
the necessity for something of the kind had been 
urged by a number of able officers. In April, 

1903, Lieutenant-Commander Roy C. Smith, United 
States Navy, had prepared an article, which was 
published in the " North American Review," March, 

1904, In which he strongly advocated the appoint- 
ment of such a board, or council, and clearly indi- 
cated what its functions should be. In this article 
he says : 

" A comprehensive view of war as affecting any coun- 
try will take into account every circumstance that can be 
shown to have a bearing. Tactics, strategy, and personaY 
qualities, in their broad aspects, all enter. It is not a 
naval question, nor a military question. The whole armed 
force of the nation, ashore and afloat, will be in demand. 
The grand strategy of the war reckons with everything. 
Incidentally, in our own country, some of the machinery 
is lacking for this comprehensive planning of wars. It has 
so long been the custom to regard the army and the navy 
as occupying entirely different spheres, that it is actually 

1 See Appendix P. 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 43 

difficult to consider them as merely parts of one harmo- 
nious whole. They are really as essential to each other, 
and as much dependent on the fundamental principles of 
war, as are, for instance, infantry, cavalry, and artillery in 
the army, or battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats in 
the navy. There is only one science of war, and this 
science includes a critical knowledge of the principles of 
action of all the branches of the national defence. Such 
knowledge is indispensable to the authority that controls 
the conduct of the war, that is, the President, as Com- 
mander-in-Chief, advised by his Cabinet officers. The 
President may, and will, seek also the advice of the senior 
officers of the army and navy ; but this advice must, in 
the nature of things, often be one-sided and sometimes 
contradictory. However good a man may be President, 
and however able are his advisers, they are handicapped 
in time of national danger by the absence of a constituted 
body organized to perform these duties only, by the lack 
of a continuous study of war plans, and by a lack of files 
of such plans previously perfected. It would not do to 
call on the army and navy for their separate plans, which 
will lack comprehensiveness and unity. A supreme war 
council, superior to both army and navy, permanently 
organized, and advisory to the President, would seem to 
meet this want. It would be a National General Staff, 
drawing on the materials collected by the general staffs 
of the army and navy." 

It is plain that at the outset Captain-General 
Blanco, in command of the Spanish troops in Cuba, 
was restricted to the strategical defensive ; for, so 
long as the United States retained control of the 



144 



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



sea in Cuban waters, an invasion of the United 
States would have been entirely impracticable. 
What then would have been the best plan of cam- 
paign for the Spanish army in Cuba? As Havana 
was the most important city of the island and was 
connected by rail with Matanzas, Cardenas, and 
Cienfuegos, and as there was a probability that 
Cervera's squadron would sail to Cuba and attempt 
to enter the harbour of Cienfuegos, or of Havana, 
or, possibly, of Santiago de Cuba, it seemed most 
likely that the American army would attempt to 
make a landing at or near one of these important 
seaports. Hence the wisest plan would have been 
to concentrate near these cities as many troops from 
the interior as could be spared. Then the policy 
should have been to act offensively against the 
invading forces, in order to destroy them in detail 
as they landed, or, if this was not possible, to over- 
whelm them by superior forces afterwards. As a 
landing under the most favourable circumstances 
would have taken several days, and as a large 
American army could not have been transported 
across the sea at one time, an excellent opportunity 
would have been offered the Spaniards of bringing 
greatly superior numbers against their adversary; 
and as Havana and the cities connected with it by 
rail, and Santiago with its well-sheltered harbour, 
were practically the only points that had to be con- 
sidered in forming a plan for repelling an invasion, 
the Captain-General of the Spanish forces could 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 145 

easily have massed his troops beforehand at these 
important points. The way to hold Cuba was to 
grasp with a firm hand the important cities and 
harbours. In war, definiteness of purpose is always 
a great gain ; a few strategic positions strongly 
held are better than many weakly defended. 

The delay in the departure of the Fifth Corps 
from Tampa was of much concern to the people 
and government of the United States. But under 
the conditions existing at the time, this delay was 
practically unavoidable ; not because there was any 
lack of energy and soldierly qualities on the part 
of General Shafter and his officers, but because 
the facilities at Tampa for the embarkation of 
such a large number of troops were totally inade- 
quate. As Tampa lies on the west coast of Florida 
only two hundred and seventy miles from the naval 
base of operations at Key "West, and is nearer Cuba 
than any other gulf port of importance, it was most 
favourably situated strategically for a base of op- 
erations for the invading land forces. And as no 
other gulf port offered any better facilities for the 
encampment and embarkation of the Fifth Corps, 
it is evident that the only way confusion and delay 
at Tampa could have been avoided would have 
been for the United States government to have 
anticipated events and made the necessary prepa- 
rations beforehand for the proper encampment and 
speedy embarkation of an army at that place. 

Had a large camp been laid out at Port Tampa 

VOL. I. — 10 



146 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and an ample supply of good water been provided 
for; had the switching facilities been greatly in- 
creased and the wharfage been extended ; had 
warehouses been built and filled with clothing, 
provisions, ordnance, wagons, ambulances, harness, 
and hospital supplies ; had the post-ofiice been 
enlarged and arrangements been made to handle a 
greatly increased amount of mail matter; and had 
a garrison of United States troops been stationed 
at the port to guard the property and keep every- 
thing in perfect working order, — there would have 
resulted very little if any delay in the embarkation 
of General Shafter's army. 

In this connection it will not be out of place 
to remark that a government ought to profit by 
past mistakes, and thereby strengthen itself for 
future conflicts. The lessons of history should 
be lessons of wisdom. Such confusion and delay 
as occurred at Tampa in the Spring of 1898 should 
not be allowed to occur again. One of the great- 
est military needs in this country to-day is a port 
in the Gulf of Mexico with ample facilities for the 
speedy embarkation of a corps of twenty or twenty- 
five thousand soldiers ; for at any moment the 
need of troops in Panama, in Central or South 
America, or in the West Indies, may become a 
pressing necessity. For this purpose probably 
Tampa is better situated strategically than any 
other gulf port; but New Orleans, or Mobile, or 
Pensacola would each probably be found to have 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 47 

some advantages that the others do not possess. 
But be that as it may, a board of officers, after 
taking into consideration the faciHties offered by- 
each port for encamping and embarking an army 
corps, and the strategical situation of each with 
respect to its defence against attack and its near- 
ness to Key West, Panama, and the West Indies, 
should make the selection, and the improvement 
of the port should then be pushed forward with 
despatch. If this were done, troops could from 
time to time be assembled there, and be given 
practice ^ in embarkation with most beneficial 
results. When Napoleon was contemplating the 
invasion of England in 1804 and 1805, he found 
after many trials that he could embark an army 
of one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers in 
twor hours. The astonishing result accomplished 
by this great master of war should at least be a 
reminder that with previous preparation and fre- 
quent practice even a large army can be embarked 
without the least confusion and delay. 

The number of American land forces that will 
be needed in any future war with any other nation 
will depend in great measure upon the proximity 
of that nation's territory to the United States. In a 
war with Mexico nearly all the fighting would take 
place on the land, and in a war with Great Britain 
a large army would be necessary for the invasion 

1 An occasional practice of this kind might wisely be held in 
lieu of one of the annual army manoeuvres. 



148 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

of Canada ; but with any other power the principal 
struggle would be on the sea, and the United States 
navy would be called upon to bear the brunt of the 
conflict. In that case the greatest need for the 
army would be to assist the navy. To close in on a 
harbour from the land side, to occupy some island 
in the West Indies, to aid or invade some South 
American country, to guard the Panama Canal — 
these are the duties that the army would mostly be 
called upon to perform. And these duties would re- 
quire the embarking and sailing of troops from some 
American port, in most cases from some gulf port. 
The present and future interests of the United 
States in the West India Islands, in the Isthmian 
Canal, and in the maintenance of the Monroe 
Doctrine will, as time advances, undoubtedly neces- 
sitate the sailing of many expeditions from the 
Gulf of Mexico. It is the part of wisdom to be 
prepared for these emergencies, for when they arise 
there will be an immediate and imperative demand 
for troops. A week's delay in embarking an ex- 
pedition might have disastrous and far-reaching 
results. Victory is most often in the hands of 
him who can strike the first blow. Time is an 
element always of the greatest importance in war. 
"It is the quarter hours that win battles," says 
Napoleon. 

In the next hundred years the Caribbean Sea is 
destined to become a great centre of commercial 
activity. The completion of the Panama Canal will 



SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES 1 49 

increase enormously the commerce in these waters, 
and as time advances the islands of the West Indies 
will become of much greater importance stra- 
tegically as well as commercially. Wars will come, 
and the great nations of the world will strive with 
every means in their power to hold or acquire 
islands and coaling stations in this great strategical 
centre. 

Since the world began, the desire for commercial 
advancement has been the principal cause of wars; 
and until there shall be a radical revolution in 
human nature the same cause will continue to 
array nation against nation in deadly conflict. 
As long as the powerful try to wrest concessions 
from the weak, as long as selfishness governs the 
actions of men and of nations, as long as material 
advantage is deemed of more importance than 
moral rectitude, just so long are wars destined 
to continue, and just so long will it be neces- 
sary for peaceably disposed nations to prepare 
for war. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND THE EARLY 
NAVAL OPERATIONS 1 



A 



DMIRAL SAMPSON believed that he could 
capture Havana by a direct attack upon its 
fortifications, and that its fall would result in the 
speedy termination of the war. He was strongly 
supported in this view by three of his leading 
officers, — Captains Robley D. Evans of the Iowa, 
Henry C. Taylor of the Indiana, and French C. 
Chadwick of the New York. 

The plan of making a direct attack upon Havana 
had been fully discussed by the naval authorities "- at 
Washington several weeks prior to the opening of 
hostilities. On April 6 the Secretary of the Navy, 
John D. Long, sent the following instructions to 
Admiral Sampson : 

" In the event of hostilities with Spain the Department 
wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy 
the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including 
the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast 
of Cuba. 

" The Department does not wish the vessels of your 
squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at 

1 See maps i, 3, and 4. 2 See footnote, page 71. 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 5 I 

Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified 
ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels 
should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case 
the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and 
employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the 
desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy's vessels, 
without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to 
the fire of the land batteries. 

" There are two reasons for this : 

"First. There may be no United States troops to 
occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot 
and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the 
first of October. 

" Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it par- 
ticularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled 
before the capture or destruction of Spain's most for- 
midable vessels. 

" The Department further desires that, in case of war, 
you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly 
the ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of San- 
tiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a 
blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield before the 
rainy season is over. . . . 

" Should the Department learn that the Spanish fleet 
had gone to Porto Rico, it is possible that the Flying 
Squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of 
your vessels may be needed to reenforce that squadron. 

" The Department hopes to be able to cut the cable 
off Santiago de Cuba, even if it has to employ a spe- 
cial cable vessel for this purpose, and it also has under 
consideration the practicability of cutting the cable near 
Havana and connecting the end to one of the vessels of 



152 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

your command, so that you can always be in communi- 
cation with the Department. Whether or not this plan 
is feasible has not yet been determined. Please con- 
sider it." 

Notwithstanding these instructions^ Admiral 
Sampson was still eager to carry out his aggres- 
sive policy and hoped to obtain permission to do 
so. Accordingly, on April 9 he wrote the Secre- 
tary of the Navy : 

" I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big 
ships against a possibly serious loss while the enemy's 
fleet is still intact. At the same time I regard it as very 
important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as 
hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by three 
or four batteries to the eastward of the entrance, mount- 
ing guns from 6 to 1 2-inch calibre. On the western side 
of the entrance there are three batteries, the guns vary- 
ing in calibre from 8 to 12-inch, and two mortar bat- 
teries. All the batteries face seaward, and those to the 
west of the entrance are quite near the shore. All 
are open batteries with heavy traverses between the 
guns. The guns and people who serve them are quite 
unprotected. 

" These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet 
from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate 
distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they 
are well placed to resist an attack (for instance the western 
batteries) from the westward and close in shore, where 

1 In this history such portions of instructions, orders, and 
despatches as have no direct bearing upon the matter in hand 
are omitted. 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 153 

the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the 
fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary 
batteries would have full effect. Even under these cir- 
cumstances the ships must have such a heavy fire that 
the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its 
volume. Before the Puritan and Amphitrite arrived I 
was not entirely sanguine of the success of such an 
attack. Since their arrival yesterday I have little doubt 
of its success. 

" Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire, I 
expect to put a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the 
interval between each two of them. In this way I do not 
think the Spaniards would be able to fire. They would 
be driven away from their guns and kept away, while the 
fire of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that 
they would be unserviceable. Although the defences west 
of the entrance are stronger than those east, the first has 
the advantage for us that all the projectiles which miss 
the batteries will fall in the city and furnish an additional 
inducement for the surrender of the city. 

" In the memorandum which I furnished to the com- 
manding officers of ships I provided that if our ships were 
not numerous enough, or the Spaniards proved better 
than I expected, we were at once to haul off and sub- 
stitute for the direct attack a close blockade of the port, 
which was to be extended east and west to adjoining ports 
as quickly as possible. Having silenced the western 
batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the city, 
which I would do only after warning given twenty-four 
hours in advance. 

" I see the force of your reasoning that we would have 
no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr. 



154 



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss 
of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. 
Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble 
before October. 

" I shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set 
forth in your letter. At the same time I hope you will 
consider the plan I have here outlined. I have discussed 
the matter freely with Captain Evans, Taylor, and Chad- 
wick, and all unite with me that the direct attack is 
sufficiently promising to warrant its trial. 

" I don't think the plan of cutting the cable at Havana 
and taking the end on board ship would succeed, for a 
ship could not anchor off Havana." 

On April 21 Admiral Sampson received from 
the Secretary of the Navy orders which began 
the war. In these orders the final decision as 
to making a direct attack upon Havana was set 
forth : 

" The Department's instructions of April 6 are modified 
as follows : 

" You will immediately institute a blockade of the north 
coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas on the east to 
Bahia Honda on the west ; also, if in your opinion your 
force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the south side 
of the island. It is considered doubtful if the present 
force at your command would warrant a more extensive 
blockade. 

" If it should become necessary for the army to embark 
for Cuba, the navy will be required to furnish the neces- 
sary convoy for its transports. For this reason it does 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA I 55 

not seem desirable that you should undertake at present 
to blockade any more of the island than has been indi- 
cated. It is believed that the blockade will cut off 
Havana almost entirely from receiving supplies from the 
outside. 

" The Navy Department is considering the question of 
occupying the port of Matanzas by a military force large 
enough to hold it and to open communications with the 
insurgents, and this may be done at an early date if part 
of the army is ready to embark. If this operation is de- 
cided upon, you are directed to cooperate with the army 
and assist with such vessels as are necessary to cover and 
protect such a movement. 

" If you obtain any information of the movements of 
the Spanish ships of war in any part of the West Indies 
you will, if practicable, inform the Department. 

" In conducting the other operations you will be gov- 
erned by the instructions contained in the Department's 
letter of April 6. 

" The Department does not wish the defences of Havana 
to be bombarded or attacked by your squadron." 

These instructions to Admiral Sampson were 
modified by the Secretary of the Navy on April 26. 

" The orders under which you are acting do not pre- 
vent the use of some of your vessels in scouring the coast 
of Cuba north and south, and capturing or destroying 
such Spanish vessels of war as may be in those waters. It 
would be within your discretion to send monitors with 
these vessels if you thought proper. While the Depart- 
ment does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by 



156 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light 
batteries which may protect vessels you desire to attack 
if you can do so without exposure to heavy guns." 

In order to carry out his instructions as effect- 
ively as possible, Admiral Sampson divided his 
command so as to cover all the ports connected 
with Havana by railroad. The main portion of 
his fleet was kept on the north side of the island, 
off the harbours of Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, and 
Cardenas, while a division under Commander B. H. 
McCalla, United States Navy, consisting of the 
cruiser Marblehead, gunboat Nashville, and con- 
verted yacht Eagle, blockaded Cienfuegos. 

At this time only a small number of Spanish 
war vessels were in Cuban waters. There were at 
Havana the small iron cruiser Conde de Venadito, 
and two or three torpedo gunboats ; at Santiago de 
Cuba, the protected cruiser Reina Mercedes ; at 
Nipe Bay, the small wooden cruiser yorge Juan; 
and at Manzanillo, Cienfuegos, and other ports, a 
few gunboats ; but none of these vessels made any 
effort to attack the American ships, or offered any 
serious resistance to Admiral Sampson's blockade. 

It is not the purpose here to give an account in 
detail of the minor incidents of the blockade, such 
as the capture of the Bueriaventiira, Catalina, 
Miguel Jovcr, Panama, and other prizes ; the shell- 
ing of the batteries at Matanzas on April 27 ; the 
cutting of the cable at Cienfuegos on May 1 1 by 
Lieutenant C. M. Winslow, United States Navy, 




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THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 57 

with a loss to the Americans of one killed and 
eight wounded; or the spirited fight made by- 
Lieutenant John B. Bernadou, United States Navy, 
at Cardenas on the afternoon of the same day, in 
which action Ensign Worth Bagley and four men 
were killed and Lieutenant Bernadou and two men 
were wounded ; but simply to state that the block- 
ade was maintained with ability, zeal, and good 
judgment. 

The situation was materially changed, however, 
by the approach of Cervera's squadron. News 
was received at Washington on April 29 that 
on that very day the four cruisers, Maria Teresa, 
Cristobal Colon, Abnirante Oqjicndo, and Vizcaya, 
and the three torpedo-boat destroyers, Pliiton, 
Furor, and Terror, had sailed westward from St. 
Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. This information 
was with the greatest possible despatch forwarded 
to Admiral Sampson. The destination and pur- 
pose of the Spanish admiral now became a matter 
of the greatest concern. Was his objective Cuba, 
or Porto Rico, or the coast of the United States } 
Would he attempt to intercept the Oregon, which 
at this time was on its way to join Admiral Samp- 
son, or would he move directly upon Cienfuegos 
or Havana and attempt to raise the blockade of 
western Cuba? 

It was supposed by the American government 
that Cervera would arrive in the West Indies about 
May 8 ; and that, being short of coal after his long 



158 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

voyage, he would seek a port where a fresh supply 
could be obtained, and most probably one that 
could be used as a base of operations. For these 
purposes it seemed most likely that the Spanish 
port of San Juan on the north side of Porto Rico 
would be chosen. 

In view of these facts, Admiral Sampson, with the 
approval and concurrence of the Navy Department, 
decided that he would sail with a squadron to the 
Windward Passage between Cuba and Hayti for 
the purpose of observation, with the intention 
of going farther eastward to San Juan, should 
future events make that plan advisable. Accord- 
ingly, leaving behind a number of his smaller 
vessels to maintain the blockade as best they could. 
Admiral Sampson, on the night of May 4, with 
his flagship, the cruiser New York, the battleships 
Iowa and Indiana, the monitors Terror and Am- 
phitrite, the small cruisers Detroit and Montgomery, 
the torpedo boat Porter, the tug Wompatiick, and 
the collier Niagara, sailed eastward along the north 
coast of Cuba towards San Juan. As the maximum 
speed of the monitors was only about half that of 
the battleships, the squadron necessarily steamed 
very slowly. To avoid as much delay as possible 
from this cause, the two monitors were taken in 
tow by the New York and the Iowa. On the morn- 
ing of May 8 the Admiral arrived with his squad- 
ron off Cape Haytien, on the north coast of Hayti. 
Here he learned from the Navy Department that 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 59 

no information had yet been received as to the 
whereabouts or destination of Cervera's squadron. 
After stopping long enough to coal the monitors 
from the collier Niagara, he proceeded eastward 
towards San Juan, where he arrived early on the 
morning of May 12. 

Immediately upon his arrival he began an attack 
on the forts of the harbour. But as it soon became 
evident that Cervera's squadron was not there, 
he decided to discontinue the attapk and return 
to Havana. The reasons for this decision are thus 
stated in his official report: 

" It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would 
not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the 
place, but the fact that we should be held several days in 
completing arrangements for holding it ; that part of our 
force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops 
to garrison it ; that the movements of the Spanish squad- 
ron, our main objective, were still unknown ; that the 
Flying Squadron was still north and not in a position to 
render any aid ; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, 
was thus open to entry by such a force as his, while we 
were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate move 
towards Havana imperative." 

Upon leaving St. Vincent Cervera received or- 
ders to sail for the West Indies. It was suggested 
that upon his arrival in those waters he should ob- 
tain information of the enemy's whereabouts before 
entering port in either Cuba or Porto Rico. But he 
was given complete freedom of action as to what 



l60 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

route to take, what port to enter, and the circum- 
stances under which he might seek or avoid battle. 
Owing to the foul bottom of the Viscaya and the 
necessity for taking in tow the torpedo-boat de- 
stroyers, Cervera's progress was so slow that he 
did not arrive off the island of Martinique, a French 
possession about nine hundred miles southeast of 
Cuba, until the afternoon of May ii. He had 
sent forward Captain Villaamil with the Furor to 
Fort de France, Martinique, to seek information as 
to the whereabouts of the enemy, and as to whether 
coal could be obtained at that port. Villaamil re- 
turned at midnight of May ii with despatches, from 
which it was learned that the bulk of Admiral 
Sampson's fleet was still blockading the western 
part of Cuba from Cardenas to Cienfuegos ; that 
Santiago de Cuba was free from blockade ; and 
that just then, according to unofficial but probably 
reliable information, a number of the enemy's ves- 
sels, with Admiral Sampson at their head, were off 
Porto Rico, and were to bombard San Juan that 
very day. May 1 1. Though this information antici- 
pated by a day the bombardment of San Juan, and 
created the erroneous impression that larger naval 
forces were in the waters of western Cuba than 
v/ere actually there, nevertheless, on the whole, it 
gave Cervera a fairly correct idea of the situation. 
On receiving this information Admiral Cervera 
immediately assembled his captains to acquaint 
them with the situation and to seek their opinion 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA l6l 

as to what was best to be done. This council took 
place on board the Admiral's flagship, the Maria 
Teresa, off Fort de France, Martinique, on May 12. 
In the minutes of this council, signed by Admiral 
Cervera and all his captains, the conditions that 
confronted the squadron are clearly set forth: 

" Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, 
which is extremely critical, owing to the scant supply of 
coal, the governor of Martinique having refused to give 
aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there 
is no coal in San Juan, nor probably at Santiago, and in 
view of the bad condition of the boilers of the destroyers, 
those of the Terror\>€\x\^ practically unserviceable, so that 
it became necessary to send her back to Fort de France 
this morning to await orders from the government, these 
officers seeing no other solution — on penalty of placing 
the squadron in a position where it will be unable to move 
and will hence become an easy prey for the enemy — 
except to go to Cura(^ao, in hopes of finding there the coal 
announced by the Minister of Marine in his telegram of 
April 26." 

In accordance with the decision reached at this 
meeting, Admiral Cervera, at about 8 A.M. of April 
12, almost at the exact time that Admiral Sampson 
discontinued his attack on the forts of San Juan, 
set sail for the island of Curasao, which lies off the 
north coast of Venezuela. Arriving there on May 
14, he found himself greatly embarrassed by the 
lack of coal. As no supply ships accompanied 

VOL. I.— II 



1 62 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

his squadron and as the steamer from which he 
expected to obtain coal had not arrived, he made 
an effort to get a supply from the Dutch officials 
of the island; but they, insisting on a strict ob- 
servance of the neutrality laws, furnished him only 
six hundred tons. 

A number of vessels laden with coal had been 
sent to San Juan, Porto Rico, and other ports of 
the West Indies. It so happened, however, that 
none of these vessels succeeded in reaching the 
squadron. Tv^'o or three days after Cervera's de- 
parture from Martinique, the steamer Alicante 
arrived there loaded with coal ; and two days after 
he had left Curagao, the steamer Rcstormcl, carry- 
ing twenty-four hundred tons of coal, put into that 
port; but, finding that the squadron had gone, 
proceeded thence to Santiago, where she was sub- 
sequently captured. 

On the night of May 15 Admiral Cervera sailed 
from Curagao and shaped his course northwest 
towards Cuba. On the morning of May 19, at 
about eight o'clock, he arrived in Santiago Har- 
bour, the last port his squadron was destined ever 
to enter. Here, in the very storm centre of the 
conflict, while the cyclone of war was closing in 
around him, the heroic admiral, with his brave 
sailors about him, forebodingly yet undismayed, 
remained during the six eventful weeks which 
preceded the destruction of his squadron. 

On May 15, while Admiral Sampson was 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 163 

returning from the attack at San Juan to the block- 
ade of Havana, the torpedo boat Porter brought 
him official information of Cervera's arrival at 
Curagao on May 14. The same telegram informed 
him that the Flying Squadron had been ordered 
to Key West, and directed him to return to that 
point with all possible speed. 

On May 13 the Flying Squadron, consisting of 
Commodore Schley's flagship, the armoured cruiser 
Brooklyn, the battleships Massachusetts and Texas, 
the collier Mcrrhnac, and the converted yacht 
Scorpion, sailed from Hampton Roads to Charles- 
ton, and thence to Key West, where it arrived on 
May 18, one day in advance of Admiral Sampson's 
squadron. In the meantime the St. Louis had been 
directed to cut the cables at Santiago and Guan- 
tanamo, and the Minneapolis, St. Paul, Harvard, 
and Yale to scout for the enemy in or near the 
passages separating Cuba, Hayti, Porto Rico, and 
Jamaica from one another. 

On the morning of May 19, almost at the very 
moment that Cervera was entering Santiago 
Harbour, the Flying Squadron started for Cien- 
fuegos, and on the 20th it was followed by the 
battleship Iowa, the gunboat Castine, and the 
collier Merrimac. About midnight of the 21st 
Commodore Schley arrived off the harbour of 
Cienfuegos. On the 22d he was joined by the 
Iowa, and on the following morning by the Castine 
and Merrimac. 



1 64 ^-^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

On May 19, a few hours after the Flying Squad- 
ron had left Key West for Cienfuegos, the Navy 
Department learned through General A. \V. 
Greely, of the United States Signal Corps, that 
Cervera had on that morning arrived in Santiago 
Harbour. This information was immediately for- 
warded to Admiral Sampson in these words : 

" The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de 
Cuba might very well be correct, so the Department 
strongly advises that you send word immediately by the 
Iowa to Schley to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba 
with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off 
Cienfuegos, Cuba, and meanwhile the Department will 
send the Minneapolis, now at St. Thomas, and Harvard 
to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba to join Schley, 
who should keep up communications via Nicolas Mole, 
or Cape Haytien. If Iowa has gone, send orders to 
Schley by your fastest despatch vessel." 

Admiral Sampson, doubting at first the relia- 
bility of this piece of news, replied to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy that he thought it advisable for 
the Flying Squadron to remain at Cienfuegos, but 
that he had instructed Schley to communicate with 
the auxiliary vessels in the vicinity of Santiago and 
learn for a certainty whether the Spanish fleet was 
there. 

When, on May 22, Commodore Schley re- 
ceived these instructions, which were forwarded 
in duplicate by the loiua and Dupont, he at once 
detached the Scorpion to make inquiries of the 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 165 

scouting ships off Santiago. Along with these 
instructions Admiral Sampson sent the following 
private letter: 

" Dear Schley, — The Iowa leaves this morning at 
II o'clock, bound for Cienfuegos. The Marblehead z.\\^ 
the Eagle will be ready to depart to-night and join you. 
Enclosed is a telegram ^ received at Key West, May 19, 
marked " A." After duly considering this telegram I 
have decided to make no change in the present plan — 
that is, that you hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. 

" If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must 
come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the muni- 
tions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. 
I, therefore, am of the opinion that our best chance of 
success in capturing these ships will be to hold the two 
points — Cienfuegos and Havana — with all the force we 
can muster. 

" If later it should develop that these vessels are at 
Santiago, we could then assemble off that port the ships 
best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it." 

Meanwhile Admiral Sampson, through informa- 
tion received from Washington and Havana, hav- 
ing become almost convinced that the news was 
correct, sent on May 21 the following despatch to 
Schley by the MarbleJiead : 

" Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba — 
four ships and three ^ torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are 

1 This was the telegram just quoted. 

2 As a matter of fact, only two destroyers were there ; Cervera 
had left the Tenor at Martinique. 



1 66 THE CAMPAIGN- OF SA XT/AGO DE CUBA 

satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with 
all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if 
the enemy is there, blockade' him in port." 

And a few hours later he sent by the Hazvk a 
duplicate of this despatch with an added para- 
graph to this effect: 

" It is thought that the inclosed instructions ^ will reach 
you by 2 o'clock a. m.. May 23. This will enable you to 
leave before daylight (regarded very important) , so that 
your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago 
A. M. May 24. It is thought that the Spanish squadron 
would [will] probably be still at Santiago, as they must 
have some repairs to make and coal to take." 

This second despatch, which arrived on the morn- 
ing of the 23d, was the first to reach Commodore 
Schley, but as he doubted the correctness of the 
news even more strongly than Admiral Sampson 
had at first done, and as the instructions were con- 
ditional, he replied on May 23 : 

" I would state that I am by no means satisfied that 
the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large 
amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the 
presence of a number of vessels, and under such circum- 
stances it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up 

1 After, sending these instructions to Commodore Schley, Ad- 
miral Sampson sent the Department at Washington the following 
telegram : 

Key West, Florida, May 24, 1898. 

Secretary of Naa'Y, Washington : 

Schley has been ordered to Santiago de Cuba. Sampson. 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 167 

a probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported via Plavana, 
no doubt as a ruse. ... I am further satisfied that the 
destination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos 
or Havana. This point, being in communication with 
Havana, would be better for their purposes if it was left 
exposed, and I think that we ought to be very careful how 
we receive information from Havana, which is no doubt 
sent out for the purpose of misleading us." 

And on the same day he wrote again to the 
admiral giving additional reasons why he thought 
the Spanish squadron was at Cienfuegos, and ended 
the letter with these words : 

" I think I have them here almost to a certainty." 

Admiral Sampson received these replies on May 
26, and on the next day sent the Wasp to Commo- 
dore Schley with the following instructions : 

"Every report, and particularly daily confidential re- 
ports, received at Key West from Havana, state Spanish 
squadron has been in Santiago de Cuba from the 19th to 
the 25th instant inclusive, the 25th being the date of the 
last report received. 

" You will please proceed with all possible despatch to 
Santiago to blockade that port. If, on arrival there, you 
receive positive information of the Spanish ships having 
left, you will follow them in pursuit." 

But in the meantime, before these instructions 
reached Commodore Schley, Commander McCalla 
of the Marblehead, having landed and communi- 
cated with some Cuban insurgents, had learned 



1 68 THE CAMPAIGN- OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

that the Spanish squadron was not in the harbour. 
Immediately upon the receipt of this information 
on the afternoon of May 24, Commodore Schley 
sailed eastward towards Santiago, taking with him 
the Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Marble- 
head, Vixen, Eagle, and the collier Merrimac. 
Owing to a rough sea, the Merrimac's broken 
engines, and the Eagle s lack of speed, he did not 
arrive off Santiago Harbour until 6 P. M. of May 26. 
A few minutes after his arrival he sighted the 
Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Yale, which had been 
ordered there in search of the Spanish squadron. 
None of the captains of these vessels, however, 
had any definite knowledge of Cervera's where- 
abouts ; but on the previous day the St. Paul had 
captured the coal-laden steamer Rcstormcl just as 
she was about to enter the harbour, which circum- 
stance pointed strongly to Cervera's being in that 
port. 

But Commodore Schley was not convinced. He 
still doubted, and his doubts were strengthened by 
his failure to secure any positive information ; and 
not being able on account of the rough sea to coal 
his ships from the collier Merrimac, he determined 
to sail for Key West. Accordingly, on the even- 
ing of the very day of his arrival, without attempt- 
ing to blockade the harbour or to ascertain whether 
Cervera was inside, he signalled the vessels of his 
squadron to sail for Key West by way of the 
Yucatan Channel. 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 169 

That night Commodore Schley started westward, 
but, owing to an accident to the Merrimac, he had 
gone only a short distance when the Harvard over- 
took him with a pressing despatch from the Sec- 
retary of the Navy. This despatch informed him 
that all reports indicated that Cervera was at 
Santiago, and urged him to secure positive infor- 
mation on the subject. But even this did not 
cause him to countermand his orders. He tele- 
graphed the Secretary of the Navy: 

" Merrimac" s engine is disabled, and she is helpless ; 
am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been 
absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, 
and Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough seas and 
boisterous weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn 
is only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal 
to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago 
in present state of coal account ^ of the squadron. . . . 
It is to be regretted that the Department's orders cannot 
be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I 
am forced to return to Key West, via Yucatan Passage, for 
coal. Can ascertain nothing certain concerning enemy." 

And yet, after all, he did not continue his voyage 
to Key West. During the 27th and 28th the sea 

^ The proceedings of the Schley Court of Inquiry in 1901 show 
that at noon on May 27 the Brooklyn had coal enough to have 
remained on blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba for twenty-six 
days, the lo^va for sixteen, the Massachusetts for twenty, the Texas 
for ten, the Alarblchead for five, and the Vixett for twenty-three. 
On this point the unanimous opinion of the Court was that " His 
official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities 
of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading." 



I/O THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

became sufficiently calm for the Texas and Mar- 
bleJicad to take coal from the collier Merrimac ; and 
about noon of the 28th he signalled his fleet to 
turn about and sail for Santiago, where he arrived 
about dark. On the following morning he made a 
reconnoissance near the entrance of the harbour 
with a number of his ships and discovered four of 
the Spanish vessels inside the harbour, which fact 
he communicated to the Secretary of the Navy in 
the following despatch : 

Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 10 a. m. 
Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon, In- 
fanta Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers 
moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the 
others are here. I have not sufficient coal. Making 
every effort to get coal in. 

On May 31 Commodore Schley transferred his 
pennant temporarily to the Massachusetts, and ac- 
companied by the Iowa and Nczv Orleans, steamed 
to within about five miles of the harbour entrance, 
where he began a bombardment of the forts, and 
the Colon, which could be seen in the bay. The 
Spanish batteries and the Colon both replied to 
the fire of the warships; but the range was so 
long, and so few shots were fired, that no casual- 
ties or damage resulted to either side. 

Meanwhile Admiral Sampson, who had become 
practically convinced as early as May 21 that 
the Spanish squadron was in Santiago Harbour, 
left Key West on that date for Havana, where 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA I /I 

he collected a squadron consisting of his flagship, 
the New York, the battleship Indiana, the moni- 
tors Puritan and MiantononioJi, the cruisers New 
Orleans, Detroit, and Montgomery, and several gun- 
boats and torpedo boats. With this squadron 
during the following week he cruised slowly back 
and forth along the north coast of Cuba in the 
vicinity of Nicolas Channel, watching for the Span- 
ish squadron, which he believed might sail out of 
Santiago Harbour before the arrival of Schley, 
and, rounding the eastern end of Cuba, make for 
Havana along the north coast of the island. On 
May 25 the cruiser Cincinnati, the monitor AvipJii- 
trite, and the dynamite gunboat Vesuvius joined 
the admiral ; and on May 28 the Oregon, which 
had arrived off the coast of Florida on May 24, 
after her long and successful voyage, also joined 
him. 

On May 28 Admiral Sampson telegraphed the 
Secretary of the Navy that the promptest and 
most efficient use of every means was demanded 
to prevent the escape of the Spanish squadron 
from Santiago Harbour. Shortly after sending 
this message he learned through the Navy Depart- 
ment that the Flying Squadron was returning to 
Key West for coal. It was a time of great anxiety 
to Sampson, for he felt certain that Cervera's 
squadron was in Santiago Harbour, and he was 
very desirous of having it blockaded there until 
sufficient warships could assemble to destroy it. 



172 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

On the 29th he telegraphed the Secretary of the 
Navy: 

'' The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be 
remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of 
presence of Spanish division at Santiago." 

But on the same day he received a despatch 
from Commodore Schley, stating that a part of his 
vessels had succeeded in taking coal from the Mer- 
rimac, and that his squadron was then blockading 
Santiago, and would remain on that duty as long as 
his coal supply permitted him to do so with safety. 

In the meantime the Navy Department had 
decided to send Admiral Sampson himself to 
Santiago. Accordingly he began preparations, 
and having placed Commodore John C. Watson 
in command of the blockade of western Cuba with 
the vessels remaining in those waters, he started 
eastward on May 30 for Santiago with his flagship, 
the New York, the battleship Oregon, the con- 
verted yacht Mayflower, and the torpedo boat 
Porter. En route thither he met the Yale and St, 
/<^;//saihng westward on the north side of Cuba, the 
latter with despatches, among which was one from 
Commodore Schley stating positively that he had 
recognized the Cristobal Colon, Maria Teresa, and 
two torpedo-boat destroyers in Santiago Harbour, 
and that doubtless the others were there. On the 
morning of June i Admiral Sampson arrived off 
Santiago and assumed personal command of the 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 173 

blockade of that port ; and here, amidst the stirring 
and tragic events of the war, he was to remain 
until the destruction of Cervera's squadron — the 
last and greatest act of that fierce battle drama. 

COMMENTS 

It was necessary for the United States to gain 
permanent control of the sea in West Indian 
waters before land operations could be safely un- 
dertaken against Cuba or Porto Rico ; for so long as 
hostile warships were in that vicinity, transporting 
troops to those islands would have been extremely 
hazardous, and a decisive Spanish victory on the 
sea would not only have compelled the United 
States government to abandon any troops that 
might have landed in the islands, but would have 
completely neutralized its vast resources for land 
warfare. 

But the control of the sea, though of the first 
importance, could not be brought to an immediate 
issue so long as the Spanish naval forces remained 
absent from West Indian waters. Accordingly, at 
the beginning of the war the Navy Department 
issued orders to Admiral Sampson to blockade 
Havana and the ports of western Cuba. Under 
the circumstances, this was undoubtedly the wisest 
course to pursue, for, prior to the arrival of Cer- 
vera's squadron, the blockading of the seaports of 
western Cuba offered the United States the best 



174 THE CAMPAIGxV OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

chance of injuring Spain. By destroying the com- 
merce between these ports and the mother country, 
this blockade not only deprived a large portion of 
the army of its regular supplies, but it caused the 
people afifected by it to demand relief from the 
home government. These circumstances doubtless 
had considerable weight in influencing the home 
government to send Cervera's squadron to Cuba, 
where, under most unfavourable conditions, it was 
finally obliged to fight against greatly superior 
forces. Moreover, as long as the Spanish naval 
forces remained away from West Indian waters, this 
portion of the island, in which lay not only the 
capital and the important seaports of Matanzas, 
Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, but also the bulk of the 
Spanish army, was the strategical centre of the 
theatre of war. 

The Navy Department acted wisely in refusing 
to grant Admiral Sampson the permission, which 
he so urgently sought, to attack the fortifications 
of Havana with his armoured ships. In the first 
place, the primary object of battle fleets is not to 
attack fortifications, but to gain control of the sea 
by making off'ensive war against the enemy's sea 
forces. Armoured ships and land fortifications do 
not contend on equal terms. In land fortifications 
heavier guns can be mounted, better protection 
can be given them, and when damaged they can 
be more easily repaired or replaced. Moreover, 
guns on land can almost always be put in an 



THE BLOCKADE OF HA VANA 



75 



elevated position, which gives them not only greater 
range and power, but better protection against the 
enemy's fire. Resting, too, on a firmer foundation, 
they can be more accurately aimed. 

Naval and military men have long since recog- 
nized the fact that guns ashore are much more de- 
structive than guns afloat. " There is an old French 
saying, " says Captain Seaton Schroeder, United 
States Navy, " that ' Un canon sur la terre vaut un 
navire sur la mer,' which is, perhaps, an exaggera- 
tion, although the slight effect produced by the 
guns of Admiral Sampson's fleet upon the earth- 
works at Santiago made me think at the time that 
it was not far from true. The relative value of guns 
afloat and ashore is largely, of course, a matter of 
personal opinion and appreciation, but my own 
personal opinion would be that a gun on shore is 
fully equivalent to three afloat." 

Since there were in the seashore fortifications of 
Havana more than one hundred ^ guns that could 
have been directed against the seventy-two guns 
of Sampson's armoured ships, and since there 
were more guns of large calibre in the fortifications 
than there were in Sampson's squadron, it would 
have been, of course, utterly impossible for him to 
capture Havana by attacking the fortifications of 
the city. That Admiral Sampson and three of 
his captains should have believed that they could 
in this way capture the city seems remarkable; 
1 See footnote, page 82, section iS, 2d paragraph. 



176 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

especially so, since his letter to the Secretary of the 
Navy discussing the matter clearly shows that he 
was well informed as to the number of the sea- 
coast fortifications and their armaments. 

Secondly, inasmuch as the control of the sea was 
of the first importance in this campaign, it would 
have been extremely unwise for Admiral Sampson 
to attack the fortifications of Havana while the 
Spanish naval forces remained undefeated. Such a 
plan would most probably have resulted in the seri- 
ous injury or loss of one or more of his armoured 
ships, and have given Spain right at the start supe- 
rior forces on the sea. Prior to the struggle for 
naval supremacy, no plan of operations should 
have been adopted that would have risked a single 
armoured ship. While engaged in making the 
blockade as efifective as possible, Admiral Sampson 
should have husbanded his strength for the purpose 
of bringing a stronger force against his enemy in 
the sea battle which sooner or later was bound to 
occur. This was the one central thought that 
should have controlled all his movements, for no 
matter how successful he might have been in the 
execution of any other plan, if he had finally lost 
control of the sea in these waters, the United States 
with all her vast military resources would have been 
powerless to invade Spanish territory. 

Thirdly, even if Admiral Sampson had succeeded 
in destroying the seacoast fortifications of Havana, 
he could not by any possibility have captured the 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 77 

city until the Spanish army occupying the land forti- 
fications and intrenchments had been captured or 
destroyed. But the United States government had 
at the time no troops available for this purpose, 
and even if it had had, an undertaking of such 
magnitude could not have been safely entered upon 
while the control of the sea in these waters was still 
undecided. What would have been involved in 
such an undertaking can, perhaps, be better appre- 
ciated if it be remembered that the city had on 
the land side and around the harbour strong fortifi- 
cations armed with nearly a hundred heavy guns; 
that the harbour was mined and several lines of 
torpedoes were placed across its entrance ; and that 
the intrenchments and fortifications immediately 
around the city were occupied by sixty thousand^ 
Spanish soldiers with one hundred and thirty-four 
pieces of field artillery, not to mention the large 
number of additional troops and guns that could in 
an emergency have been quickly transported to the 
scene of action from Matanzas, Cardenas, Cienfue- 
gos, and the interior. 

In the blockade of Havana and the ports of 
western Cuba Admiral Sampson had to keep two 
objects constantly in view: first, the vessels of his 
fleet had to be distributed in such a way as to 
make the blockade ^ as effective as possible ; and, 

1 See footnote, page S3, last paragraph. 

'^ For blockading purposes all kinds of warships may be used ; 
but for offensive warfare, for obtaining control of the sea, each 
power has to rely almost exclusively on its armoured vessels. 
VOL. I. — 12 



178 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO ^DE CUBA 

secondly, the armoured vessels of his fleet had to 
be kept united in order that he might be able to 
meet with equal or superior forces any attack 
made by the enemy. 

Even though armoured vessels were greatly 
needed to blockade Cienfuegos, which with its 
railroad connection is virtually a back door to 
Havana, Admiral Sampson could not spare any 
for this purpose. To have divided his fleet, which 
at this time consisted of only two battleships, three 
monitors, and one armoured cruiser, would have 
been to tempt fortune and court defeat, for it would 
have given Cervera the chance of defeating each 
part in detail with superior forces. Campaigns are 
won not by dispersing one's fighting forces, but by 
keeping them united, or, if separated, by concen- 
trating them before the battle hour arrives. 

Nor would it have been expedient for Admiral 
Sampson to concentrate all his armoured vessels 
before Cienfuegos, even though it seemed more 
probable that Cervera would attempt to enter that 
port rather than that of Havana, for such a move- 
ment would not only have left entirely unguarded 
Matanzas, Cardenas, and Havana, the most im- 
portant city of all, but would have uncovered his 
base at Key West and exposed it to an attack of 
the enemy coming from the east through the 
Nicolas Channel. 

Accordingly all the armoured vessels of Samp- 
son's fleet were kept on the north side of the island 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 79 

in the vicinity of Havana, while a small division, 
consisting of but one unarmoured cruiser and two 
other small vessels, was held before Cienfuegos. 
Though this division was effective in stopping 
commerce between Cienfuegos and the outside 
world, it would have been of no use whatever in 
preventing even a single armoured ship of Cervera's 
squadron from entering the harbour. 

The result of Cervera's entering this harbour with 
his squadron would have been not only to raise the 
hopes of the Spanish soldiers and people of Cuba 
who were suffering from the effects of the block- 
ade, but to draw the American soldiers thither and 
cause the fighting to take place around this port as 
a centre, where with the large number of Spanish 
soldiers near at hand and the railroad connection 
with Havana and the interior the chances of Spanish 
victory would have been greater than at any other 
West Indian port except Havana. In fact, this 
portion of the island lying between Cienfuegos 
on one side, and Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas 
on the other, was not only the strategical centre 
of the theatre of war, but the stronghold of the 
Spanish West Indian possessions. Here the only 
preparations worthy of the name had been made 
to meet the enemy. Here was the only strongly 
fortified city. Here was the bulk of the Spanish 
army. 

Had Cervera entered this harbour, which, like 
the harbour of Santiago, had a narrow entrance, 



l80 THE CAMPAIGN' OF SAXTIAGO DE CUBA 

the campaign would doubtless have been much 
more prolonged than it was at Santiago; for as 
the American navy would hardly have been able 
to force its way through the entrance, the destruc- 
tion of Cervera's squadron could not have been 
accomplished without a long and difficult land 
campaign. 

It will be remembered that this harbour v.as not 
closed to Cervera until the arrival of the Flying 
Squadron about midnight of May 21, more than 
sixty hours after he entered the harbour of San- 
tiago. Had he sailed directly there from Marti- 
nique, or even from Curasao, he could easily have 
entered without opposition. Why he did not do 
so will be described later, but it should be noted in 
passing that, prior to his arrival at Santiago, neither 
Spain nor the United States had any reason to be- 
lieve that the decisive struggle would take place in 
the eastern province of Cuba. Referring to this 
subject, Major Nunez of the Spanish army, in his 
history of this war, says : 

" The idea certainly did not occur to the United States 
in their plan of campaign, that the eastern department of 
the island of Cuba would be the field of decisive conflict. 

" The secret of success in modem war consists in giving 
battle under conditions superior to those of the enemy, 
and the Americans would hardly have supposed that the 
Spaniards would proceed so foolishly as to make Santiago 
de Cuba a decisive point, since it was a weak place, lacking 
in modem defences, far from the real base of operations, 



Hr.-:.:\:._^ ?.":. c:r::-le:e!v feyArAtei ::::-i the principal de- 
fending forces. Sue:. are appUcar 
ble to offensive wars, are ai .. : : . : ■- ?. rtunflirt 
such as this, in which we were : : : 



and conseqnendy matteis 5: : :! e rv -- 

ranged in such a manner as :: re.: : .e s: e 

point where we had ozr ire.i:es: force.' 

The 5:rA:er -;:::: eemanded that the Fly- 
i..~ i: ;;.i : ^ .: .. e : eensent to Cienfuegos 
at :he be^ : _^ ::' the blockade; for, in the first 
" ":: :: ?: . : . :hcre. it would have rendered 
:.. : : - : : ; :. : e : : s effective, and at the same 

time have :e;;. :■: where, in an emer- 

gency, i: ce.hi .; : : : Sampson's squadron, 
or Sampson's squadron with it, in a much shorter 
time. 

Secondly, if Cener?. had attempted to enter this 
harbour, Schle : ron, reenforced by a battle- 

ship from Sar.v --- ; squadron, would have been 
strong enough to have kept him out. In this case 
Cervera would have been compelled either to return 
to Spain or to seek some open port where the Span- 
iards had made little or no preparations to resist 
attack, where they had no modem defences, and 
where their land forces were few in number. 

Ot" : :: = : Cervera might have fought either 
A:..:: : ~ ..dron. or have made an attack upon 
the Atla J cities, but he would have been 

in no CO do either without first seeking 

some West Indian port as a base of operations. 



1 82 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Thirdly, the delay in closing in on Cervera's 
squadron at Santiago would have been in great 
part avoided, for Commodore Schley would then 
have known that Cervera's squadron was not in the 
harbour of Cienfuegos, and could have started for 
Santiago early on the morning of May 23, immedi- 
ately after receiving Admiral Sampson's despatch. 
He could in that case have arrived at Santiago at 
least two days earlier than he did. 

It will be remembered that Cervera's squadron 
entered Santiago on the morning of May 19, but 
that the Flying Squadron did not arrive at Santiago 
until the evening of the 26th, and on that very even- 
ing Commodore Schley, not knowing that Cervera 
was in the harbour, sailed in the direction of Key 
West, and did not return to begin the blockade 
until the evening of the 28th. During these ten 
days, with the exception of a few hours, the 
Spanish squadron could have sailed out of the 
harbour without meeting a single armoured ship. 

Had Commodore Schley been positive that the 
Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos but was 
at Santiago, he doubtless would have sailed im- 
mediately and begun the blockade of Santiago 
Harbour on May 24, at least four days earlier than 
he did. The importance of his early arrival there 
can hardly be overestimated, for Cervera's escape 
would have changed the entire plan of subsequent 
operations and made the strategical situation much 
more difficult for the Americans. 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 183 

It should be remembered that Commodore 
Schley at first believed that Cervera's squadron 
was in the harbour of Cienfuegos. Doubtless this 
belief was in great measure based upon the fact that 
he perceived, and rightly, that either this port, or 
that of Havana, should have been Cervera's objec- 
tive. Moreover, he was undoubtedly strengthened 
in this belief by the report that Cervera's squadron 
was bringing to the Cuban troops munitions of 
war, which would naturally have to be delivered at 
either Havana or Cienfuegos for distribution. 

It remains to notice what effect the sending of 
the Flying Squadron to Cienfuegos at the begin- 
ning of the blockade might have had upon the 
Atlantic seaboard cities. Undoubtedly a number 
of them were vulnerable to an attack by the Span- 
ish warships ; but the probability that Cervera 
would have assailed any of them was extremely 
remote, for the reason that, however successful he 
might have been in such an effort, no great gain to 
the Spanish cause would have followed. At best 
he could have done no more than capture a few 
coasting vessels and shell one or two cities before 
the American squadrons would have been upon 
him. But with his coal allowance running low, he 
would scarcely have dared to incur the hazard of 
attempting an attack of this kind without first ob- 
taining a base of operations at San Juan,i Porto 

1 Though San Juan Harbour is hardly large enough to have 
accommodated all of Cervera's vessels at one time, it would have 



1 84 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Rico, or at some other port in that locaHty. Even 
had he made a sudden dash in order to spread 
terror along the coast and deceive the American 
authorities as to his real intentions, he would, on his 
withdrawal, have found great difficulty in eluding 
the American squadrons, which in all probability 
would have immediately advanced upon him, and 
in so doing would have come between him and the 
very port or ports he wished to enter. 

Had Cervera entered San Juan Harbour in an 
attempt to carry out this or any other plan, the 
American scouting vessels in that vicinity could 
have quickly reported the fact; and the battleships 
and armoured cruisers of Sampson's and Schley's 
squadrons could then have advanced eastward from 
Havana and Cienfuegos along both the north and 
the south side of the island, with the strong proba- 
bility of closing in upon him before he could have 
refilled his coal bunkers. With Schley's squadron 
at Cienfuegos, the two American squadrons could 
have united more speedily and safely for an attack 
on Cervera at San Juan, Porto Rico, than they 
could have done if Schley's squadron had been at 
Hampton Roads. First, because Cienfuegos is 
three hundred and forty-six miles nearer San Juan 
than is Hampton Roads, and, secondly, because 
the two squadrons, after passing eastward of Cuba, 

answered very well for a temporary base of operations. There 
were, however, in that locality a number of other places, such as 
Fajardo or Culebra that Cervera could have used as a base of 
operations had he been accompanied by colliers. 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 85 

could with little delay have united about five hun- 
dred miles west of Porto Rico, and thence have 
proceeded to San Juan. But had the Flying 
Squadron sailed direct from Hampton Roads to 
San Juan, it could have made no junction with 
Sampson's squadron until it reached its destina- 
tion ; in which case the chance, in all probability, 
would have been given Cervera of fighting one 
squadron before the other arrived. Or if he had 
been able to sail forth before the arrival of either, 
he could have met one or the other singly. As 
Cervera's four cruisers were about equal in fighting 
power to the two battleships and the single cruiser 
of each American squadron, he would in such a 
battle have had a fair chance of victory. 

Upon this strategical plan Captain Mahan com- 
ments most interestingly as follows: 

" The writer assumes that, had our coast defences been 
such as to put our minds at ease concerning the safety 
of our chief seaboard cities, the Flying Squadron would 
from the first have been off Cienfuegos. He is forced to 
assume so, because his own military conviction has always 
been that such would have been the proper course. 
Whatever coup de main might have been possible against 
a harbor inadequately defended as were some of ours, — 
the fears of which, even, he considered exaggerated, — 
no serious operations against a defended seaboard were 
possible to an enemy after a transatlantic voyage, until 
recoaled. . . . 

" Consider the conditions. The Spaniards, after crossing 



1 86 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

the Atlantic, would have to coal. There were four 
principal ports at which they might do so, — Havana, 
Cienfuegos, Santiago, and San Juan de Puerto Rico. 
The first two, on the assumption, would be closed to 
them, unless they chose to fight a division so nearly equal 
to their own force that, whatever the result of the battle, 
the question of coaling would have possessed no further 
immediate interest for them. Santiago and San Juan, and 
any other suitable eastern port open to them — if such 
there was — were simply so many special instances of a 
particular case ; and of these San Juan was the most 
favorable to them, because, being the most distant, it 
insured more time for coaling and getting away again be- 
fore our divisions could arrive. After their departure 
from Curasao was known, but not their subsequent inten- 
tions, and while our divisions were proceeding to Havana 
and Cienfuegos, measures were under consideration at 
the Navy Department which would have made it even 
then difficult for them to escape action, if they went to 
San Juan for coal ; but which would have raised the 
difficult close to the point of the impossible had our divi- 
sions from the first been placed before Havana and 
Cienfuegos, which strategic conditions dictated, but fears 
for our own inadequately defended coast prevented. 

" To insure this result the contemplated method, one 
simply of sustained readiness, was as follows. Adequate 
lookouts around Puerto Rico were to be stationed, by 
whom the enemy's approach would be detected and 
quickly cabled; and our two divisions were to be kept 
ready to proceed at an instant's notice, coaled to their 
best steaming lines, as far as this was compatible with a 
sufficiency of fuel to hold their ground after arriving off 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 8/ 

San Juan. Two of our fastest despatch vessels, likewise 
at their best steaming immersion, were to be held at Key 
West ready to start at once for Cienfuegos to notify the 
squadron there ; two, in order that if one broke on the 
way, one would surely arrive within twenty-four hours. 
Thus planned, the receipt of a cable at the Department 
from one of the lookouts off Puerto Rico would be like 
the touching of a button. The Havana division, reached 
within six hours, would start at once ; that at Cienfuegos, 
eighteen hours after the former. Barring accidents, we 
should, in five days after the enemy's arrival, have had off 
San Juan the conditions which it took over a week to 
establish at Santiago; but allowing for accidents, there 
would, within five days, have been at least one division, a 
force sufficient to hold the enemy in check. 

" Five days, it may be said, is not soon enough. It 
would have been quite soon enough in the case of the 
Spaniards after a sea voyage of twenty-five hundred miles, 
in which the larger vessels had to share their coal with the 
torpedo destroyers. In case of a quicker enemy of more 
executive despatch, and granting, which will be rare, that 
a fleet's readiness to depart will be conditioned only by 
coal and not by necessary engine repairs to some one 
vessel, it is to be remarked that the speed which can be, 
and has been, assumed for our ships in this particular case, 
nine knots, is far less than the most modest demands for 
a battleship. . . . Had not our deficiency of dry docks left 
our ships very foul, they could have covered the distance 
well within four days. Ships steady at thirteen knots 
would have needed little over three ; and it is sustained 
speed like this, not a spurt of eighteen knots for twelve 
hours, that is wanted. No one, however, need be at pains 



1 88 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

to dispute that circumstances alter cases ; or that the 
promptness and executive ability of an enemy are very 
material circumstances. Similarly, although the method 
proposed would have had probable success at San Juan, 
and almost certain success at any shorter distance, it would 
at two thousand miles be very doubtfully expedient." 

Why then was the Flying Squadron not sent 
to Cienfuegos at the beginning of hostilities? 
Largely, no doubt, because the people of the Atlan- 
tic seaboard were in a state of unreasonable terror 
lest their cities and harbours should be captured or 
destroyed. The inadequateness of coast defences 
and the prevailing ignorance as to the true military 
situation caused the people to demand protection, 
and to protest with all their might, through their 
representatives in Washington, against their coasts 
being left defenceless. Such a demand upon the 
authorities as this, even when known by them to 
be in great part unreasonable, is, in a republic 
where the people are sovereign, often most difficult 
to resist. The people see only their own interests; 
their vision extends no farther than their own 
shores ; they do not grasp the strategy of the situa- 
tion ; they do not perceive that campaigns are won 
by a concentration of effort upon the vital centres 
of the theatre of war ; they do not apprehend that 
in war the battle is the end to be sought, and that 
everything depends upon the destruction of the 
enemy's fleet or army or both ; they do not realize 
that the primary purpose of battle fleets is offensive, 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 189 

not defensive action, and that in the long run 
the best and only sure protection for their cities 
and harbours is the destruction of the enemy's 
battle fleets. Nor do they realize that it is only by 
subordinating minor issues, and striking a decisive 
blow at the very heart of things, that great victories 
have been won on either land or sea. 

History affords numerous examples in which 
the unreasonable clamour of a people and the de- 
mand of their representatives have prevented the 
execution of correct strategic plans and frequently 
brought about disaster. Such political considera- 
tions in the great Civil War led to the federal 
disaster of the first Bull Run. Such considerations 
forced Marshal MacMahon in 1870 to attempt 
the relief of Marshal Bazaine at Metz by a flank 
march which was foredoomed to failure, and which 
terminated in the disaster of Sedan. Such con- 
siderations caused General Kuropatkin in the 
Russian-Japanese War to commit the serious blun- 
der of sending an army under General Stakelberg 
past the flank of General Kuroki's army of twice 
the size to the relief of the beleaguered city of 
Port Arthur. " Our records at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century," says an able British 
authority,^ " teem with instances of the military 
incompetency of our rulers. Unable to grasp the 
elementary fact that concentration of efl"ort is 

1 Lieutenant-Colonel Walter H. James, P.S.C, editor of the 
Wolseley Series. 



I90 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

supremely important in war, they frittered away 
our strength in countless minor expeditions of no 
value for their great aim, the overthrow of Napo- 
leon, but which cost the country millions of money 
and thousands of lives. The expeditions to South 
America, the second expedition to Egypt, the 
dismal failure of Walcheren, the aimless wander- 
ings of Bentinck in Italy, were of no possible ad- 
vantage to the main object of the war. But the 
diversion of troops and treasure from Wellington 
in the Peninsula, where he sadly needed both, 
prolonged the struggle with Napoleon at least one 
year and possibly two. The history of the war in 
Spain is one long record of the foolishness of 
British methods of administration, which was only 
overcome by the iron will and steadfast purpose of 
the great Duke." 

But this subject will scarcely be appreciated in 
the proper light unless it is remembered that the 
deficiency in coast defences was the principal cause 
of the demand of the people for protection of their 
defenceless cities. Had they, through their rep- 
resentatives, been as insistent in time of peace 
for the speedy construction of coast fortifications 
as they were clamorous in time of war for the 
protection of their defenceless coasts, the plan of 
campaign which the strategical situation demanded 
could have been carried out. " The great evil of 
our deficiencies in coast armament," says Captain 
Mahan, " was that they neutralized temporarily a 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 191 

large part of our navy; prevented our sending it 
to Cuba; made possible that Cervera's squadron, 
during quite an interval, might do this or that 
thing of several things thus left open to him, the 
result of which would have been to encourage the 
enemy, and possibly to produce political action 
by our ill-wishers abroad. Directly upon this con- 
sideration — of the use that the Flying Squadron 
might have been if not held up for coast defence 
— follows the further reflection how much more 
useful still would have been a third squadron ; 
that is, a navy half as large again as we then 
had. Expecting Cervera's force alone, a navy of 
such size, free from anxiety about coast defence, 
could have barred to him San Juan de Puerto 
Rico as well as Cienfuegos and Havana ; or had 
Camara been joined to Cervera, as he should have 
been, such a force would have closed both Cien- 
fuegos and Havana with divisions that need not 
have feared the combined enemy. If, further, 
there had been a fourth squadron, — our coast 
defence in each case remaining the same, — our 
evident naval supremacy would probably have 
kept the Spanish fleet in Europe. Not unlikely 
there would have been no war, in which event 
the anti-imperialists may observe there would, 
thanks to a great and prepared navy, have been 
no question of the Philippines, and possibly none 
of Hawaii." 

The sailing of Admiral Sampson's squadron of 



192 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

armoured vessels on May 4 to the Windward Pas- 
sage and thence eastward to San Juan, Porto Rico, 
was a mistake. First, because nothing definite was 
known as to the whereabouts or even the destina- 
tion of the Spanish squadron. Although it was 
supposed by the American government that Cer- 
vera would arrive in the West Indies about May 8, 
and would probably seek the harbour of San Juan, 
Porto Rico, as a base of operations, there was 
nothing to indicate with any degree of certainty 
that he would take this course. Indeed, there 
were, as has already been pointed out, excellent 
reasons why he should have attempted to enter 
the harbour of Cienfuegos or of Havana. 

Secondly, this movement lessened to a great 
extent the effectiveness of the blockade, which at 
this time was of the first importance. Serious 
injury was being inflicted upon Spain by this 
blockade, and any relaxation of it in order to seek 
the Spanish squadron, whose destination was not 
yet known, was exchanging a certainty for a prob- 
ability, and in direct violation of that oneness of 
purpose which lies at the foundation of all sound 
strategy. 

In a nutshell, the correct strategy for the Amer- 
ican naval forces was this : until the arrival of the 
Spanish squadron in West Indian waters, and until 
its exact whereabouts became known, the blockade 
of Cuba was of the first importance ; after that the 
destruction of the Spanish squadron became of 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 1 93 

the first importance. Such being the case, every 
effort should have been made to make the block- 
ade as effective as possible until the arrival of the 
Spanish squadron ; then, immediately, every avail- 
able armoured vessel should have been directed to 
the destruction of that squadron. 

Thirdly, owing to the inequality of the speed of 
the vessels composing Sampson's squadron, in 
which there were two monitors, it was impossible 
for him to overtake the four swift cruisers of Cer- 
vera's squadron or to fight them advantageously on 
the high seas. An eight-knot squadron going in 
chase of a squadron of twice that speed presented 
a spectacle as absurd as that of a bulldog attempt- 
ing to catch a greyhound. Admiral Sampson took 
the monitors with him in order to obtain the neces- 
sary superiority in fighting power, for without them 
he might have had to fight the four Spanish cruisers 
and three destroyers with his two battleships, one 
armoured cruiser, and one torpedo boat, in which 
case the Spaniards would have outnumbered him 
in ships and had practically the same number of 
guns. Of course the monitors would have been of 
great use in blockading purposes had he succeeded 
in catching the Spanish squadron inside a harbour, 
or they would have been very helpful had his 
adversary forced the fighting and compelled him 
to defend himself But for offensive action on the 
high seas they were utterly useless, because the 
Spanish admiral could have sailed away and 
VOL. I.— 13 



194 '^^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

fought only that portion of the American squadron 
which had sufficient speed to keep in touch with 
him. 

In view of what we now know as to the fighting 
quahties and speed of the Spanish war vessels, it 
might seem that even with his two battleships and 
one armoured cruiser Admiral Sampson would have 
been victorious. But there was no reason to think 
so at that time, and even had there been, it would 
in any case have been a strategical error to fight a 
battle — especially such an important one, upon the 
result of which would have hinged to a great extent 
the fate of the whole campaign — with inferior or 
equal forces, when it was possible to bring the 
armoured cruiser and two battleships of Schley's 
squadron in addition to those of his own upon the 
battlefield. The best that could be said of such a 
battle, even if successful, is that it would have 
showed good tactics but poor strategy.^ 

That this opportunity for combination would 
have been given Admiral Sampson for the asking 
appears clearly from the following paragraph of 
the instructions sent to him on April 6: 

"Should the department learn that the Spanish fleet 
had gone to Porto Rico, it is possible that the Flying 

1 "The employment of troops in the fight belongs to tactics 
and forms its chief object. The decision as to when and for 
what object battle shall be joined, the assembly of the necessary 
forces, and the reaping of the proper result, is the business of 
strategy." — Blume's " Strategy." 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 195 

Squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your 
vessels may be needed to reenforce that squadron." 

Fourthly, this movement on San Juan, Porto Rico, 
uncovered the strategical centre of the theatre of 
war. It left both Havana and Cienfuegos open 
to Cervera's squadron at the very moment when 
it was most important that they should have been 
closed. Had Cervera proceeded on the morning 
of May 12 directly from Martinique to Havana 
instead of to Curacao at the average speed with 
which he sailed to Curacao, eleven knots an hour, 
he could have covered the distance of 1655 miles 
in one hundred and fifty hours, and have entered 
the port of Havana about noon of May 18, twenty- 
four hours before the return of Sampson's squad- 
ron to its naval base at Key West, thirty-six hours 
before the reassembling of the squadron in front of 
Havana, and while the Flying Squadron was still 
at Key West just after its voyage from Hampton 
Roads. Again, had Cervera sailed on the evening 
of May 15 from Curasao to Cienfuegos, instead of to 
Santiago de Cuba, even at the low rate of speed of 
eight knots an hour, which was about the speed 
of his squadron in going from Curasao to Santiago, 
he would have covered the distance, nine hundred 
miles, in one hundred and thirteen hours, and have 
arrived at Cienfuegos thirty-six hours in advance 
of the Flying Squadron. 

On the morning of May 12 Cervera's squadron 
was just on the point of sailing from Martinique, 



196 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Admiral Sampson's squadron was bombarding 
San Juan, Porto Rico, and the Flying Squadron 
was at Hampton Roads, Virginia. The distance 
of Havana from Fort de France, Martinique, is' 
1655 miles, from San Juan, Porto Rico, 984 miles, 
and from Hampton Roads, Virginia, 967 miles. 
The faultiness of this situation with respect to the 
American squadrons will perhaps be more clearly 
seen if it be remembered, first, that at the time 
Admiral Sampson, knowing nothing of the foul 
bottom of the Viscaya, believed that the speed of 
the Spanish squadron was considerably greater 
than it really was. Secondly, that Cervera at 
Martinique, with a squadron whose rated trial 
speed of each vessel was twenty knots an hour 
and whose rated service speed of each vessel was 
sixteen knots, was much nearer to Havana in time 
than was Sampson at San Juan with a squadron 
containing two monitors whose service speed was 
eight knots. Thirdly, that Cervera at Martinique 
with a squadron the speed of whose slowest vessel, 
the VizcayUy was about thirteen knots, was as near 
Havana in time as was Sampson at San Juan with 
a squadron whose speed was only eight knots. 
Fourthly, that Havana, being the most important 
port of the West Indies, and strongly fortified and 
defended by a large number of Spanish troops, was 
the very place where the Spaniards were prepared 
to make their strongest defence. Fifthly, that the 
result of Cervera's squadron entering that port and 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVAXA 1 97 

of the American squadrons closing in upon it, would 
have caused the decisive struggle to take place at 
that point. And with the fortifications of Havana 
protecting the Spanish warships, the defeat of the 
Spanish troops in that vicinity would have been 
absolutely necessary before Cervera's squadron 
could have been captured or destroyed. Had 
Cervera entered Havana Harbour and been block- 
aded there by the American squadrons, the situa- 
tion would not have been unlike that which has 
since occurred at Port Arthur in the Russian- 
Japanese War, where on both sides were displayed 
such desperate fighting and heroic courage. 
Though the fortifications on the land side of 
Havana were greatl}' inferior to those of Port 
Arthur, the Spaniards had a much larger army in 
western Cuba than the Russians had on the Laio 
Tung peninsula, and the chances were that the 
Spaniards, with the facilities for easy concentra- 
tion offered by the railroads leading from Havana 
to the important ports and interior of the island, 
and with their usual splendid courage on the de- 
fensive, would have made a desperate, sanguinary, 
and perhaps prolonged defence, which would have 
taxed severely for a year or more the military 
power of the United States. 

The reasons which Admiral Sampson gave in 
his official report^ for discontinuing the attack on 
San Juan and returning to Havana were conclusive ; 

1 See page 159. 



198 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

but one fails to see why these same reasons should 
not have applied with equal force against his 
going there at all. 

In this movement to San Juan, Porto Rico, as 
well as in the desire to attack the seacoast forti- 
fications of Havana, Admiral Sampson seems to 
have displayed an eagerness for battle that was not 
justified by the circumstances. When occasion 
demands it, every commander should be ready to 
take risks, for victories can seldom be won without 
them; but nothing can be said in justification of 
any plan that gives an enemy an equal or better 
chance of victory when there are superior forces 
in the theatre of operations that can readily be 
brought upon the battlefield. The commander 
who has the greater force should take as few risks 
as possible. He should not permit his courage 
to outrun his caution. It is never wise to under- 
estimate the strength of an enemy. " The better 
part of valour is discretion." 

It is difficult to understand why the Navy De- 
partment, instead of allowing Admiral Sampson to 
make this movement, did not carry out its original 
plan of sending Schley's squadron, reenforced by 
one or two of Admiral Sampson's swifter vessels. 
Though even this plan, while Cervera's destina- 
tion was still unknown, would have been faulty, 
it would have been less open to criticism ; first, 
because the Atlantic seaboard cities could have 
been uncovered with much less risk than could 



777^ BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 199 

Havana and the naval base at Key West, and, 
secondly, because the commander of the Flying 
Squadron would have had swifter vessels with 
which to intercept or search for the Spanish 
squadron. Moreover, had the Navy Department 
contemplated the sending of the Flying Squadron 
no farther than the Windward Passage, it would 
in this position not only have still covered the At- 
lantic seaboard cities from an attack of Cervera's 
squadron coming, as it most probably would, 
through the Windward Passage, but it would also 
have been much nearer to both Havana and Cien- 
fuegos. In this position, too, it would have been 
much more favourably situated for hastening to San 
Juan, Porto Rico, should it have been necessary to 
go there to meet the Spanish squadron. 

It was a mistake to send Cervera's squadron to 
the West Indies; but having decided upon this 
course, the Spanish government should have done 
everything possible to facilitate the movements 
and increase the strength of the squadron. Had 
supply ships been sent with the squadron or been 
sent ahead to meet it at Martinique, had Cervera's 
four swift cruisers each been put in perfect fight- 
ing trim, as they might easily have been at the 
expense of a very little forethought and energy, 
the efficiency of the squadron would have been 
enormously increased. 

The possibilities open to such a squadron were 
many. It might have succeeded in intercepting 



200 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

the Oregon, which passed near Martinique on its 
way to join Admiral Sampson's forces. It might 
have sailed boldly to some Spanish West Indian 
port and, finding there only unarmoured vessels, or 
even a number of armoured ones, might have been 
able to fight them with superior forces, or, being 
the swifter squadron, could, if it met the enemy 
in superior force, have avoided a battle. Or it 
might have sailed boldly to Havana, perhaps have 
entered that port without opposition, and in this 
way have made sure that the decisive struggle 
would take place at that point, where the Span- 
iards could make their strongest defence. Though 
blockaded in that harbour by all the armoured 
vessels of the American navy, the Spanish squad- 
ron, protected by the fortifications of the city, 
would have continued to be a serious menace to the 
American forces, and under favourable conditions 
might perhaps have sallied forth at an opportune 
moment for the purpose of destroying American 
transports or for attacking some weakly defended 
portion of the blockading coast-line. " The con- 
trol of the sea, however real," says Captain Mahan, 
" does not imply that an enemy's single ships or 
small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot 
cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, 
make harassing descents upon unprotected points 
of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbours. On 
the contrary, history has shown that such evasions 
are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 201 

party, however great the inequality of naval 
strength." 

Havana was Cervera's proper objective. Why 
then did he not sail for that port? Two reasons 
may be assigned. First, he was doubtless led to 
believe that Havana as well as Cienfuegos and San 
Juan, Porto Rico, were closed against him ; for 
he had received at Martinique about midnight of 
May II information that the bulk of the enemy's^ 
ships were blockading the western part of Cuba 
from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, and that Admiral 
Sampson with a number of his vessels was off 
Porto Rico, and was expected to bombard San 
Juan, Porto Rico, that very day. May ii. And, 
secondly, his coal supply was limited. He had 
not been able to obtain any coal at Martinique, 
and only six hundred tons at Curagao, and though 
he had more than sufficient to carry him from 
Martinique or Curagao to San Juan, Porto Rico, 
and probably an abundance to carry him to Cien- 
fuegos, it is doubtful whether he had enough to 
reach Havana. But even if he had had, it would 
have been extremely hazardous to appear at 
Havana, the very centre of active operations, with 
his coal bunkers nearly empty, for he surely could 
not have expected to enter that port without 
meeting equal or superior forces. And yet, it is a 
remarkable fact that had the Spanish squadron 

1 " Que los buques enemigos bloquearon la parte O. de Cuba, 
desde Cardenas a Cienfuegos, con el grueso de su Escuadra." 



202 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

been properly supplied with coal, and the bottom 
of the Vizcaya been clean, Cervera could have 
sailed from Martinique on the morning of May 12, 
and with no great effort could have safely entered 
any one of the four principal ports of the Spanish 
West Indian possessions. With the exception of 
a single monitor, only unarmoured vessels could 
have barred his way to Havana or Cienfuegos; 
Santiago de Cuba would have continued to remain 
free from blockade; and at the time Cervera's 
squadron would have reached San Juan, Sampson's 
squadron was off the north coast of Hayti sailing 
westward towards Havana. 

But even more remarkable still, perhaps, is the 
fact that, under the conditions as they actually 
existed, Cervera could have sailed from Curagao 
on the evening of May 15 at a rate of speed not 
exceeding seven and a half knots an hour and 
entered without opposition any one of the four 
principal harbours of Cuba or Porto Rico except 
Havana. 

His next best objective was Cienfuegos. He had 
plenty of coal to reach that port, which lies almost 
directly on the route from Curagao to Havana. 
Even if he had found no coal there, which was 
highly improbable, he could in an emergency 
have obtained a supply by rail from Havana. 
Cienfuegos being the back door of Havana, offered 
strategically several advantages that Havana itself 
offered. Here Cervera could have received the 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 203 

cooperation of the Spanish troops of western Cuba. 
Here in telegraphic communication with all the 
principal West Indian ports, he could have in- 
formed himself of the exact whereabouts of the 
enemy's forces, and had the opportunity arisen, 
could have quickly slipped out of the harbour and 
perhaps have reached Havana. 

Nothing could have been more fortunate for the 
Americans than Cervera's entrance into Santiago 
Harbour. His going there transferred the deter- 
mining centre of war from Havana to Santiago, 
eliminated from the contest that portion of the 
Spanish army occupying western Cuba, and caused 
the decisive struggle to take place where the Span- 
iards were especially weak. Santiago was poorly 
fortified, inadequately defended, and scantily sup- 
plied with provisions and coal. Moreover, the 
harbour had a long narrow entrance, which would 
necessitate Cervera's vessels going out one by one, 
thus giving a blockading squadron the opportunity 
of concentrating an overwhelming fire upon each 
vessel as it came out. 

Although Cervera doubtless believed from the 
information he had received at Martinique that 
the ports of Cienfuegos, Havana, and San Juan, 
Porto Rico, were each closed against him by a 
division of armoured vessels, yet this very infor- 
mation, indicating that the American armoured 
vessels were divided and widely separated, was in 
itself a strong additional reason for his going to 



204 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago de Cuba; be- 
cause, under these conditions, he might with reason 
have expected to find the blockading forces in 
front of Cienfuegos inferior to his own. In that 
case he could have fought a battle with the chances 
of victory in his favour. His only hope of success 
was in attacking and defeating in succession the 
fractional parts of the American navy; but if he 
could not do this, he might still hope to prolong 
greatly the conflict by taking refuge in the harbour 
either of Havana or of Cienfuegos. 

As a matter of fact, had Cervera sailed on the 
evening of May 15 directly from Curagao to Cien- 
fuegos, at an average speed of eleven knots an 
hour, he could have entered Cienfuegos early on 
the morning of May 19 just a few hours before 
the Flying Squadron sailed for that port, and two 
days before Admiral Sampson's squadron returned 
to Havana. Here he could easily have learned 
that no armoured ships were then blockading 
Havana; and, allowing his vessels forty-eight 
hours to take on more coal, he could have sailed 
out of that port for Havana unopposed on the 
morning of May 21. If he had pursued this 
course, he would have met, about 3 r. M. of that 
same day, the Flying Squadron, which consisted 
of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the 
battle which would have occurred, Cervera would 
have outnumbered his adversary in armoured 
ships and guns; and he certainly would have had 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 



205 



a fair chance of victory. Pressing on towards 
Havana, he would, early on the morning of the 
next day, have met the Iowa on its way to re- 
enforce the Flying Squadron. In this battle the 
advantages would have been overwhelmingly in 
his favour. Again pushing forward, he would have 
found the New York, Indiana, and three or four 
monitors blocking the entrance to Havana Har- 
bour. Though this squadron was superior to his 
own in the number of ships and guns, the inequal- 
ity in speed of the vessels composing it would have 
given Cervera a great tactical advantage. 

Of course, it seems hardly probable that such 
successes as here indicated could have occurred, 
for after fighting the Flying Squadron it is very 
doubtful whether Cervera would have been in a 
condition to press on to new victories ; neverthe- 
less he had a good fighting chance ; it was en- 
tirely possible that these very things might have 
happened. In discussing supposititious battles, in 
which both sides are assumed to be equally brave 
and skilful, victory must of course be given to 
that side which succeeds in bringing a prepon- 
derating force upon the battlefield. 

Having been ordered to sail to the West Indies 
in spite of his protests, Cervera and his brave offi- 
cers, though feeling that their voyage was futile 
and their squadron doomed, should not only have 
faced the situation with courage, as they actually 
did, but should have striven with every means in 



206 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

their power to do as much injury to the enemy as 
possible. Cervera should therefore have adopted 
a bold policy, for as long as his squadron was able 
to strike a telling blow there was some chance of 
victory. " I know," said Lucius Marcius on assum- 
ing command after the death of the two Scipios, 
" that the measure appears to you daring ; but it 
is when your circumstances are so difficult as to 
be almost desperate that the boldest counsels are 
the safest." As Cervera's only hope lay in fight= 
ing, he should have assumed the aggressive at 
every favourable opportunity. In the game of war 
victory is not always to the stronger. By rapidity 
of action and brilhancy of strategical combination 
battles and campaigns have often been won when 
the last lingering ray of hope had all but vanished. 
" Fortune," says Napier, " always asserts her su- 
premacy in war, and often from a slight mistake 
such disastrous consequences flow that in every 
age and in every nation the uncertainty of arms 
has been proverbial." 

After Admiral Sampson received the informa- 
tion that Cervera's squadron had arrived at Curasao, 
he made no more strategical mistakes. He then 
hurried to Key West and immediately took meas- 
ures for preventing Cervera from entering either 
Cienfuegos or Havana. For this purpose he sent 
the Flying Squadron to Cienfuegos, and on the 
following day \\\q Iowa ; and with the remaining 
armoured vessels of his own squadron he then 



THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA 207 

took up a position off Havana. In reenforcing the 
Flying Squadron with the Iowa, Admiral Samp- 
son weakened his own squadron considerably ; but 
nevertheless this action was wise, as Cienfuegos 
was Cervera's most probable objective, and as this 
reenforcement would enable Commodore Schley to 
meet the Spanish squadron with superior forces. 

Meanwhile, the entrance of Cervera's squadron 
into Santiago Harbour changed the determining 
centre of the theatre of war. The problem now 
was to blockade this squadron there with superior 
forces, or, if it should succeed in getting out, to cap- 
ture or destroy it, or at least prevent it from enter- 
ing either Cienfuegos or Havana. With this end in 
view. Admiral Sampson ordered the Flying Squad- 
ron to Santiago, while with his own squadron he 
cruised slowly back and forth in the vicinity of 
Nicolas Channel ready to meet the Spanish squad- 
ron should it in the meantime escape from San- 
tiago and attempt to reach Havana by going 
around the eastern end of the island. 

But when he heard that the Flying Squadron, 
after arriving at Santiago, had suddenly turned 
back and sailed for Key West, he saw that his 
plans were about to end in failure, just at the very 
moment when he had reason to expect success ; 
he saw the opportunity of a great and decisive 
victory slipping from his grasp. No wonder that 
he was worried and telegraphed to the Secretary 
of the Navy, " The failure of Schley to continue 



208 THE CAMPAIGN- OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

blockade must be remedied at once if possible. " 
No wonder that the Navy Department in its anx- 
iety decided to send Admiral Sampson himself to 
Santiago. 

But fortunately Commodore Schley, having 
reconsidered his determination to sail for Key 
West, returned to Santiago before Cervera escaped. 
Luckily this movement rectified what promised to 
be a disastrous blunder and gave Admiral Sampson 
the opportunity of bringing overwhelming forces 
against the Spanish squadron. He immediately 
hastened to Santiago with the Nciv York and Ore- 
gon, and several days later he was joined by the 
Indiana, which had been acting as an escort to 
General Shafter's Corps. Sampson had now col- 
lected at Santiago all the battleships and armoured 
cruisers of the American navy. He now had 
superior forces upon the battlefield, and was ready 
to fall upon Cervera's ships one by one as they 
issued from the mouth of the harbour. The strat- 
egy of the campaign had ended, and the tactical 
manoeuvres of the greatest sea battle in American 
history were soon to begin. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR ^ 

THE Minister of Marine at Madrid, having re- 
ceived the news of Admiral Dewey's victory 
in Manila Bay, sent on May 12 the following des- 
patch to Admiral Cervera, whose squadron was 
then in the vicinity of Martinique : 

" Situation changed since your departure. Your in- 
structions amplified so that if you do not believe that 
your squadron can operate there successfully may return 
to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably 
Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt and indicate decision." ^ 

And on May 15, after it had been learned that 
Cervera had not received the above despatch, the 
Minister of Marine cabled the Commandant at San 
Juan, Porto Rico : 

" Use every means possible to get to Admiral of squad- 
ron, who is at Curasao, the telegrams you have for him, 
as also information on situation [of] hostile squadron, and 
arrange for immediate departure of English steamer Roath, 
if she has coal on board for squadron." 

' See Maps 5 and 6. 

2 Another despatch, sent Cervera on the same day, but not re- 
ceived, was in part as follows : " Steamer Alicante must have 
arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer with three thou- 
sand tons [of coal] is to make that harbour under orders of Captain 
of Alicante. Both vessels at j-our disposal." 



2IO THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

But Cervcra did not receive the despatch of the 
1 2th until his return to Spain after the destruction 
of his squadron. He was, however, informed of its 
purport on the 20th of May, the day after his arrival 
at Santiago. Meanwhile, Captain-General Ramon 
Blanco, having learned of the instructions contained 
in the despatch, was greatly disturbed, and on May 
17 telegraphed his government : 

" Have asked Commandant of Navy whether he has 
received news of our squadron. He tells me [that he] 
received from San Juan confidential cipher message say- 
ing that telegram has been sent to commander-in-chief of 
squadron at Fort de France that his instructions are am- 
plified, and if he cannot operate there successfully may re- 
turn to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here 
would be wholly untenable, and I could not prevent 
bloody revolution in this capital and whole island, feeling 
being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of 
our squadron. Therefore, beg your excellency to tell me 
whether it is true that order has been issued to squadron 
to return to Peninsula, and if so does government real- 
ize significance of such a decision, which might be the 
cause of a bloody page staining our history, and of final 
loss of this island and the honour of Spain. If our squad- 
ron is defeated, it would increase here determination to 
vanquish or die ; but if it flees, panic and revolution are 
certain." 

On the receipt of this communication the Min- 
ister of Marine sent, on May 19, the following 
despatch to the Naval Commandant at Santiago 
de Cuba: 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 211 

"If possible to communicate with Admiral [of] our 
squadron, notify him that government cancels telegram as 
to return to Spain." 

When Cervera arrived in Santiago his warships 
were very much in need of coal. About thirty- 
four hundred tons of Cardiff and Cumberland coal 
were found there ; but as the facilities for putting 
it on board were wholly inadequate, the work of 
supplying the squadron progressed very slowly. 
Moreover, provisions and water, being very scarce 
in the city, were obtained with great difficulty. 
Nevertheless, by continuous exertion day and 
night, a sufficient amount of coal, water, and pro- 
visions was got aboard to enable the squadron to 
reach any other harbour in the West Indies. 

It was a time of great anxiety to Admiral Cer- 
vera, for he realized that he could not remain long 
at Santiago without being blockaded by a large 
number of the armoured ships of the American 
navy. Accordingly, on May 23, he decided to 
sail the next morning for San Juan, Porto Rico. 
But having received during the night information 
which led him to doubt the wisdom of his immediate 
departure, he called together his ranking officers 
for a discussion of the matter. He told them that 
since the preceding evening he had been informed 
that Admiral Schley's squadron had left Key West 
on the 20th instant, bound for the south side of 
Cuba; that Admiral Sampson's squadron had been 
sighted off Cienfuegos, and that, in his judgment, 



212 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

the correctness of this information was strongly con- 
firmed by the fact that four ships had remained in 
front of the harbour of Santiago throughout the 
preceding day. He stated also that either of the 
enemy's squadrons was superior to his own. 

In view of this information, taken in connection 
with the following considerations developed during 
the discussion, namely, that the ships had only 
about one-third their coal supply; that owing to 
the foul bottom of the Vizcaya the maximum 
speed of the squadron was calculated to be only 
fourteen knots ; and that the narrow channel at 
the harbour entrance made it necessary for the 
sortie to be made by the ships one at a time, all 
the officers thought that the few advantages which 
might be derived from reaching the harbour of 
San Juan, Porto Rico, would not counterbalance 
the dangers which might be incurred in going out. 
They therefore decided that it was better to re- 
main at Santiago for the present, replenish their 
supplies as far as possible from the stores there, and 
await a more favourable opportunity for leaving 
the harbour. 

On the next day Admiral Cervera, in a letter 
to General Arsenio Linares, commander of the 
Spanish forces at Santiago, explained his reasons 
for not going out: 

Honoured Sir, — I have the honour of acknowledging 
the receipt of your two official and confidential letters on 
the movements of the hostile fleets, for which I thank you 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 21$ 

very much. It is much to be regretted that the squadron 
did not go out yesterday while it had all the fires lighted. 
But information received from the government confirmed 
the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on 
the night of the 20th, and that Sampson was following 
with his fleet, and for that reason all the captains of this 
squadron were unanimously of opinion that the sortie was 
impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our coal, I 
ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out. 

As these ships require a number of hours to get up 
steam, they would not be ready before night, and that 
would be too late, especially in view of the rapid con- 
sumption of coal. For these reasons there is no other 
course open at present but to take up positions, as we 
agreed yesterday, to defend the harbour and city in case 
an attempt should be made to force the entrance. The 
Co/on is already at her post and the Teresa will be there 
shortly. The others will not be there until to-night or 
to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If 
another opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and 
take advantage of it, but as I cannot hope with these 
scant forces to attempt any definite operations, it will 
only be a matter of changing this harbour for another, 
where we would also be blockaded. 

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this 
harbour, which is so short of everything we need, and I 
had chosen it in preference because, not being blockaded, 
I supposed it to be well supplied with provisions, coal, and 
stores of every kind. Although I always thought that it 
would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep 
the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the 
only effective service that can be expected of this small 



214 



THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



and poorly equipped squadron, 1 beg that you will trans- 
mit these explanations to his excellency the captain- 
general, as the highest representative of the nation in this 
island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent 

inaction. Yours, etc., 

Pascual Cervera. 

On May 26 the ranking officers of the squadron 
were again assembled for a discussion of the same 
matter. The conclusions arrived at are set forth 
in the proceedings of the meeting: 

" Proceedings 

" The second in command of the squadron, the captains 
of the battleships, the chief of staff, and the commander of 
the torpedo-boat flotilla, being convened by the Admiral, 
assembled in his cabin on May 26, 1898. 

'' The Admiral acquainted the officers with recent infor- 
mation received relative to the movements of the hostile 
fleets, and asked for their opinions as to the expediency of 
going out that day, taking advantage of the bad weather 
prevailing. It was unanimously decided that the squad- 
ron should proceed to San Juan, and orders were issued 
to spread the fires of all the boilers and be ready by 5 
o'clock p. M. 

" At 2 o'clock the semaphore signalled the presence of 
three hostile ships. In view of this fact, in connection 
with the circumstance that the weather was clearing, the 
Admiral again convened the officers aforesaid. Doubts 
as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the going 
out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the 
meeting in the morning. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 215 

" To settle this question, Pilot Miguel was called, who 
had piloted in the flagship, and who, in the opinion of 
the captain of the harbour, is the most intelligent of the 
pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot, who is ill). 

" Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there 
would be no trouble whatever about taking out the Teresa^ 
Vizcaya, and Oquendo any time, day or night, their 
draught being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but that the 
going out of the Colon, whose draught is 24.9 feet, might 
present difficulties on account of a fiat rock in the water 
off Point Morrillo, where the water is only twenty-seven 
and one-half English feet deep. 

" The pilot was sent to the harbour entrance to form a 
more exact opinion on the state of the sea, and returned, 
saying that he thought it very probable that, owing to the 
swell, the Colon might touch bottom on the flat rock 
referred to. Under these circumstances the Admiral pro- 
pounded the following question, on the assumption that 
the whole squadron should go out together, leaving only 
the torpedo-boat destroyers in the harbour : Is it expe- 
dient to risk the Colon being injured, or should the sortie 
not be effected, awaiting more favourable circumstances? 

" The question being put in this form. Captains Concas 
and Bustamante were in favour of the sortie, for reasons 
hereinafter set forth, and all the other officers were in 
favour of not going out, with the exception of the Ad- 
miral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions 
the foregoing proceedings were drawn up. 

"Jose de Paredes. 
Antonio Eulate. 
Juan B. Lazaga. 
Emilio Diaz Moreu. 
Fernando Villaamil." 



2l6 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 



Separate Opinions 

" My reasons for expressing the opinion that the 
squadron should go out immediately, in spite of the state- 
ment of Pilot Miguel, are as follows : My impression on 
the probable situation of the hostile squadrons is the same 
as that formulated by the Admiral. To-day we are certain 
that they are not off this harbour ; they are almost sure 
to be there to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe to 
be well founded, I reason as follows : Our squadron, 
blockaded by far superior forces, has very little prospect 
of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each 
ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practi- 
cable in my opinion, and would expose us to the loss of 
one or more ships. 

"To go out openly and accept battle seems to me 
almost inhuman, because our defeat would be certain, 
and unwise, because it would be preparing an easy 
triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems to 
me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city 
wlien, in a month from now or little more, we shall find 
ourselves without provisions, since we are completely cut 
off by land and sea. This last solution is to my mind 
even more inadmissible than any of the former. 

" This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron 
at the present time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I 
am in favour of saving three of the ships, even at the 
risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe such 
loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of 
safety, and so do hydrographers. The Coloii's draught, 
according to her captain, is 7.60 meters, that is to say 
24.93 English feet. The rock, according to the pilot, 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 21/ 

has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent (he 
says considerably less than the width of the Admiral's 
cabin). Hence there would be a margin of two and one- 
half English feet, and the swell did not seem excessive to 
me this morning, when I was at the mouth of the harbour 
and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. More- 
over, the Colo}i might pass over the rock without being 
struck by any sea, and even if she should be struck it 
would not be at all certain that the resulting injury would 
disable her from continuing the voyage. 

" Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, 
I believe it preferable for the Colon (which, in my mind 
should be the last to go out) to remain disabled at the 
harbour entrance than for us to await what I fear is in 
store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope that I 
may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, 
and I cannot hold it back. 

"Joaquin Bustamante." 

" Concurring entirely in the opinion of Captain Busta- 
mante, I wish to add that the hostile squadron which is 
coming from Cienfuegos and which we expected this 
morning, having probably been detained by the storm, 
may be here at daybreak, and the blockade we should 
have to run in that case would be immensely superior 
even without counting the other squadron which is re- 
ported to be coming by the way of the Old Channel. 

" In order to realise the seriousness of the situation of 
the city, it should be remembered that eleven months' 
pay is due the army as well as the navy ; that the army 
owes for its provisions for almost the same length of time, 
and that commercial enterprise does not care to increase 



21 8 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

the debt, there being back in the minds of all the thought 
that with the autonomy of the island the treasury will 
pass out of our hands. Consequently the city of Santiago 
de Cuba, being blockaded by land and sea, is besieged 
by itself, which is the most effective kind of blockade, 
for there are no provisions and no one is doing any- 
thing to supply any. Therefore the capitulation will 
become necessary in a very short space of time, and 
will drag the squadron along with it. 

" The same as Captain Bustamante, I do not believe 
the loss of the Cristobal Colon at all probable, and while 
under ordinary circumstances we should not go out 
and probably should not have entered, to-day circum- 
stances demand our running the risk even of total loss, 
which I consider very remote, however. A delay of 
twenty or twenty-five days, which is all that remains to 
us, is not sufficient to warrant a hope of a favourable 
opportunity or a change of circumstances. 

"VICTOR M. CONCAS. 
"Santiago de Cuba, May 26, 1898." 

*' I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to 

make it necessary to risk the loss of the Colon at the rock 

where the Gero/ia, of less draught than the former, lost 

part of her false keel, and in hopes that the sea will calm 

down and that another opportunity will present itself the 

sortie is deferred. 

" Cervera." 

This was his last opportunity. The arrival of 
Commodore Schley on May 28 and of Admiral 
Sampson on June i so completely closed the door 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 219 

of escape that, unless a storm or hurricane should 
disperse the American warships, there was no 
longer a possibility of Cervera's getting out with- 
out having to fight his way through the concen- 
trated strength of the American navy. 

When Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago, 
he found the vessels of Commodore Schley's 
squadron in position just westward of the mouth 
of the harbour. On the next day he issued an 
order of battle, which had for its object not only 
the close blockade of Santiago, but the attack and 
destruction of the Spanish squadron, should it 
attempt to escape. In accordance with this order 
the fleet was divided into two squadrons : the first 
under the direct command of the admiral, was com- 
posed of the New York, Iowa, Oregon, Neiv Orleans, 
Mayfloiver, and Porter ; the second, under the com- 
mand of Commodore Schley, was composed of the 
Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, and 
Vixen. The first squadron was ordered to take 
position on the east side of the entrance ; the sec- 
ond, on the west side. The warships were to form 
in a semicircle off the mouth of the harbour, to 
remain within about six miles of the Morro in the 
daytime, and move in three or four miles nearer 
at night. Should the enemy appear, they were to 
close in at once, regardless of the shore batteries, 
which were not deemed of sufficient power to do any 
material injury, and endeavour to sink his vessels 
or force them to run ashore. Accompanying the 



220 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

order of battle was the following diagram, showing 
the blockading positions assigned to the different 
vessels : ^ 



i /■■ 








\ 


A&*)&«*V i' 


\ 


V 




O-gon «^'' 



Though the attacks made upon the forts of the 
harbour and the temporary withdrawal of vessels 
for coaling and other purposes necessitated from 
time to time a different arrangement, yet, in gen- 
eral, the positions indicated above were maintained 
throughout the blockade. 

In order to prevent the enemy from escaping at 
night, the lozoa, Oregon, and MassacJuisetts were 
ordered to take turns of two hours each in keep- 
ing a searchlight directly on the entrance of the 
harbour; at the same time the New York and New 
Orleans on the eastern side of the entrance, and 
the Brooklyn and Texas on the western side, were 
to take turns in using their lights to sweep the 
coast-line and the horizon. 

1 The Indiana later had a place in the cordon. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 221 

On June 3 Admiral Sampson was informed by a 
reliable Cuban that all four armoured cruisers and 
two torpedo-boat destroyers of Cervera's squadron 
were inside Santiago Harbour; and on that same 
day he received a despatch from Washington, 
saying that the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror} 
the only missing vessel of the squadron, was then 
in San Juan Harbour, Porto Rico, in a greatly 
damaged condition. The receipt of this infor- 
mation put an end to any doubt that may have 
lingered in the mind of Admiral Sampson as to the 
exact whereabouts of Cervera's entire squadron. 

Santiago Bay is a landlocked harbour extending 
about five miles inland. On the east side of the 
head of the bay is the city of Santiago, the capital 
of Santiago Province. The entrance to the bay is 
through a long, narrow channel varying in width 
from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and 
fifty feet. On the east side of the entrance, upon 
a huge rocky point lying along the south shore, 
Morro Castle rises two hundred and sixty feet 
above the sea level, — old, rugged, imposing, and 
seemingly formidable, but armed only with a few 
obsolete cannon. A few yards east of the castle, 
on the crest of this huge rocky point, was an earth- 
work, known as the Eastern or Morro Battery. 
This battery was armed with two obsolete 8-inch 
iron howitzers and five 6.3-inch bronze guns, made 

1 On May 25 the Terror sailed to San Juan, Porto Rico, from 
Martinique, where Cervera had left her for repairs. 



222 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

in the years 171 8, 1768, 1769, 1779, and 1783 re- 
spectively. Occupying the heights on the opposite 
side of the entrance was Upper Socapa Battery, 
armed with three obsolete 8-inch iron howitzers, 
and two 6.3-inch Hontoria guns taken from the 
Spanish cruiser Rcina Mercedes, which was lying in 
the harbour at the outbreak of the war. Directly 
behind Morro Castle, on the east side of the neck 
of the channel and about a quarter of a mile from 
its mouth, was Estrella Battery, in which were 
mounted two short, obsolete 4.7-inch bronze 
guns, two obsolete 8-inch iron howitzers, and two 
3-inch breech-loading Placentia guns. On the 
opposite shore, near the water's edge, was the 
Lower Socapa Battery, an earthwork armed with 
four 1.5-inch Hotchkiss revolving cannon and two 
Nordenfelt rapid-fire machine guns, which were 
taken from the Reina Mercedes. Farther up the 
bay on the east side, about a mile from the Morro, 
was Punta Gorda Battery, in which were mounted 
two modern 6-inch Meta howitzers, two 3.5-inch 
breech-loading Krupp guns, and two Hontoria 6.3- 
inch guns taken from the Reina Mercedes. This 
battery, lying directly in line with the channel, 
completely commanded the narrow entrance. 

Prior to the declaration of war there was not a 
single modern gun at the mouth of the harbour, 
nothing but obsolete ordnance, nearly every piece 
of which was more than one hundred years old. 
The four batteries, Morro or Eastern, Upper 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 223 

Socapa, Lower Socapa, and Punta Gorda, were 
all hastily and imperfectly constructed after hos- 
tilities began. The two Krupp guns and two 
Meta howitzers on Punta Gorda were placed in 
position between April 21 and 27. Of the four 
Hontoria guns taken from the Reina Mercedes, two 
were carried to the Upper Socapa Battery, where 
the first was mounted on May 18, and the second 
on the 28th; the other two were mounted at Punta 
Gorda on June 2 and 17 respectively. These old 
forts and batteries were occupied by regular sol- 
diers, who were reenforced on June 22 by a com- 
pany of sailors from Cervera's squadron, but the 
guns taken from the Reina Mercedes were served 
by officers and sailors from that ship. 

Early in April the Spaniards began placing sub- 
marine mines in the channel, and by the end of the 
month this work was practically completed. The 
firing stations for these mines, which were arranged 
to explode by electric currents, were the Upper and 
Lower Socapa and Estrella batteries, and the island 
of Cay Smith, opposite Soldados Point. 

Before sailing from Key West to Santiago, Ad- 
miral Sampson had seriously considered the prac- 
ticability of obstructing the narrow entrance to the 
harbour by sinking a large vessel across the chan- 
nel. With this object in view, he had on May 27 
sent the New Orleans to convoy the collier Sterling 
to Santiago with instructions to Commodore Schley 
to sink the collier across the entrance to the harbour. 



224 ^-^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

But as the vessels did not reach Santiago until May 
30, only two days before Sampson's arrival, the 
orders regarding the Sterling w&rQ not carried out. 

In the meantime Admiral Sampson had decided 
to substitute the collier Merrimac for the Sterling ; 
and for the execution of this desperate undertak- 
ing he selected Assistant Naval Constructor Rich- 
mond Pearson Hobson, U. S. Navy, with whom he 
had been in consultation as to its details during 
the voyage from Key West. Out of a large num- 
ber of volunteers, the following crew was chosen : 
Osborn Warren Deignan, coxswain of the Merri- 
mac ; George F. Phillips, machinist of the Merri- 
mac ; Francis Kelly, water tender of the Merrimac; 
George Charette, gunner's mate of the TV^w York ; 
Daniel Montague, chief master-at-arms of the Neiv 
York ; Randolph Clausen, coxswain of the -New 
York; and J. E. Murphy, coxswain of the Iowa. 

As the channel opposite Estrella Point was only 
three hundred and fifty feet wide and the Merrimac 
three hundred and thirty-three feet long, the har- 
bour entrance could be completely obstructed by 
sinking the vessel athwart the channel at this point. 
The plan as worked out by Hobson was to steam 
into the channel just before daylight until opposite 
Estrella Point, then swing the big vessel around 
directly across the channel, drop the anchors at 
bow and stern, and sink her by opening her sea 
valves and exploding ten torpedoes fastened along 
the port side. 




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THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 225 

The intention was to enter the harbour on the 
morning of June 2, and the start was actually made 
then; but owing to the delay in completing the 
preparations, the break of day was so close at hand 
that Admiral Sampson decided to recall the Merri- 
mac and postpone the undertaking until the next 
morning. 

About half-past three o'clock on the morning of 
June 3, while the moon was shining brightly above 
the western horizon, Lieutenant ^ Hobson, standing 
on the bridge of the Merrimac, directed her course 
straight for the Morro. The big vessel approached 
the mouth of the harbour. Save the muffled throb- 
bing of her engines no sound broke the awful still- 
ness until she was within about four hundred yards 
of the old castle, when suddenly from a picket boat 
near the shore on the west side of the entrance a 
shot flashed forth that sounded ominous in the 
deep silence. Another flash ! Another shot ! But 
untouched the Merrimac passed into the mouth 
of the harbour. A moment more and there was a 
crash from the Socapa Battery, followed almost 
immediately by a terrific fire from both sides of the 
channel. Yet the big ship moved on ; and amidst 
the storm of shot and shell the heroic Hobson 
coolly and courageously gave his orders, which 
were as coolly and courageously responded to by 
the brave helmsman of his valiant crew. " That is 

* An Assistant Naval Constructor, United States Navy, has 
the relative rank of Lieutenant. 
VOL. I. — 15 



226 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Estrella, Deignan. Steer for Estrella ! " " Steer 
for Estrella, sir, " is the response. " Watch the 
helm ! " " Watch the helm, sir. " " A touch of 
port helm ! " '* A touch of port helm, sir." 
" Steady ! " " Steady, sir." " Starboard ! " " Star- 
board, sir." "Starboard, I say!" "The helm's 
a starboard, sir. " " Hard a port ! " " Hard a 
port, sir." " Hard a port, I say ! " " The helm is 
hard a port, sir, and lashed." 

Meanwhile the engines had been stopped, and as 
the Merrimac neared the spot where she was to be 
sunk, her valves were thrown open and Hobson 
gave the order to explode the torpedoes. Only 
two of them could be discharged; the electric 
wires of the others had been broken by the enemy's 
fire. But the explosion of the two was not suffi- 
cient to sink the ship fast enough, nor could she be 
swung across the channel, for her steering gear had 
been shot away and one of her anchor chains cut 
by a shell. The dreadful fire of the batteries was 
augmented by a hail of bullets from Mausers and 
machine guns. From the Reina Mercedes and the 
destroyer Pliiton torpedoes were discharged, and 
three mines were exploded in the channel, one of 
which tore a great hole in the ship. The crew lay 
flat upon the deck to escape if possible the tem- 
pest of deadly missiles that crashed through the 
sides or swept the vessel from stem to stern. The 
ship's momentum and the strong tide meanwhile 
swept her on through and beyond the narrow 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 22/ 

channel, until she finally sank at a point where she 
offered little obstruction to the harbour entrance. 
None of the crew had been killed and only two 
slightly wounded ; and as the ship went down they 
gathered about and clung to an old catamaran at- 
tached by a line to the hulk. Here, with only 
their heads above the water, their teeth chattering, 
and their bodies shivering with cold, they remained 
until just after sunrise, when a launch carrying 
Admiral Cervera and a number of Spanish soldiers 
came down the harbour. As it passed near, Lieu- 
tenant Hobson hailed it, and surrendered himself 
and crew as prisoners of war. 

On June 6, from 7.30 A.M. until 10 A.M., a tremen- 
dous fire was delivered by the American fleet 
against Socapa and Morro batteries, and Fort 
Aguadores, which was about three miles farther 
east. Nearly two thousand shells were fired. The 
warships began the bombardment at a distance of 
about three miles from the Spanish batteries and 
gradually worked up to within about two thousand 
yards. The batteries were frequently hit, but little 
or no injury was done to the guns. Most of the 
shells struck the rocks of Morro or Socapa, a i^w 
pierced the walls of the old castle, and many passed 
over the heights into the bay beyond, or fell upon 
Cay Smith, where much damage was done. A vil- 
lage on the island was destroyed, and the Reina 
Mercedes anchored near by was struck thirty-five 
times. On this vessel Commander Emilio de Acosta 



228 THE CAMPAIGN- OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

of the Spanish navy and five sailors were killed and 
twelve wounded, and in the batteries ten men were 
killed and one hundred and eighteen wounded.^ 

The batteries offered but a feeble resistance to 
this attack. The guns of the Upper Socapa Bat- 
tery fired forty-seven shots, but those of the Punta 
Gorda, since they commanded but a small space of 
the open sea through the narrow channel, fired 
only seven. One shot from a Spanish battery 
struck the Massachusetts without doing her any 
injury, but no other American vessel was hit. 

Immediately following the bombardment of June 
6, Admiral Sampson turned his attention to secur- 
ing a harbour near Santiago where his warships 
could in an emergency receive slight repairs, ob- 
tain coal with less difficulty than from colliers, or 
seek refuge from the hurricanes, which were fre- 
quent in those waters during that season of the 
year. He found such a harbour at Guantanamo 
Bay, which lies thirty-seven nautical miles east of 
Santiago Bay. It consists of a large deep outer 
basin and a large shallow inner basin, connected 
by a channel running through a group of islands. 
Just beyond the channel, on the southwest side of 
the inner basin, is the small town of Caimanera, con- 
nected by a railroad with the city of Guantanamo, 
which lies twelve miles inland. The bay was de- 
fended by the small Spanish gunboat Sajidoval, by 
an old fort on Toro Key, on the east side of the 
1 See Appendix M. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 229 

narrowest part of the channel, and by a blockhouse 
near Caimanera and another at the cable station of 
Playa del Este on the east side of the outer basin. 

From a reconnoissance made on May 19 by 
Captain Casper F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy, while 
at Guantanamo on a cable-cutting expedition, it 
was learned that the Spanish defences there were 
very weak, and on May 29 the Secretary of the 
Navy recommended the seizure of the bay. 

On June 7 Admiral Sampson sent the Marhle- 
head and the auxiliary cruiser Yankee to take pos- 
session of the outer basin of the harbour. As the 
two warships approached the entrance they were 
fired upon by the gunboat Sandoval, and by one or 
two guns at the blockhouse near Playa del Este ; 
but a few shots from the warships quickly drove 
the gunboat into the inner basin and scattered 
the Spaniards occupying the blockhouse. This 
having been accomplished, the Yankee returned 
to Santiago, but the JSIarblehead remained to hold 
possession until the harbour could be permanently 
occupied by a battalion of marines, which was then 
en route from Key West on the transport Panther. 
This battalion was commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel R. W. Huntington, U. S. Marine Corps, 
and consisted of five companies of infantry and 
one of artillery, having four 3-inch rapid-fire guns, 
in all twenty-one officers and six hundred and fifteen 
enlisted men.^ 

^ See Appendix N. 



230 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

The Panther arrived on June lO, and with her 
came the Oregon and several smaller vessels from 
Santiago to protect the disembarkation. The ma- 
rines landed and established their camp ^ without 
opposition, near the old cable station of Playa 
del Este. 

The fire of the warships had forced the Span- 
iards to withdraw, but on June ii they returned 
and began firing at the marines, and for two or 
three days continued at intervals to attack and 
harass them. In meeting these attacks the marines 
had to fight at first in an unsheltered open space, 
but the Spaniards, using smokeless powder and 
conceaUng themselves in the brush and behind 
hillocks, were able to pour in a terribly annoying 
fire without betraying their positions. Neverthe- 
less, the marines held their positions and, finally, 
having intrenched themselves, were able with their 
machine guns, aided by the guns of the Marblchcad, 
to repulse successfully every attack. It was learned 
from the Cuban scouts that the Spaniards had a 
sort of temporary base about three miles distant, 
where a well furnished them their only supply of 
drinking water. This point was attacked on the 
14th by two companies of marines aided by about 
fifty Cubans. After an engagement, in which a 
number of the Spaniards were killed and wounded 
and eighteen captured, the well was destroyed. 

1 In honour of the captain of the Marbhhead the encampment 
was called Camp McCalla. 




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THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 23 1 

As the Sandoval continued to bring reenforce- 
ments across the bay from Caimanera to Tore 
Key, Sampson on June 15 detached the Texas 
and Snzvance to join the Marblchcad in an attack 
upon the fort and gunboat. The fort was de- 
stroyed, but owing to mines in the channel the 
Sandoval could not be reached. On the 17th 
the warships again bombarded the shores of the 
channel and the points of the harbour from which 
the Spaniards had fired upon the marines. With 
the destruction of the fort on Toro Key and the 
Spanish station at the well, the fighting practically 
ceased, but the marines continued to remain in the 
harbour until after the Spanish surrender. Their 
entire loss was six killed and sixteen wounded. The 
loss of the Spaniards is not accurately known. 

The dynamite gunboat Vesuvius, v^\)xz\\.'\\d.A been 
sent to Santiago at Admiral Sampson's request, 
arrived on June 13, and from that time on until the 
surrender she would nearly every night run close in 
to the harbour entrance, and from her three guns 
fire three dynamite shells at the fortifications. The 
tremendous explosion of these shells created great 
terror, and produced awful destruction ^ wherever 

1 Lieutenant Jose Miiller, Spanish Navy, in his " Battles and 
Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba," says : " Every night with 
great regularity, the Vestivhts threw h^- three bombs at the bat- 
teries at the mouth of the harbour. . . . For that purpose she 
would come close to the coast, accompanied by another ship, usu- 
ally a battleship, — for the mission of the Vesuvius is only offensive, 
she has no defensive qualities, — and as soon as she was within 
convenient distance she would discharge hree tubes at regular 



232 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

they struck, but, on the whole, they did httle real 
damage to the fortifications, owing to the limited 
range of the guns and the difficulty of aiming them 
with accuracy. 

On June 14 the Neiv Orleans moved in close to 
the entrance and engaged Morro and Socapa bat- 
teries; and though both replied to the attack, the 
cruiser was not hit. On June 16 the two batteries 
were again bombarded by the Neiv York, Brook- 
lyn, Oregon, lozva, Massachusetts, Texas, and New 
Orleans ; but the reply of the batteries was feeble 
and ineffective. In these attacks three men in 
the Socapa and Morro batteries were killed, and 
three officers and twenty-two men were wounded. 
During the blockade the warships also threw a few 
shells into the city of Santiago, and made one or 
two other brief attacks against the batteries at the 
entrance of the harbour, and against the landing- 
places on each side of the Morro, for the pur- 
pose of preparing the way for the disembarkation 

intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin 
was certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles 
to understand them. . . . One of the projectiles, which fell on the 
northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a dis- 
tance of sixty-five feet. Another made an excavation not very deep 
but very wide ; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. Still 
another dropped into the water, but close to one of the destroyers 
which was violently shaken, as also the Mercedes, anchored at a 
short distance." Again he says: "The Vesttvhis\\2.A discharged 
two bombs the preceding night (May 25), one completely destroy- 
ing the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously damag- 
ing the fortress, wounding three sailors of the Mercedes and a 
soldier of the garrison." 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 233 

of the land forces which arrived on June 20. The 
total casualties resulting from all these bombard- 
ments, as obtained from Spanish sources,^ were 
twenty-four sailors and soldiers killed and two 
hundred and nine wounded. But though approxi- 
mately five thousand projectiles were fired, more 
than half of which were of large or medium calibre, 
the only damage done the Spanish guns was the 
dismounting of one piece in the Morro Battery 
and the disabling on July 2 of one Hontoria gun 
in the Upper Socapa Battery. 

On June 18 the Navy Department was advised 
that Admiral Camara's squadron, consisting of the 
battleship Pclayo, the armourrd cruiser Enipcra- 
dor Carlos V, six converted cruisers, and four de- 
stroyers, had started by way of the Suez Canal 
for the Philippines. About a week before this 
information reached Washington, the Mo7itercy 
had sailed from San Diego, California, to reenforce 
Admiral Dewey at Manila, and on June 23 the 
Monadnock left San Francisco for the same pur- 
pose. But as the speed of these monitors was 
very slow, it seemed hardly probable that they 
would arrive at their destination in advance of 
Camara's squadron. Accordingly, the Navy De- 
partment deemed it wise to send some of the ships 
of Sampson's fleet to reenforce Admiral Dewey. 
Commodore John C. Watson was relieved of the 
command of the blockading forces of western Cuba 
1 See Appendix M. 



234 ^-^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and ordered to Santiago, where he was to assume 
command of the Oregon, Iowa, Newark, Yoseviite, 
Yankee, and Dixie. A number of steam colliers 
loaded with forty thousand tons of coal were assem- 
bled at Hampton Roads preparatory to joining 
these vessels in the Azores Islands. It was in- 
tended that this squadron should cross the Atlantic, 
enter the Mediterranean, and follow Camara. 

The real destination of this squadron was kept 
secret; but as the departure of Camara's squadron 
had left the coast of Spain practically without naval 
defence, the authorities in Washington announced 
that the destination of Watson's squadron was the 
coast of Spain, " with a view primarily to alarm 
Spain and cause the recall of Camara, and sec- 
ondarily to awaken Europe to the fact that the 
republic of the western hemisphere would not 
hesitate to carry war, if necessary, across the 
Atlantic." 

But Admiral Sampson was very reluctant to 
part with any of his armoured ships; he informed 
the department that the force he then had insured 
the capture or destruction of Cervera's squadron; 
and that this would, in his opinion, end the war. 
Notwithstanding these representations, the Navy 
Department decided to make no change in the 
plan; but in order that the vessels which would be 
left at Santiago might for a longer period maintain 
their position in the blockading line, Sampson 
was authorized to postpone the sailing of the 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 235 

squadron until all his armoured ships could fill 
their coal bunkers. 

Camara reached Port Said on June 26, but was 
delayed there several days in efforts to obtain 
coal. This delay indicated that proper provision 
had not been made for supplying his ships with fuel 
for such a long voyage, and suggested some doubts 
as to whether the Philippines were his real destina- 
tion. On July 2 the squadron began its passage 
through the Suez Canal, but before all the ships 
reached the Red Sea Cervera's squadron was de- 
stroyed ; and as this left the armoured vessels of 
Sampson's fleet free to cross the Atlantic, Camara 
was compelled to return to the defence of Spain. 

The bottling up of Cervera's squadron in San- 
tiago Bay gave the American army an opportunity 
to cooperate with the navy in the destruction of 
the Spanish squadron, and gave the navy an 
opportunity to cooperate with the army in the 
capture of the garrison and city of Santiago. As 
early as May 24 the Navy Department had in- 
structed Admiral Sampson to be prepared to con- 
voy an army from Tampa, Florida, to Cuba. On 
May 27 the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed 
Sampson : 

" If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago 
de Cuba, it is the intention of the department to make 
descent immediately upon that port with ten thousand 
United States troops, landing eight nautical miles east of 
that port. You will be expected to convoy transports, 



236 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

probably fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking 
with you the Neiv York and Indiana and the Oregon, and 
as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly 
be gathered, to guard against possible attack by Spanish 
torpedo-boat destroyers." 

But on the 29th Sampson, acting under the 
orders of the department, sailed from Key West to 
Santiago with the New York and Oregon, leaving 
the battleship Indiana behind to act as a convoy 
for the troops when they should be ready. In the 
meantime the War Department, having determined 
to send the Fifth Corps, then at Tampa, Florida, 
under the command of General Shafter, to Santiago 
de Cuba, orders were issued on May 30 and 31 
to that effect. On June 3 Admiral Sampson was 
informed that General Shafter expected to start 
from Tampa on June 4 with eighteen thousand 
men. Sampson replied on the same day: 

" Have received reliable information from Cuban offi- 
cers that the Spanish force in this vicinity consists of 
seven thousand men intrenched in Juraguacito (Siboney) 
and Daiquiri ; five thousand men in Santiago de Cuba ; 
in Morro de Cuba four hundred men ; at other points in 
the bay one hundred men, with small rapid-fire guns and 
submarine mines at various points. With superior force 
and insurgent force, which is ready, though mostly need- 
ing arms, Santiago de Cuba must fall, with ships in port, 
which cannot be entered against obstruction and mines." 

And immediately following the bombardment of 
the forts at the mouth of the harbour on June 6, 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 237 

he telegraphed a report of the same to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, adding : 

" If ten thousand men were here city and fleet would 
be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration 
demands immediate army movement ; if delayed, city 
will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the 
fleet." 

But the almost inextricable confusion at Tampa, 
and the receipt of a false report that two Spanish 
cruisers and a torpedo-boat destroyer had been 
seen in the Nicolas Channel, delayed the depar- 
ture of the Fifth Corps for about two v/eeks. 
Finally, on June 14, the expedition, convoyed by 
the Indiana and several smaller ships, set sail for 
Santiago de Cuba. 

It is not the intention at this time to describe in 
detail the sailing and disembarkation of General 
Shafter's army ; that is reserved for another chap- 
ter. But it may be remarked here that this army 
arrived at Santiago on June 20, and in conjunction 
with the navy was then ready to strike the blows 
which were to decide the fate of Cuba and end the 
war. The delay at Tampa was but the lull before 
the storm. 

COMMENTS 

No sooner had the naval authorities of Spain 
received positive information of Admiral Dewey's 



238 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

victory in the Philippines, than they felt the need 
of having a strong naval force in home waters. 
Accordingly, the despatch of May 12 authorizing 
Cervera's return was sent; and so anxious were 
they that this despatch should reach Cervera 
before he arrived in any Cuban or Porto Rican 
port that three days later the commandant at San 
Juan, Porto Rico, was directed to use every pos- 
sible means to forward it to the admiral, who 
was then at Curagao. As Admiral Cervera did not 
receive the despatch until his return to Spain sev- 
eral months later, and as he did not even learn 
that such a despatch had been sent until May 20, 
the day after it was cancelled by the Spanish gov- 
ernment, there was of course no opportunity for 
him to take advantage of the permission granted 
therein. It appears, however, that the despatch 
arrived at Martinique only a few hours after his 
departure for Curagao. Had he remained off 
Martinique a day longer, he doubtless would have 
received not only this despatch, but also the other 
one sent on the same day, informing him that the 
steamer Alicante loaded with coal was then due at 
that port. A delay of three or four days would 
have enabled the vessels of the squadron to take 
on sufficient coal to carry them back to Spain ; or, 
after receiving the despatch of the 12th, Cervera 
could have sailed to Curagao, where he expected 
to find coal, and where, after a short wait, he could 
have obtained it from the Rcstormcl, which arrived 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 239 

there on the 17th. In either case he doubtless 
would have been able to coal his ships and return 
to Spain without meeting any of the armoured 
vessels of the American squadrons. Though the 
return of the squadron without fighting would 
have weakened greatly the prestige of Spain, 
nevertheless it would have been the best solution 
of the strategical problem. Such a manoeuvre 
would have made practicable the execution of the 
plan which Cervera and his captains had so per- 
sistently advocated, and would have placed the 
squadron in a position where it could have formed 
a junction with Camara's squadron against any 
attack made by either of the American squadrons 
in European waters. In short, Spain would have 
regained the advantage of strategical combina- 
tion, which she had lost in despatching Cervera's 
squadron to the West Indies. 

In war, seemingly the most trivial matters often 
lead to momentous results. An error of judg- 
ment, a sleeping sentinel, a delayed despatch, a 
broken wire, an omitted word, may cause the loss 
of a battle or of a campaign — may even change 
the destiny of a nation, and write anew the map of 
the world. Had the despatch of May 12 been for- 
warded to Cervera a few hours earlier, or had he 
remained a few hours longer at Martinique, the 
strategy of the entire campaign would have been 
changed, and the course of the war would have 
been vastly different from what it was. There 



240 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

would have been no Las Guasimas, no El Caney, 
no San Juan Hill. On another field the great 
struggle would have taken place. Around Havana, 
doubtless, the conflict would have centred ; and 
it would have been bloodier and much more pro- 
longed, for the Spaniards behind their fortifications 
and intrenchments would have fought with that 
superb courage that they have always shown on 
the defensive ; and the Americans with their char- 
acteristic aggressiveness and determination would 
have carried on the war until victory crowned 
their efforts, regardless of hardships, setbacks, and 
bloodshed. 

No sound strategical reason can be assigned for 
Captain-General Blanco's protest against Cervera's 
return to Spain. What could have been his ob- 
ject? Did he desire that the squadron should 
measure strength in the open sea with the Ameri- 
can squadrons? This would have been rash 
indeed, for the naval forces of the United States 
in American waters were far superior in fight- 
ing strength not only to Cervera's squadron, but 
to any aggregation of vessels that Spain could 
then have possibly sent against them. The defeat 
which would have been the almost certain result 
of such a battle would, to say the least, have 
crippled the squadron to such an extent that it 
would no longer have been of any service either 
as a menace to American transports, or as a means 
of communication with Spain. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 24 1 

Did Blanco intend that the squadron should enter 
the harbour of Havana? He must have known 
that there was only a remote possibility of such a 
thing, for the harbour had been closely blockaded 
from the start; and though just at this time a num- 
ber of the armoured vessels of the blockading fleet 
were absent, the squadrons of Sampson and Schley 
were near enough to reach the scene of action in a 
very short time. But suppose the squadron had 
succeeded in eluding the blockading vessels and 
had entered the harbour without the slightest in- 
jury, it no doubt would, in a few hours, have been 
as hopelessly shut in as it shortly afterwards was 
at Santiago, and as powerless to prevent the land- 
ing of American troops on Cuban soil as the 
Russian fleet, blockaded at Port Arthur, was to 
prevent the landing of Japanese troops on the Liao 
Tung Peninsula. 

Good strategy demanded the withdrawal of 
the squadron from Cuban waters to some point 
beyond the danger of its being blockaded or de- 
stroyed, where it would have been a constant men- 
ace to American transports. If Blanco had clearly 
grasped the situation, and had urged the return of 
Cervera's squadron to Spain, instead of protesting 
against it, he would have been spared the humilia- 
tion of seeing, as a result of his protest, the de- 
cisive battles of the war fought around Santiago 
with inadequate forces, while the great bulk of his 
army was too far away to extend a helping hand ; 

VOL. I.— 16 



242 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and the still greater humiliation of seeing the 
flower of the Spanish navy annihilated at a single 
blow. 

Since the vessels of the squadron had by May 23 
taken on board a sufficient supply of coal to enable 
them to reach any West Indian port, there was no 
valid reason for remaining in the harbour of San- 
tiago. The principal reason given by Cervera 
for not going out on May 24 was, that he had 
received information on the evening of May 23 
that Schley's squadron had left Key West on the 
night of May 20, and that Sampson, following 
with his squadron, had arrived off Cienfuegos. 
This, evidently, was a good reason for not going 
westward ; but as Cervera had planned to go to 
San Juan, it was not only a poor reason for not 
going out, but was indeed the very best reason 
why he should have gone out. Since he believed 
that Schley's squadron was on the south side of 
Cuba, eastward of Cienfuegos, and that Sampson's 
squadron was then at Cienfuegos, surely the des- 
perateness of the situation demanded that he should 
leave Santiago Harbour before these two squad- 
rons could arrive and blockade him in port. The 
other reasons given for not going out on the 24th, 
namely, that the squadron had only one-third its 
coal supply, that its maximum speed, owing to 
the foul bottom of the Vizcaya, was only fourteen 
knots, and that the long narrow entrance to the 
harbour made it necessary for the sortie to be 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 243 

effected by the vessels one by one, were really not 
worth serious consideration. In the first place, 
the squadron had more than sufficient coal to 
carry it to San juan; secondly, the maximum 
speed of the squadron could not have been in- 
creased in the least by any further delay at San- 
tiago ; and, thirdly, it mattered not how long he 
remained there, the narrowness of the channel 
would have made it necessary for his vessels to go 
out one by one. Nor was there any valid reason 
why the squadron should not have gone out on 
the 26th as was subsequently planned. There 
was of course a bare possibility that, owing to the 
swell prevailing at that time, the Colon might have 
been injured by striking on the rock at the mouth 
of the harbour; but even so, would it not have 
been far more prudent to take such a risk than 
to have to go out in the face of the armoured 
vessels of the American squadrons? The truth 
of the matter is that, with the exception of a 
few hours between the 23d of May and the even- 
ing of the 28th, when Schley's squadron arrived 
and took up a permanent position before the 
harbour, there was not an hour that the squadron 
could not have escaped without encountering op- 
position. 

Cervera, on arriving at San Juan, would have 
found an abundance of coal and copies of all 
despatches that had not yet reached him; and, 
as his government at this time was still seriously 



244 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

considering his recall,^ he might have been directed 
to return to Spain. 

In the hght of these circumstances it can easily 
be seen how fortunate it was for the Americans 
that Cervera and his captains twice changed their 
minds about sailing out of the harbour, and how 
Schley's retrograde movement, which left a way 
clear for Cervera to escape on the 26th, 27th, or 
28th, might have had a far-reaching and momentous 
influence upon the conduct of the campaign. 

Cervera, not having received any word from the 
Spanish government authorizing his return, was 
acting under his original instructions, which com- 
pelled him to remain in West Indian waters, but 
left him free to enter any harbour he pleased, and 
to accept or decline battle as he deemed best. 
His plan was to leave Santiago Harbour and to sail 
for San Juan, Porto Rico. But having been led to 
believe that both American squadrons were on the 

1 On June 3 the Spanish Minister of War at Madrid cabled 
Captain-General Blanco : " Very serious situation in Philippines 
compels us to send there ships and reenforcements of troops as 
early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at 
Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet 
there. At present [we have] only two warships [to send] there, 
and one of them I believe cannot pass through canal. The only 
thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron 
that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding the govern- 
ment wishes to know your opinion as to [the] effect the withdrawal 
of Cervera's squadron might produce in Cuba. This movement 
would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in 
Philippines, the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of 
time and strongly reenforced," 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 245 

south side of Cuba, advancing upon Santiago, he 
thought that his going to San Juan would not 
lessen to any appreciable extent the difficulties 
confronting him, for he felt sure that his move- 
ment eastward would be reported by the American 
scouting vessels, and that Sampson and Schley 
would at once hasten to San Juan and block- 
ade him in port. This view of the situation no 
doubt had great weight in causing Cervera and 
his captains to change their minds about sailing 
out of the harbour. Feeling that the plan of 
going to San Juan offered no opportunity of 
escaping the American squadrons, and that, at 
best, it would only postpone for a few days 
longer the destruction of the squadron, they were 
undecided, timid, and vacillating at the very time 
when they should have been decided, bold, and 
aggressive. 

It is a well-established maxim of war that when 
a commander has an inferior force in the theatre 
of operations his only hope of success is to adopt 
an aggressive policy. The enemy's advantage in 
numbers must be counterbalanced by boldness 
of manoeuvre, rapidity of movement, and skill in 
combinations. It was thus that Bonaparte in his 
first Italian campaign defeated six Austrian armies 
sent successively against him, every one of which 
outnumbered his own. It was thus that Stonewall 
Jackson in the valley of the Shenandoah won for 
himself an imperishable renown. 



246 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Did the circumstances at Santiago justify such a 
poHcy? Let us see. If both American squadrons 
were on the south side of Cuba advancing upon 
Santiago, as Cervera beheved them to be, Havana 
was uncovered, or at most defended only by a few 
monitors and unarmoured vessels. Here, then, was 
Cervera's opportunity. By sailing for Havana by 
way of the Windward Passage, he would probably 
have been able to reach that port ahead of either 
American squadron; for if the American squad- 
rons were then advancing upon Santiago, it would 
have been most natural for them to follow him, 
rather than to turn back to cover Havana, in which 
case he might reasonably have expected to beat 
them to Havana. Having arrived there, he could 
have destroyed the weaker blockading vessels, 
evaded or attacked the monitors as he saw fit, and 
entered the harbour. 

If it be replied to all this that as a matter of fact 
Sampson was not on the south side of Cuba, but 
was cruising back and forth with a powerful squad- 
ron in the vicinity of Nicolas Channel, eastward of 
Havana, expecting that Cervera might make this 
very movement, the answer is that even then the 
chances of battle would not have been unfavourable 
to Cervera. Sampson's armoured vessels consisted 
at this time of the cruiser New York, the battleship 
Indiana, and the monitors Puritan, Amphitritey 
and Miantonomoh. The Oregon joined him on May 
28, but had Cervera sailed for Havana on the 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 247 

morning of May 24, at an average speed of twelve ^ 
knots an hour, he could have covered the distance, 
six hundred and thirty-nine miles, in about fifty- 
three hours, and arrived at his destination at noon 
of May 26, about forty-eight hours before the Ore- 
gon joined Sampson's squadron. He would then 
have had a fair chance of success, for the only 
armoured vessel of Sampson's squadron swifter 
than Cervera's slowest vessel was the New York. 
He might have evaded the monitors, kept out of the 
reach even of the Indiana, and had the New York 
followed him he could have turned upon her with 
his four cruisers. Having sailed around or slipped 
by the slower vessels of Sampson's squadron, he 
could have driven away or destroyed the unar- 
moured blockading vessels off the harbour of 
Havana. Even had he found the American ar- 
moured vessels in position around the entrance 
of the harbour, the powerful guns of the fortifica- 
tions, which extended several miles on either side 
of the entrance of the harbour, would have kept 
these vessels so far out at sea that he probably 
could have gained the shelter of the land batteries 
by breaking through the line of defence at some 
unprotected or weak point. 

This plan would have enabled Cervera to evade 
for a time one of the American squadrons and to 
bring against the other his entire force, while the 

1 According to Cervera's statement, the maximum speed of his 
squadron was fourteen knots. 



248 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

enemy would have been compelled to fight with 
only a part of his forces, — a part, too, that con- 
tained but two armoured vessels that were really 
fit to be pitted against the vessels of the Spanish 
squadron ; and it would also have enabled him to 
fight in the open sea, where he would have had the 
full power of manoeuvre, and where, if the battle 
were drawn or his vessels were crippled, he could 
have sought shelter behind the fortifications of Ha- 
vana. No other plan offered liim the opportunity of 
accomplishing at practically the same time the two 
important objects which he should have constantly 
kept in mind, namely, to bring an equal or supe- 
rior force upon the battlefield ; or, if that were not 
possible, to take refuge in the harbour of Havana. 

By remaining at Santiago, Cervera gave the 
Americans the chance of bringing an overwhelm- 
ing force against him on the battlefield, and of 
attacking one by one the vessels of his squadron 
as they issued from the mouth of the harbour. In 
other words, he allowed the Americans both the 
strategical and tactical advantages of the situation, 
thus giving them the opportunity of practically 
ending the campaign before the greater part of 
the land forces of either combatant had a chance 
to fire a shot. 

One of the great principles of strategy, applica- 
ble alike on the sea and on the land, is : The offen- 
sive alone promises decisive results. On first thought 
it might seem that this principle could hardly ever 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 249 

be followed by the weaker combatant ; but the 
chances for offensive action and bold manoeuvres 
are so numerous in every war that there is rarely 
lacking to a commander of inferior forces an op- 
portunity to strike his enemy a telling if not a 
destructive blow. " A general," said Bonaparte, 
" always has troops enough if he knows how to 
employ those he has." The really great com- 
mander perceives the situation in all its bearings, 
and knows how with the forces at hand to produce 
a maximum effect upon a vulnerable or vital point 
of his adversary. 

Cervera had a clear conception of the general 
strategical situation, but he depreciated the diffi- 
culties of his adversary and exaggerated his own. 
He had great courage, but he was lacking in bold- 
ness and aggressiveness. Though he commanded 
a squadron peculiarly fitted for offensive action, 
he remained constantly on the defensive. Had he 
acted upon the principle that the offensive alone 
promises decisive results and taken the risks that 
the desperateness of the situation justified, he 
might have struck a more powerful blow for his 
country and won for himself a greater name. 

The attempt to close the entrance to Santiago 
Harbour by sinking the Merrimac in the channel 
has been adversely criticised ; it will therefore not 
be out of place to examine the subject somewhat 
in detail. As the channel opposite Estrella Point 
was only three hundred and fifty feet wide and the 



250 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Merrimac three hundred and thirty-three feet long, 
it is evident that the sinking of the vessel across 
the channel at this point would have completely- 
obstructed the entrance. The undertaking would 
have probably been successful had not the steer- 
ing gear, the torpedo connections, and one of the 
anchor chains been shot away. At any rate, the 
fact that the ship entered the channel and passed 
beyond the narrowest point before sinking proves 
that the undertaking was at least feasible. 

Had the channel been obstructed, the Spanish 
vessels could not possibly have gone out, nor could 
the American vessels have entered. In that case 
the burden of destroying Cervera's squadron would 
have been shifted from the navy to the army, and 
the fate of the squadron would have depended upon 
the success or failure of the American land cam- 
paign against the Spanish forces surrounding the 
city and harbour. But as the army had not yet 
left the United States, as there was no certainty 
that it would be able to land, or be victorious if it 
should land, and as Sampson's forces at the mouth 
of the harbour were strong enough to destroy the 
Spanish squadron should it attempt to escape, it 
might seem on first thought that there was nothing 
to be gained by blocking the channel. But Samp- 
son was looking forward not so much to a great 
naval victory as he was to the certain success of 
the campaign, however it might be accomplished. 
He purposed to do what in his opinion offered the 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 2$ I 

best chances of final success, regardless of whether 
he himself or some soldier should reap the glory. 
As long as the channel was open, there was always 
a chance that a part or even all of Cervera's vessels 
might escape. No one could foresee with certainty 
the result of a battle. It seemed hardly probable 
that the entire squadron would be destroyed should 
it go out in the daytime, and still less probable 
should it go out at night; nor did it seem probable 
that Cervera would sail out of the harbour either in 
the daytime or at night without sinking, or at least 
damaging, some of the American ships. Moreover, 
there was danger that a storm or hurricane might 
at any time disarrange the blockading line or drive 
the American ships away from the harbour and 
give Cervera an opportunity to escape. 

But with the channel closed, even if the Ameri- 
can army had not been successful, Cervera would 
have continued to be locked in like a prisoner in a 
dungeon; and Sampson could have ignored the 
squadron almost as completely as if it had been 
captured and sent into some American port. One 
or two vessels left off the mouth could have easily 
prevented the Spaniards from opening the channel. 
The corking up of Santiago Harbour would, there- 
fore, not only have rendered nugatory the vessels 
of Cervera's squadron, but would have set free 
most of the vessels of Sampson's fleet, and in this 
way have given the Americans a much greater 
preponderance in naval force. 



252 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

The bearing that the closing of the harbour en- 
trance might have had upon the strategical situa- 
tion will perhaps be more clearly perceived when 
it is remembered that from the outset the United 
States had greatly felt the need of more battleships 
and armoured cruisers. Such vessels were greatly 
needed in the Philippines to reenforce Admiral 
Dewey's squadron, which at the beginning of the 
war contained only unarmoured cruisers. Before 
Cervera's whereabouts were known, a squadron of 
battleships and armoured cruisers was needed off 
Cienfuegos, and another off San Juan, Porto Rico, 
to prevent his entering either of those ports. Even 
after he was blockaded at Santiago, more ships 
were needed to look after Camara's squadron, 
which might have appeared at any time in West 
Indian waters. Again, when Camara's squadron 
started for the Philippines by way of the Suez 
Canal, the need of battleships in Asiatic waters be- 
came so great that the United States naval authori- 
ties decided to withdraw two battleships from the 
.blockading squadron at Santiago, even against 
Sampson's protest. ^ Indeed, from the beginning 

1 " The Spanish reserve fleet arrived at Port Said on June 26, 
and the fact was cabled to Dewey. Sampson was also advised of 
the distance it had made, but he was loath to part with any of his 
ships because of his opinion that the force he then had ' insures a 
capture which I believe will terminate the war.' But the depart- 
ment could not leave Dewey with an inferior force. Our suprem- 
acy in the Pacific, with all that it meant, must be maintained ; the 
troops en route to Manila must be protected. So, disregarding 
Sampson's views, it was decided not to change the plan with 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 253 

of the war until the destruction of Cervera's squad- 
ron, there was not a moment when the American 
authorities did not feel the need of more battleships 
and cruisers, and would not have willingly paid two 
or three prices for vessels of this kind. 

In connection with these facts it should be no- 
ticed that the relative strength of the American 
navy — and relative strength is, after all, what 
counts in war — would have been increased enor- 
mously by closing the mouth of Santiago Harbour. 
It may be assumed that the relative strength of the 
armoured vessels of the United States and of Spain 
at the time the Merrimac sailed into the harbour 
entrance was in the proportion of about three 
to two, and that Cervera's squadron represented 
more than half the armoured strength of the Span- 
ish navy. But with Cervera's squadron elimi- 
nated, the ratio would have been at least three to 
one, instead of three to two. That is to say, the 
armoured strength of the American navy would by 
this act have become relatively twice as powerful 
as it was before ; or, in other words, the closing of 
the entrance of Santiago Harbour would have been 
equivalent, strategically, to increasing the American 
navy by two armoured cruisers, five battleships, 
and six monitors. 

respect to Watson's squadron. The departure of the battleships 
was delayed, however, in order that the remaining armored ves- 
sels might fill their coal bunkers and maintain, for as long a time 
as possible without recoaling, their position off Santiago." — John 
D. Long, Secretary of the Navy. 



254 ^-^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

Again, with the channel closed, the fall of San- 
tiago would have resulted in the capture of the 
squadron, which, unless the Spaniards themselves 
had destroyed it, would have become a valuable 
acquisition to the American navy — an acquisition 
which would have made still more overwhelming 
the American preponderance in naval strength. 

The situation at Santiago with Sampson's squad- 
ron blockading the Spanish squadron was very sim- 
ilar to the situation at Port Arthur in the Russian- 
Japanese War, when Admiral Togo's squadron 
was blockading the Russian squadron. In both 
cases the attempt was made to close a harbour; 
and in both cases the admirals had the same great 
strategical object in view. The persistent efforts 
that Admiral Togo made to close Port Arthur 
Harbour show what importance he attached to the 
accomplishment of this undertaking. He had an 
eye for great results. He saw clearly that closing 
the entrance would increase enormously the relative 
fighting strength of the Japanese navy, and leave 
him a comparatively free hand to deal with the 
Russian Baltic squadron upon its arrival in Asiatic 
waters. 

It is somewhat remarkable that although several 
thousand projectiles were fired at the batteries at 
the mouth of Santiago Harbour the only damage 
done was the dismounting of one piece in the 
Morro Battery and the disabling of one Hontoria 
gun in the Socapa Battery. In commenting upon 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 255 

the effects of these bombardments, Commander 
Jacobsen of the German navy says : 

" A systematic blockade had been established, and in 
this connection the main object, namely, the destruction 
of Cervera's squadron, was never lost sight of. Thanks 
to the intelligent dispositions of the commander-in-chief 
of the fleet and the skill of the American officers and 
crews, this object was attained with complete success. 
Incidentally the batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and 
Punta Gorda were bombarded by the American fleet, 
and these bombardments offer so much that is of interest 
and so many points of discussion for naval officers that I 
shall have to speak of them somewhat more at length. 
How much has been said of these bombardments ! How 
many times have the batteries of the Morro and Socapa 
been placed out of action, the guns dismounted, the 
fortifications levelled to the ground ! Batteries which 
even did not exist, as, for instance, Morro Castle proper 
and Estrella Battery, were said to have returned the galling 
fire, the latter completely destroyed, the former nothing 
but a heap of ruins. Such were the newspaper reports, 
of the inaccuracy of which I had an opportunity of con- 
vincing myself personally on the scene of events. . . . 

" The final result of the numerous bombardments was 
but one gun placed out of action in the Morro Battery 
and one in the Socapa Battery. The loss in human life 
was a few killed and wounded. Punta Gorda Battery, 
the only important position in a question of forcing the 
harbour entrance, remained uninjured. As I have already 
said, I am unable to state the total number of projectiles 
which the American ships fired in order to attain this 



256 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

modest result. In any event, the number is out of pro- 
portion to the result, and has proved once more a fact 
well established by the history of naval wars, namely, that 
coast fortifications are extremely difficult to place out of 
action, even with an expenditure of large quantities of 
ammunition. The American method of firing may per- 
haps be susceptible of improvement — that is not for me 
to say. But the American naval officers may take com- 
fort in the thought that other seafaring nations would not 
have done any better in their place — perhaps not so 
well ; for no navy, with the exception of the French, has 
made it a point in time of peace to make the bombard- 
ment of coast fortifications, fortified cities, etc., the sub- 
ject of thorough practical study. 

" As for the fire of the Spanish batteries, I have read 
of but one case where a Spanish projectile hit an Ameri- 
can ship. It was in a fight with the Socapa Battery that 
the battleship Texas received a hit probably from one of 
the 6.3-inch guns taken from the Reina Mercedes. The 
projectile struck the port side about twenty feet abaft the 
bow and exploded, after passing through a stanchion 
between decks, killing one man and wounding six. The 
American officer who took charge of the battery at 
Morro Castle also told me the following amusing inci- 
dent : There was a bombardment of the ISIorro Battery 
at night, and one of the American ships was throwing her 
searchlight on the battery. The Spaniards answered the 
fire part of the time. The ship with the searchlight 
was not hit, but the battleship Lnva, lying quite a dis- 
tance away in the dark, was unexpectedly struck by an 
accidental hit from one of the Spanish howitzers. The 
projectile passed through the deck, entered the officers' 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 257 

mess room, exploded there, and caused some minor 
damages to the rooms ; but none of the crew was hit. 
But what could be expected of the kinds of guns the Span- 
iards had at their disposal. It must surely have given the 
American officers who took charge of the battery a slight 
shock when they saw the dates 166S, 17 18, etc., on the 
guns which they had been fighting. Part of the mediaeval 
howitzers still had charges in them when the American 
officer took possession of the Morro Battery. He there- 
fore desired to fire them, which gave him an opportunity 
of establishing the fact that even with the greatest eleva- 
tion the range was only eight hundred yards. It is possible 
that the cartridges had suffered from humidity ; but, on the 
other hand, it is quite probable that this was their greatest 
range. One thousand meters was not a bad performance 
for guns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. No 
wonder that the Spaniards could not reach the hostile 
ships with these guns ! 

" But now another question. Did the American fleet 
really allow itself to be deceived by these batteries ? In 
the beginning, perhaps. And why not ? I do not hesitate 
to acknowledge that I had the same experience, together 
with several other officers. When we inquired into the 
nature of the batteries, we had no idea of the venerable 
age of those guns, but set them down as 4.7-inch and 
6.3-inch guns. It is true that we did not go through a 
fight with the batteries, and that is the essential factor for 
estimating their efficiency. From observations made at 
the Spanish batteries I judge that the Socapa Battery 
was the main objective of the Americans. They seem to 
have known that the only serviceable guns, namely, the 
6.3-inch Hontoria guns from the Reina Mercedes^ had 
VOL. I.— 17 



258 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

been set up there ; but the Morro Battery too was fired 
upon quite a number of times. Would the Americans 
have done this had they known what miserable guns their 
enemies had ? Hardly. So there can be no doubt that 
in the beginning at least the Americans were deceived as 
to the strength of the foe, whom they overestimated, as is 
usually the case in war. Moreover, there was no occasion 
for the American commander of the fleet, even if the 
Spanish batteries had been recognized as efficient and 
dangerous, to attack them under prevailing circumstances. 
If the harbour entrance was to be forced, neither the 
Morro nor the Socapa Battery need have been consid- 
ered, because they could not sweep the narrow entrance 
with their guns. The Punta Gorda Battery was the only 
one that controlled the entrance, and owing to the great 
distance, and the difficulty of observing the fire, it was 
almost impossible to place this battery out of action from 
the sea. Then, why the bombardments of the batteries 
and the immense expenditure of ammunition, especially 
since the American commander-in-chief did not intend to 
force the entrance, but on the contrary was desirous 
of obstructing it, as is plainly shown by Hobson's attempt.'' 
A simple blockade, without any further attack on the 
fortifications, would have had exactly the same result. I 
cannot possibly believe that the American commander- 
in-chief had nothing more in view than to harass the 
enemy by the numerous bombardments and to reassure 
the home press. My idea is that Admiral Sampson, as 
a practical and experienced gunner, had a very definite 
object in view in these bombardments. I have no proofs 
to offer in support of this assumption, but I have an idea 
that there is something in it. After the batteries had 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 



259 



been brought out all the subsequent bombardments were 
nothing more or less than target practice. The Admiral 
wanted to accustom his officers and men to sharp firing. 
The whole crews were made to practise at regular inter- 
vals — the commanders in the manner of handling their 
ships, the officers in conducting and superintending the 
firing, the gun captains in training and aiming, the gun 
and ammunition crews in serving the guns and passing 
the ammunition, and all these under conditions of actual 
war, in fights with coast batteries. When the decisive 
day arrived, — the battle on the high sea, ship against 
ship, — the American fleet was well prepared and able to 
achieve its task in a brilliant manner and in the shortest 
possible time. 

"Whether I am right or wrong in this assumption, 
whether it was a question of actual bombardment or of 
target practice, the final result remains the same. Even 
at target practice each one fires as well as he can. 
Therefore we are still confronted with the fact that the 
coast fortifications, in spite of vastly superior naval artil- 
lery and the expenditure of immense quantities of am- 
munition, were not placed out of action. What lessons 
are we to derive from this ? 

" Aside from the forcing of harbour entrances, where 
the assailant must eventually expose himself for a short 
time to the hostile fire, cases may arise in war where it 
becomes necessary prior to such forcing, or for other 
reasons, to destroy certain forts. The history of war 
teaches us that this is one of the most difficult prob- 
lems. It should therefore be made a subject of study 
in time of peace, the same as any other problem. Of 
the necessity of studying tactics and strategy and their 



260 THE CAMPAIGN OF SAXTIAGO DE CUBA 

practical application, every one is convinced, from the 
commander-in-chief to the youngest lieutenant. Im- 
mense sums are being expended for coal alone, in order 
to have the ships of the fleet pass through all manner of 
evolutions in tactics and strategic manoeuvres. Money 
should also be devoted to target practice under exactly 
the same conditions as in actual war. For what is it that 
decides a naval battle? The tactics of the commander- 
in-chief of the fleet and the commanders of the different 
ships are certainly of some influence on the battle, but 
nothing more. The decision will always be dependent 
on the good training of officers and men for the fight and 
the good firing of gun captains and officers. That is 
what the naval battle of Santiago has once more plainly 
demonstrated." ^ 

If the Spanish batteries at the mouth of the har- 
bour had been armed with heavy modern cannon, 
Cervera would have had a much better chance of 
escape, especially at night; for the American ves- 
sels could not then have maintained positions suffi- 
ciently near the shore to throw a blinding light 
into the channel. 

The bombardments of the shore batteries at San- 
tiago most naturally raise the question, What 
chances under the conditions of modern naval war- 
fare have guns afloat against guns ashore? The 
history of recent wars certainly shows that under 

1 " Sketches from the Spanish-American War," by Comman- 
der Jacobsen, of the German navy, translated from the German 
by Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy Department. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SA XT/AGO HARBOUR 26 1 

almost any imaginable condition a large prepon- 
derance of guns afloat is necessary to put out of 
action the guns of shore batteries. Indeed it may 
be stated as a fact that coast defences well pre- 
pared, well equipped with modern guns, properly 
manned, and efficiently commanded, are sufficient 
to withstand greatly superior forces at sea. If it 
were possible to state with any degree of accuracy 
the relative effectiveness of guns afloat and guns 
ashore in the form of a ratio, such information 
would be very valuable. However, as the condi- 
tions are different in every case, close approxima- 
tion to accuracy is impossible. Very little has 
been written by experts on this subject; but the 
following extract from a letter to the author by one 
of the ablest officers^ of the United States army, 
who has given the subject much study and thought, 
is instructive : 

" I believe that your navy friend's ratio of three to one 
is not unfair to the navy, and is fairly accurate for guns 
at about the same level afloat and ashore. Mortars, 
however, are supreme. Against them the navy is almost 
without effect, unless it can take the pits in reverse ; and 
the mortar shell attacks the ship at its weakest point, the 
deck, which rarely has over four inches of best steel protec- 
tion. The weak point of mortars is their doubtful accuracy 
as compared with direct-fire rifles, or long guns, but their 
accuracy is sufficient and greater than usually supposed ; 

1 Lieutenant-Colonel John P. Wisser, Artillery Corps, United 
States Army. 



262 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

moreover, they are as accurate at twelve thousand yards 
as at four thousand — a most important point, since 
they come into play at long ranges before the enemy can 
act — and we can fire salvos from pits of four pieces, or 
batteries of eight or sixteen pieces, thus securing greater 
chances of hitting. 

" Direct-fire guns (rifles) on high sites are better pro- 
tected from guns afloat, and have a better action on ships. 
On sites from sixty to one hundred and twenty feet a gun 
ashore is worth about four afloat ; and on sites from one 
hundred and twenty to two hundred feet about five or six. 

" These are very conservative ratios ; but it is not wise 
to claim too much for guns ashore, because guns afloat 
can very often take up advantageous positions, which 
counteract the protection of the shore guns. If the fleet 
succeeds in passing the forts, it may even take the latter 
in reverse, as was the case in the navy-coast artillery 
manoeuvres at New London in 1902. Moreover, there 
may be dead angles on the water not covered by the range 
finders ashore, in which case the shore guns would be 
temporarily helpless. 

" There is no doubt that Abbott's ratio ^ is too low at 
present, much too low, but an accurate ratio can hardly 
be given. The above ratios are fair to the navy, but in 
my opinion a future war will show that these ratios should 
be much higher for guns ashore. I would be willing to 
fight a fort having one-fifth the number of direct-fire guns 
which a fleet could bring to bear against me, assuming 
no advantage of height of site, particularly with guns on 
disappearing carriages." 

1 Abbott's ratio was two to one for guns at about the same level 
afloat and ashore. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 263 

Nothing in this campaign is more deserving of 
praise than the conduct of the blockade of Santiago 
from the arrival of Admiral Sampson on June i until 
the destruction of Ccrvera's squadron on July 3. 
The success of the undertaking required great 
vigilance, tireless efforts, and a clear conception of 
the problems to be solved. It was necessary to 
place and maintain the blockading vessels in such 
positions as would best enable them to cope with 
the enemy if he attempted to escape ; to keep the 
ships of the squadron in coal ; to prevent, if pos- 
sible, Cervera's sailing out of the harbour at night; 
to bombard the forts at the mouth of the harbour 
and give his gunners target practice; to aid in the 
landing of Shafter's army; and to keep a watchful 
eye upon the movements of Caniara's squadron. 
In the narrative part of this work it has been shown, 
or will be shown, how Sampson accomplished these 
things ; how he issued the order of battle on June 2, 
under which the squadron fought on July 3 ; how 
he attempted to block the channel and came 
within a hair's breadth of success; how he kept an 
electric light directed into the channel, thus mak- 
ing it much more difficult for Cervcra to go out by 
night than by day; how he captured Guantanamo 
Bay and established there a coaling and refitting 
station ; how he bombarded the coast batteries and 
aided in the disembarkation of the Fifth Corps ; 
and how, while attending to these details, and many 
more too numerous to mention, he kept by night 



264 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

and by day a superior force upon the vital point, 
— the mouth of the harbour, — ready to overwhelm 
and crush his enemy the moment he appeared. 
What particularly deserves praise is not that with 
a superior force he won the battle — that was to 
be expected ; but that during more than thirty 
days of weary watching, of tireless efforts, of vigi- 
lance seldom if ever surpassed, he maintained in the 
face of most trying difficulties a preponderating 
force off the mouth of Santiago Harbour, To con- 
centrate upon the vital point a superior force and 
to maintain it there under so many unfavourable 
conditions, ever ready for action, day after day and 
week after week until the battle hour arrived, was a 
military operation worthy of Nelson's genius. " The 
history of the time — now nearly a year — that has 
elapsed since these lines were first written," says 
Captain Mahan, " impels the author, speaking as a 
careful student of the naval operations that have 
illustrated the past two centuries and a half, to 
say that in his judgment no more onerous and im- 
portant duty than the guard off Santiago fell upon 
any officer of the United States during the hostil- 
ities; and that the judgment, energy, and watchful- 
ness with which it was fulfilled by Admiral Sampson 
merits the highest praise. The lack of widely 
diffused popular appreciation of military conditions, 
before referred to in these papers, has been in 
nothing more manifest than in the failure to recog- 
nize generally, and by suitable national reward, 



THE BLOCKADE OE SANTIAGO HARBOUR 265 

both the difficulty of his task, and that the disposi- 
tions maintained by him ensured the impossibiHty 
of Cervera's escaping undetected, as well as the 
success of the action which followed his attempt at 
flight. . . . This it is which constitutes the claim 
of the American Commander-in-chief upon the 
gratitude of his countrymen ; for to his skill and 
tenacity in conducting that operation is primarily 
due the early ending of the war, the opportunity 
to remove our stricken soldiery from a sickly 
climate, the ending of suspense, and the saving of 
many lives." 

Admiral Sampson's objection to detaching two 
battleships and other vessels from his squadron 
and to sending them to the Philippines to reenforce 
Admiral Dewey was, from a strategical point of 
view, well founded. There were several reasons 
why this movement should not have been made. 

First : The battleships could not be spared from 
the blockading line. Not to mention the smaller 
vessels on either side, Sampson had seven vessels 
to oppose Cervera's four. To prevent the escape of 
Cervera and to insure his defeat in case he should 
sail out of the harbour, Sampson's force was none 
too large. " A committee of very distinguished 
British Admirals a few years since," says Captain 
Mahan, " reported that having in view the difficulty 
of the operation in itself, [namely, the blockad- 
ing of an enemy's squadron] and the chances of 
the force detailed falling below the minimuin by 



266 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

accidents, or by absence for coal or refits, British 
naval supremacy, vital to the Empire, demanded 
the number of five British battleships to three of 
the fleet thus to be controlled." 

Had a single armoured vessel of Sampson's 
squadron been sent away, the ratio of his forces 
to those of the enemy would have fallen below the 
ratio which these British officers thought to be 
necessary for success under such conditions. Had 
two of Sampson's battleships been taken away, 
and had the conditions been similar on the day of 
battle to what they actually were on July 3 ; that 
is to say, had one of the remaining five vessels 
been absent coaling, as was the Massachusetts, and 
another so far away as to be able to take hardly 
any part in the fight, as was the case with the Nezv 
York, Sampson would have had only three vessels 
to meet Cervera's four, a ratio which, to say the 
least, would have made the result of the batde 
uncertain. 

But with the blockading line remaining as it was, 
the destruction or capture of Cervera's squadron 
was practically assured. Even if two of Sampson's 
vessels should have been absent on the day of 
battle, as practically was the case, he would still 
have had five vessels to oppose four, a proportion 
which, taken in connection with the fact that the 
vessels of Cervera's squadron would be obliged to 
sail out of the harbour one by one, gave him suffi- 
cient strength to count on almost certain victory. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 267 

If Cervera had escaped as the result of the with- 
drawal of two of the battleships of Sampson's 
squadron, the damage that would have been done 
to the Americans could not have been counter- 
balanced by any good that would have resulted 
from Watson's sailing to the Philippines. As the 
avowed purpose of the war was the expulsion of 
the Spaniards from Cuba, the control of the sea 
in West Indian waters was absolutely essential to 
success. Without such control all the land forces 
and all the resources of the United States would 
have availed nothing. The vital centre of the 
war was in the West Indies. Here the armoured 
strength of the American navy should have been 
concentrated, and here it should have remained 
until the control of the sea was assured. 

Second : The withdrawal of two battleships from 
Sampson's forces would have played into the hands 
of the enemy. As early as June i Admiral Cer- 
vera telegraphed the Minister of Marine at Madrid : 
" To make successful running of blockade possi- 
ble, attempt should be made to draw off armoured 
cruisers Brooklyn and New York." On June 3 the 
Minister of War at Madrid telegraphed Governor- 
General Blanco : " Very serious situation in the 
Philippines compels us to send there ships and 
reenforcements of troops as early as possible. To 
be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila, it 
will be indispensable to send an equally strong 
fleet there. . . . The only thing we can do is to 



268 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can 
get out of Santiago. . . ." On June 9 Admiral 
Cervera, in a telegram to his government giving 
the views of his captains as to the practicability of 
his squadron's sailing out of the harbour, stated 
that Captain Concas of the Teresa \v2lS of the opin- 
ion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, Brooklyn 
or New York, should at any time disappear, the 
sortie should be attempted immediately. On June 
20 Captain-General Blanco telegraphed the Minis- 
ter of War : " Seventy American vessels with land- 
ing corps [are] off Santiago. General Linares states 
if government does not have the means to help 
them by sending a squadron against United States 
coasts, [with the] object to draw off part of the 
United States fleet which attacks them, so that our 
squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from 
Spain [to] run the blockade in cooperation with 
Cervera's sortie, circumstances will take care of 
solving conflict." 

Thus, as the desperateness of the situation in- 
creased, it became more and more apparent to 
the Spanish officials that Cervera's only hope of 
escape was for the Spanish government to make 
some move which would cause the withdrawal of 
a part of Sampson's warships from the blockad- 
ing line. Such was the situation of affairs when 
Camara's squadron was ordered to the Philippines. 
Just what the Spanish authorities had in mind in 
ordering this movement is not definitely known, 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 269 

but undoubtedly one of the objects was to cause 
the Americans to weaken their blockading forces 
off Santiago, and thus give the principal Spanish 
squadron a chance to escape. 

If to this reasoning it be replied that neither 
Admiral Sampson nor the naval authorities in 
Washington knew at this time the contents of 
the above telegrams, the answer is that the very- 
situation of the opposing forces at Santiago was 
sufficient to convince any one that the Spaniards 
were extremely anxious to have a part or all of 
Sampson's vessels withdrawn. 

Third : The destruction of Cervera's squadron 
would have given the American navy absolute 
control of the sea in West Indian waters. Even 
if, regardless of consequences, Camara's squadron, 
which contained but two armoured vessels, had 
been sent to those waters, it would doubtless have 
been at once destroyed, or at any rate it would 
have been absolutely powerless to interfere with 
the movements of American transports. With an 
open sea the United States could have sent any 
number of men to Cuba, and kept them supplied 
with food, clothing, and ammunition. On the 
other hand, the condition of the Spanish armies 
in Cuba and Porto Rico would have been utterly 
hopeless, for armies that lose permanently their 
communications are doomed. Like rudderless 
ships adrift on the ocean, their fate is only a ques- 
tion of time. In order to fight, soldiers must 



270 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

have ammunition, clothing, and food. No greater 
calamity can befall an army than to be cut perma- 
nently from its base of operations and lose its source 
of supply, for in the end this of itself means starva- 
tion and death. It may mean, and often does 
mean, too, death without fighting — death without 
the opportunity of showing courage and patriotism 
amidst the gloom of sanguinary strife. 

It would therefore have been the height of 
folly for Spain to have continued the war after 
Cervera's squadron was destroyed. There was 
much to be lost by persisting in such a course, 
and nothing whatever to be gained, except, per- 
haps, to exhibit to the world some further proofs 
of valour, which could have had no effect on the 
final result. '* The object of military operations 
is final success and not proofs of valour." 

That the destruction of Cervera's squadron 
would end the war was apparent to nearly all 
thoughtful students of strategy. In the early part 
of the blockade, when urging the American gov- 
ernment to hasten the arrival of the land forces in 
order to make Santiago Bay untenable for Cer- 
vera's squadron, Sampson telegraphed, "The de- 
struction of this squadron will end the war." On 
June 7, in a memorandum to his captains setting 
forth the necessity of a close blockade of the port, 
especially at night, Sampson said, "The escape 
of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a 
serious blow to our prestige and to a speedy end 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 2/1 

of the war." And on June 26, after receiving the 
order to send the Oregon, lozva, Ncivark, Yosemite, 
Yankee, and Dixie to the PhiHppines under Ad- 
miral Watson, Sampson informed the Secretary 
of the Navy that the force he then had " insures 
a capture which I beheve will terminate the war." 
"The moment Admiral Cervera's fleet was de- 
stroyed," said the London Times, in its issue of 
August 16, "the war was practically at an end, 
unless Spain had elected to fight on to save the 
point of honour." " Even granting," said Captain 
Victor M. Concas, commander of the armoured 
cruiser Maria Teresa and chief of staff of Cer- 
vera's squadron in the naval battle of Santiago de 
Cuba, " that we had had the rare good fortune of 
forcing our way through, it would have been with 
such injuries and losses that our squadron would 
have been rendered useless for the rest of the 
campaign, which would have ended the war for 
Spain, for the war was the squadron, and nothing 
but the squadron. To suppose, as it was sup- 
posed at that time, that the hostilities could be 
continued after the loss of the ships shows a sad 
lack of knowledge of our military situation and of 
the meaning of modern squadrons." And upon 
this point Commander Jacobsen of the German 
navy wrote as follows : 

" I have information from reliable sources that on 
August 12 the military administration of Havana had pro- 
visions on hand for three months longer, outside of what 



2/2 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

the blockade runners had brought into the country and 
what was hidden away in the houses of the city. One 
can therefore understand the indignation of Captain- 
General Blanco when he heard that the peace protocol 
had been signed. But of what use would have been a 
further resistance on the part of the Spanish garrison? 
The United States only needed to make the blockade 
more rigid. That would necessarily have sealed the fate 
of Havana sooner or later. A fortress in the ocean, cut 
off from its mother country, can be rescued only with the 
assistance of the navy. The enemy who has control of 
the sea need only wait patiently until the ripe fruit drops 
into his lap." 

Though it would have been a great mistake to 
send any of the armoured vessels of Sampson's 
squadron to the Philippines while Cervera's squad- 
ron remained undefeated in the West Indies, it 
was nevertheless good strategy to try to make the 
Spaniards believe that a squadron would be sent 
to Spain; for this threatened movement against 
the commerce and coast cities of the Peninsula 
would have had a powerful effect in causing the 
Spanish people to insist on the return of Camara's 
squadron. 

Though the Navy Department of the United 
States seemed to be particularly anxious that 
Camara's squadron should not continue its voyage 
to the Philippines, there was from a strategical 
point of view no good reason for such anxiety. 
In the first place, this movement, which took 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 273 

from the home waters practically all the remain- 
ing armoured vessels of the Spanish navy, left 
the Americans free to destroy the commerce and 
blockade the seaports of Spain. Secondly, it took 
the squadron still farther away from the strategical 
centre of the war, and henceforth made the pos- 
sibility of Camara's uniting his squadron with 
Cervera's still more remote. Thirdly, in case Cer- 
vera's squadron were destroyed, Camara's squad- 
ron would have been in a most hopeless and 
dangerous situation; for there was little proba- 
bility, in case the war were continued, that the 
squadron would ever have been able to remain 
in the Philippines or to return to Spain without 
encountering an overwhelming force of American 
warships that would have been free to leave West 
Indian waters immediately after the destruction of 
Cervera's squadron. Fourthly, such a movement 
would have been nothing more than a wild-goose 
chase to the other side of the earth for the purpose 
of seeking an enemy v.ho could easily, by a little 
strategical skill, have avoided battle until the fate 
of Cervera's squadron was determined. 

It is due, however, to the Spanish authorities 
to say that this movement was in all probability 
nothing more than a feint — a bluff carried to its 
extreme limit — made for the purpose of causing 
the American naval authorities to withdraw from 
off Santiago a number of Sampson's armoured 
vessels in order to facilitate Cervera's escape ; and 
VOL. I.— 18 



274 ^-^^ CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

though it failed of this purpose, it is very instructive 
to note how near it came to succeeding. That the 
movement failed in this object was due, first, to 
Sampson's well-founded opposition to the plan 
of sending a part of his forces to the Philippines ; 
and, secondly, to the early destruction of Cervera's 
squadron. 

END OF VOL. I. 



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